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MALOTA - AN URBAN SLUM COMPOUND:






The rapid growth of towns in recent decades in
Africa has posed problems of both an academic and a
political nature. In this study two specific problems
associated with the process of urbanization - housing
needs and political participation - provide the focus for
a study of change in Livingstone, Zambia which was carried
out in 1970/1971. Malota, the town's oldest housing area,
has over the last two decades come to be seen as a
squatter area and there have been continual demands for
its demolition. It is thought by many people in the
town to be a separate community; marginal in social,
economic, and political terms and resistant to change.
However, the analysis of data from a variety of sources
over a twenty-year period shows that there have been
major changes in the compound's social composition,
particularly in terms of an increasing social and economic
heterogeneity. It is evident that the compound is, and
always has been, an integral part of the urban system.
Malota is also regarded as politically marginal
with general tendencies to conservatism and traditionalism,
and with an exaggerated emphasis on rural origins and
values. A discussion of two particular institutions -
tribal 'elders' and the local-level leadership of the
ruling political party - suggests that this belief is also
inaccurate. Viewed within the historical development of
Zambian urban politics, the contemporary dominance of
these two institutions by specific ethnic groups can be
seen as the consequence of a series of factors relating
to the distribution of resources in the urban sector. As
a result, it is more appropriate to view the relationship
between tribe and political participation in terms of the
intervening variable of socio-economic status.
Many of Malota's supposed characteristics cannot
be supported by fact. Though it is undoubtedly a slum,
it has been a crucial factor in the town's development,
providing the flexibility needed in periods of rapid
urban growth and a 'legal* alternative to the squatter
areas that surround so many African towns and cities.
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1:1 The Urban Slum
Modern African states have encountered many
problems attendant upon the responsibilities of
independence. Those who achieve power must take over,
for example, the day-to-day role of providing jobs,
housing, and education. The problems that this presents
are exaggerated by the fact that independence is seen by
many as a major breakthrough at which exploitation will
cease and a higher standard of living will become the
prerogative of all members of society. Such promises
will almost certainly have been stressed by the politi¬
cians who were responsible for bringing about indepen¬
dence. In the years after independence, many people
arrive in the towns and cities hoping to participate in
this new prosperity. Few newly independent states can
cope easily with this insurgence and problems of housing
and unemployment get steadily, in some cases rapidly,
worse.
One of the most visible symbols of such problems
are the slums and 'squatter* areas that often surround
the larger cities. Bates comments that! "As any visitor
to Zambia over the last several years would surely have
noticed, shantytowns have burgeoned around the major
•i
urban centers." The term 'shantytown' can cover a
number of phenomena - legal slum, unauthorised housing
area, or squatter settlement - for it refers primarily
to the physical layout, construction, and appearance of
a housing area rather than to any social or sociological
characteristics. But they have one thing in common in
that they are taken by administrators, planners, and
politicians (as well as many other urban-dwellers) to
constitute a 'problem' needing a solution. Generally
speaking, such areas are believed to be repositories of
all that is bad in urban life. They are thought to be
focal points for crime and delinquency, dirt and disease,
chaos and disorder. They are not seen as an integral
part of the urban environment but something that is
uninvited, unnecessary, and above all, unfortunate. The
people who live there are, more often than not, believed
to be unemployed 'loafers' who would be better off back
in their rural villages.
This then is the general image of Africa's urban
slums. It is only recently that observers have tried to
look further and find the "intrinsic logic of the process
2
of unplanned urban settlement." Such work tries to avoid
a stereotype of slum settlements that assumes them to be





populations as 'out-groups' which are excluded from the
conventional housing sector. One of the inadequacies
of conventional research has been the tendency to view
the legal component (primarily the title to land) and
the material component (the haphazard and non-standard¬
ised nature of building) as major determinants which
differentiate slums from the overall process of urban
settlement. These undeniable differences have subse¬
quently led many observers to make the assumption (in
line with public opinion) that slum-dwellers are a
separate type of urban person with different social,
economic, and political characteristics. Little attempt
has been made to use the needs and motives of the urban
settler as a basis for the differentiation of the settle¬
ment process.
The squatter has become the focus of much
attention in recent years. Squatter areas are conven¬
tionally distinguished from other housing areas by
reference to the populations' lack of legal title to the
land on which their housing is situated. 40^ of Zambia's
urban population is thought to be living in squatter
areas, which are regarded primarily as a response to
post-independence housing shortages that have arisen as a
result of the rapid growth of towns. They are also
believed to house concentrations of first-time migrants
Much of this work originated in Lation America
and owes a great deal to the ideas of the architect John
Turner. See, for example, Turner (1969) in Breese (1969);
Turner and Mangin (1968) in Oliver (197Q; Leeds (1969);
Brett (1974).
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(often unmarried or unaccompanied) who are looking for
work. For this reason it is believed that they contri¬
bute little to the well-being of a town. Quite the
opposite, they are a substantial drain on limited
resources and, ultimately, a threat to the security of
the wider urban population.
However, recent research is beginning to show
that many of these beliefs are inaccurate and that it is
possible to view the squatter or slum-dweller from a very
different perspective. As a result it is argued increas¬
ingly that "squatter areas rather than constituting a
♦problem' olay an essential part in the process of
-i
urbanisation", and that it is not their illegality, but
the "uncontrolled and seemingly uncontrollable urban
expansion" that they represent, that makes them of such
2
concern to outsiders. The existence of slums dramati¬
cally highlights the inability of governments to change
quickly enough, and the squatter or slum-dweller has
become the unfortunate symbol of the gap between the
theory and practice of development and modernisation.
Slums are regarded as highly undesirable, not simply
because of the effect that they have on those who populate
them, but because they contradict the promises and
expectations of political change.
The problem then is not one of slums per se, but






groups of people cope with the effects of rapid urban¬
ization. Nor is it just a recent oroblem. Despite the
belief that the colonial administration kept a tight hold
on housing matters, the growth (frequently rapid) of
towns throughout the whole of this century has meant that
unauthorised housing areas and squatters have been a
permanent feature of Zambia's towns. The population of
any urban area is widely varied in terms of various
factors such as background, education, level of income,
and so on. As a result, the town must cater for a wide
range of tastes, needs, resources, and ambitions. As we
shall see in later chapters, this is frequently not
possible. Instead the population must develop its own
framework within which this can be done. This may take a
variety of forms from overcrowding to squatter settlement.
Though this may be a source of embarrassment to govern¬
ments and municipal authorities, it is frequently an
essential adaptation on the part of the urban population
without which the town could not function properly. This
is the built-in contradiction, for the areas are both
unacceptable and unavoidable.
This study focuses on a particular housing
situation in Livingstone, Zambia where the population has
a legal right to tenure, but which is regarded by the
administration and the rest of the town as a squatter
compound. It is widely believed that the compound, known
A
The term 'compound' is used in the Central and
Southern African sense to refer to a housing area,
location, or estate.
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as MALOTA, degrades the status of the town and prevents
it from becoming a modern city. Consequently, there have
been continuing demands for its demolition. Perhaps
because of this, the compound is often seen as a totally
separate community within the town and to many people it
is'a village in the town'. On the other hand, it was
probably the first compound to be built in Northern
Rhodesia by the incoming settlers and it has survived
in much the same form for over 60 years. Its population
is thought to contain some of the town's original
inhabitants and it is known that there are a large number
of long-term residents. In this sense it is very
definitely urban. Nor is it isolated from the rest of
Livingstone. Many of the compound's inhabitants work
elsewhere In the town, and most of the facilities for
leisure, worship and trade are outside the compound's
boundaries. As a result, very few people live totally
within its confines. Despite its history and appearance,
therefore, I have not assumed that Malota is a community
in any sociological sense, but have preferred to follow
Leeds in viewing it as a 'locality1 - a sensorily
distinct locus of settlement which comprises a node of
1
interactions. If the population of Malota should
comprise "a big family", or "feel a spirit of oneness"
as a Livingstone Municipal Council report recently
2




Municipal Council of Livingstone (1971)
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Malota does not fit easily into any of the
conventional categories of urban housing. It is an
official municipal housing area which bears great
similarities to the 'site-and-service' schemes of the
post-independence era and also the colonial 'townships'
of the 19^0s and 1950s. Yet at the same time it is
believed to be a squatter compound. It has in its long
history experienced a number of changes as the housing
policies and resources of the various administrations
have changed. Similarly, it has been influenced by the
varying changes of fortune that the town has experienced.
In recent years it has virtually doubled its population.
By studying the development of the compound and its
population throughout its history, I hope to be able to
explore the more general patterns of urban growth
throughout the country over a period of time. A
housing area and its population are not isolated, and
the nature (indeed the very existence) of Malota is
necessarily related to a whole range of factors at
different levels.
1:2 Urbanization and Migration in Central Africa
The study of urban areas in Central and Southern
Africa has been primarily the study of the growth and
development of towns, more specifically the process of
urbanization. This was inevitable in a region where at
the beginning of the century there were no towns as such,
and where subsequent growth has been, by any standards,
7
•1
unusual. The study of this "very complex" and "elusive"
phenomenon has been the focus of much debate. The
concept of 'urbanization* is intended to have some sort
of universal applicability and its breadth means that it
encompasses, subsumes, or is connected with, a number of
other concepts such as *Westernization*, industriali-
2
zation, stabilization and 'detribalization'. The
interdisciplinary nature of the concept (and the fact
that it has often been used outside of the social
sciences) means that it has too often been used as a
catch-all phrase for virtually all urban social
phenomena.
Many of the difficulties arise from the initial
problem of defining the exact meaning of 'urban'. The
wide range of available definitions has led some writers
to suggest that a common-sense approach be employed.
Southall, however, has argued that "it is doubtful
whether such an amateur view is adequate when anthro¬
pologists attempt, as they must, to work towards valid
generalizations over wide ranges of time and space.
At the other end of the spectrum, it is argued that the
terms 'town' and 'townsman* are, structurally, virtually
meaningless because they must be defined "by reference to
4









There have also been a number of attempts to express it
in quantitative terms. Knoop, for example, claims that:
For Wirth, and a growing number of sociologists
following his lead, the formal criteria of a
scientific definition of the urban community are
satisfactorily met by a definition in terms of its
demographic uniqueness in terms of three major
demographic variables: absolute numbers of
population in a permanently settled area, density
of the settlement, and heterogeneity of the
population. These in turn generate "urbanism", a
mode of existence or way of life characteristic of
the urban community.'
A series of attempts have been made to provide simple,
quantitative measures based on arbitrary numerical
dichotomies of urban and rural populations. However,
they are inevitably restricted if used by themselves and
many social scientists, certainly most social anthro¬
pologists, would argue that other social, economic and
cultural factors are the essential dimensions of the
process of urbanization. Southall argues that any
definition of urban life "must essentially concentrate
upon the high spatial density of social interactions,
rather than the mere physical density of bodies or
2 ^
buildings." He, like Plotnicov , believes that it
should be the objective of anthropologists to deal with
the qualitative aspects of the urbanization process.
Little attempts to provide a more operational framework







phrase as 'urban population growth' for 'urbanization*
except where questions of social process are specifi-
1
cally involved."
In these terms, urbanization is the specifically
sociological aspect of the process of urban development
and grovrth. Y/hat is not necessarily made clear, however,
is the level of analysis that is involved. There is
frequently no clear distinction between the urbanization
of a continent, a nation-state, a village, or an
individual (or group of individuals). Thus we can talk
about how 'Africa has become rapidly urbanized' or how a
particular individual has become 'permanently urbanized'.
Though these are undoubtedly connected, analytically they
involve the discussion of quite different combinations of
factors. The result of this has been, according to
Banton, the development of a broad contrast between two
general schools of thought. One, exemplified by much of
the research done on the Zambian Copperbelt, "focuses
upon interpersonal relations and tries to build upwards
to a model of the society"; the other, which he terns the
♦Durkheim-Southall' approach "works downward from a
2
nacrosociological starting point". It is, Southall has
claimed more recently, the specific job of urban anthro¬








It is clear that the study of urban behaviour is
surrounded by a variety of debates involving a number of
oppositions - urban/rural, demographic/sociological,
roicrosocial/macrosocial, institution/individual, and so
on. All have been abstracted from the available data in
order to make analysis and the construction of general¬
ised propositions feasible. Though a necessary part of
the research process, it has tended to lead to a series
of sharply dichotomised and over-simplified categories
which cannot convey the complexity, or the dynamics, of
urban life.
The increase in urban-based African research in
the years after World War II highlighted the dilemmas
that the structural-functionalists faced when studying
social change. Researchers were now continually faced
with situations that exacerbated a sociological tendency
to contrast order and change. The decline of colonialism,
and the emergence of newly independent states throughout
the continent, promoted a picture of rapid, and frequently
chaotic, change. The existence of such radical changes
was in dramatic contrast to the anthropologists' view of
traditional African societies in which significant
elements were a lack of development and an emphasis on
harmony and continuity. Such a framework is centred on
the idea of the equilibrium of the system, and the
initial reaction of social anthropologists v/as to try and
incorporate change into this framework. As a result,
11
1
changes were seen in terms of a "moving equilibrium" or
2
a "succession of different social equilibria". Even in
urban areas, where change was very evident, social life
continued to be regarded as a series of temporary equil¬
ibria connected by a number of crises, the origins of
which lay in the "external stimuli making for social
change". Social change was therefore seen as something
that impinged on ♦normal* social life.
In the towns social anthropologists were faced
with situations that were radically different from any¬
thing that their existing analytical framework and
methodology could have prepared them for. It says some¬
thing for the structural-functional approach that it
could, initially at least, be adapted to this changed,
and changing, situation. The early emphasis in urban
studies was summarised by Epstein who wrote:
The persistence in the towns of tribal customs and
values, the abandonment or modification and adap¬
tation of others, and the emergence of specifically
urban customs, usages and attitudes raise complex
problems •••• They raise questions about social and
cultural change, and the relationship between them.
It was in fact the emergence of these problems
rather than the nature of urban society itself which
first drew the attention of anthropologists to the
tov/ns of Africa.^
In this way the study of urban life was seen as a means
of delimiting the complex material on change, with the





Epstein (1S61) in Mitchell (1969:115-116)
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city itself providing a relatively easily recognisable
and circumscribed 'system' within which the study of the
1
general processes of change could be concentrated.
However, it quickly became apparent to some of
those working in urban areas that urban life had a logic
of its own, and could not simply be viewed in terms of
the original rural systems of its participants. The
individual came to be seen in terms of his urban environ¬
ment rather than as a rural person who was losing, to a
greater or lesser degree, his rural (or tribal) customs
and values. This approach, used most notably in the
2
context of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, was to
bring about a significant change of emphasis. Urban life
could now be seen more frequently in terms of the ways in
which individuals moving into towns developed, adapted,
and manipulated their roles within the urban context.
The concern of the researcher was no longer with what the
individual lost in relation to his pre-change situation,
but with his relationship to the new situation. As such,
urban behaviour was seen in terms of the "on-going nature
of urban institutions and the continuities of the urban
3
•social field'." Thus urban life was seen as a separate
-i
This approach was centred on the 'culture
contact' school of thought e.g. Mair (1938); Fortes (19^9);
Hunter (1961), and was first used in a specifically urban
situation in Hellman's (19^8) study of a Johannesburg
slum yard.
Particularly Mitchell (1956a) and Epstein (1958).
An early summary of the approach and its theoretical
underpinnings is given in Gluckman (1961).
J Harries-Jones (1969:297)
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system in contrast to rural life, in itself a system. In
a changing society these systems may run in parallel to
each other without attendant chaos and disorder. This
•alternation model* separates off two kinds of systems
and two kinds of change which can be studied closely by
observing the migrant who, in moving from one system to
the other, is forced to change roles and thus must carry
around, as it were, different sets of attitudes which may
be used when situationally appropriate. This acceptance
of the situational nature of human behaviour was an
2
important development in urban studies, but in some ways
it served to promote and exaggerate an over-rigid dichotomy
between urban and rural life. The effect, if not the
intent, was to allow the individual migrant to •parti¬
cipate' analytically in two separate systems of a very
different nature without any apparent signs of conflict.
The concept of situational change allowed the individual's
involvement in the larger historical changes to be
passive, moving as he did from one set of institutions
and values to another with ease. The result of this,
claims Phillip Mayer, was that Mitchell and Epstein
presented "a static and schizoid picture of the migrant's
social personality."^




This is discussed in general terms in




short period of time, from nothing, and they are still
growing. Like most African urban populations, they are
"both unstable and continuously adding to their numbers,
principally through immigration." Gluckman and his
colleagues were working in a specific economic and
political situation and this affected not only the type
of data that they produced but also the concepts and
models they developed in order to analyse them. As we
shall see in later chapters, the Northern Rhodesian
colonial administration insisted for many years on
viewing the urban worker as soneone who was a 'temporary*
inhabitant, and policies were directed at ensuring that
the African urban population remained in very close
contact with their rural origins. This was done by the
deliberate promotion of short-term circulatory migration
between rural and urban areas, and by tying the available
urban housing to wage employment. Though this began to
change in the late 1940s, with an increasing emphasis
on the stabilisation of the urban population in the




Wilson (1941:46-7) attempted to define the
population of Broken Hill (now Kabwe) in terms of their
migratory patterns. A 'peasant visitor' had spent less
than one-third of his time since first leaving his rural
home in towns; a'migrant labourer* between one-third and
two-thirds; and the 'temporarily urbanized' over two-
tMrds, but not all. It was his argument that, in Broken




this dominant pattern of the circulation of migrants.
This pattern was characteristic of almost all of Southern
and Central Africa, and was brought about by the indus¬
trial/employment structure instigated by the settlers
(and in particular the mining companies) who gave the
migrants few options. It is Garbett's argument that
circulatory migration has been
most persistent ... where it is in the political and
economic interest of a dominant section of the popu¬
lation to maintain a high degree of residential and
social segregation, to control the allocation of
political rights, and hence, to influence wage rates
and the flow of migration.2
Subsequent political and economic changes have greatly
•3
affected this pattern of circulatory migration, but the
development of urban research has continued, to some
extent, to be based on these early influences.
Circulatory migration between town and country is
only one of a number of possible patterns of migration.
4
Seymour, for example, breaks up urban migrants into
three basic categories: those born in rural areas who
migrate to town; those who undergo periodic residential
mobility whether it be inter- or intra- urban; and those
who "maintain ties with a rural home to which they intend
1
Seymour (1976:57); Garbett (1975)
2
Garbett (1975:113)
J Parkin (1975:9-10) concludes that it still
persists but that its composition and intensity have
altered and that it is mainly to be found amongst the
unemployed job-seekers.
h.




eventually to return." A good deal of debate has
centred upon the relative importance of economic and
'extra-economic' factors in the determination of migra¬
tory patterns. Some would argue that this is a futile
exercise. Amin, for example, comments that "the survey
of motivations, by which some sociologists believe they
can separate economic from extra-economic motivations,
is in reality useless because the economic reason is
there in every case and its ideological guise is equally
2
general." But, though few would argue that economic
factors are not important determinants of migration,
there are many who would insist that we view the
'social', 'cultural', or 'ideological' aspects of migra¬
tion as analytically separable from,though interconnected
with, these economic determinants. The different models
that have been developed to explain patterns of migration
reflect this debate, as do their inadequacies. The
'rational choice/maximization' model, for example, is
borrowed from economists and, through its heavy emphasis
"5
on wages and incomes, is unable to explain why people
continue to circulate and also has great difficulty in
explaining the variations between individual patterns and
careers. Similar problems are encountered in 'push-pull'






For example, see Harris and Todaro (1970)
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individuals being 'pushed' from rural areas because of
the limitations of their socio-economic environment, and
•pulled' into town by the various attractions supposedly
to be found there.
These models tend to see the actions of migrants
as essentially passive, something over which they have
no control or choice. But though these forces undoubt¬
edly exist, they should rather be seen as a bias or
constraint on, not a simple determinant of, migrant
behaviour. In deciding to move into, remain in, leave,
or return to, an urban area, the individual is subjected
to a variety of constraints at different levels. To
understand the impact of these constraints on individual
decision-making processes, Garbett proposes a model of
2
circulatory migration which tries by linking "the concept
of an individual exercising strategic choices in the
pursuit of multiple alternatives to the concepts of
social network, field, and the emergent properties of
systems" to bridge the gap between the various levels of
analysis and, in doing so, avoid "the often marked
dichotomy between 'actor-oriented' and 'institutional'
types of analysis." In doing this, he is searching for
" .dy
•1
For a critical review of various such models
that have been developed, see Garbett & Kapferer (1970).
r
Which he says (1975:125) could, "also be applied






a flexibility that has eluded many earlier researchers.
The migrant, and the process of migrancy, form the basis
of the growth of most African towns and an understanding
of the factors influencing the process is essential if we
are to better understand the nature of urbanization.
Additionally, the migrant enables us to see urban life in
a wider perspective for, as Garbett points out, "in
considering the alternatives confronting a migrant we
have to be aware of the dynamics of the social field,
spanning both rural and urban contexts, in which the
migrant is involved." In using the concept of 'field1,
he is attempting to remove the burden of analysis from
the urban system per se. It is only too apparent that
"the process and Impact of urbanization in Africa as
elsewhere extends far beyond the physical bounds of the
2
city." Our analysis of urban life must be equally
capable of moving beyond the superficial physical and
demographic boundaries of the town or city. In the same
way, we must also avoid seeing urban areas as undiffer¬
entiated wholes existing in stark contrast to their rural
surrounds. As Little points out, it is not the town
itself, but the system encompassing it, that must provide








1:3 The Study of a Slum Compound
One of the major problems of studying the growth
and development of urban areas is determining a unit of
study that will provide conclusions that are more than
specific in nature. It is this problem that makes
statistics, which are relatively comprehensive and
comparable, such an attractive proposition wrhen it comes
to defining and describing urban life. The search for a
representative town or compound is a futile (and possibly
dangerous) task. Each has its own unique characteristics.
It is in the origin of the differences that we must seek
to find the generalities. Malota is not like any other
compound within Livingstone. It is, and always has been,
an option open to all Africans arriving in Livingstone.
People who moved there chose to do so rather than
deciding upon some other possibility. If, therefore we
can determine what brought, and still brings, people to
live there, we will discover facts about the other options
that are available. If we do this over a period of time
we will be able to determine what factors have caused the
various options to become available.
Malota is a particularly valuable subject for
•i
study because it allows us this time perspective. In
particular I have concentrated on the period 1952-1971
for which there is detailed and comparative statistical
■i
Gutkind points out that most African urban
studies have been almost wholly synchronic and argues that
we need more diachronic studies "whereby we keep under
observation the older and the newer African towns and
townships over a considerable period of time." (1969:266)
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data from a number of sources. The distinction between
the demographic and sociological aspects of urban life is
an artificial one created by the way in which we abstract
and present our data. Demographic variables cannot, as
Knoop rather bizarrely suggested earlier, 'generate'
urbanism. Both are alternative ways of describing the
same reality. Demographic figures such as sex ratios,
population size, ethnic heterogeneity, or age structure
emerge from the decisions and actions of many people who
are constrained by a series of social, economic, and
political factors, past and present, urban and rural.
Social composition is therefore an "emergent property
from an ongoing social process" and the presentation of
demographic characteristics is not separate from (nor
interchangeable with) sociological analysis but an
integral and dynamic part of it.
The available demographic data covers a period of
enormous change and expansion in Zambian urban areas and,
most importantly, involves that phase during which inde¬
pendence was achieved. I have thus been able to consider
the compound in both the pre- and post-independence eras.
The main sources of data on Malota are three surveys
carried out in 1952, 1961 and 1971. McCulloch's detailed
statistical survey of Livingstone in late 1952 and early
2 3






Referred to by McCulloch as the "Grass Compound".
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but also allows comparisons with other compounds and the
town as a whole. Nearly ten years later, a study of
Malota was carried out by a member of staff of the then
<1
Rhodes-Livingstone Museum. Though only a preliminary
report was ever prepared, it provides interesting data of
both an historical and a demographic nature. Finally,
the Municipal Council of Livingstone carried out its own
100# sample survey of the compound in 1971. This was in
response to a number of demands for action in relation to
the compound, a matter which had become an increasingly
2
sensitive political issue. I later gained direct access
to the information collected in this survey, and though
the official report was of limited value I was provided
with the individual household returns from which I have
been able to rework the data in terms of the specific
objectives of this study.
My own field work was carried out between October
L
1970 and August 1971. Originally centred on the study of
'tribal elders' on the compound, and later extended to
encompass officials of the United National Independence
Party (UNIP), it also involved the collection of detailed




Times of Zambia, 24/1/1971; 3/3/1971.
■5
In the remainder of the study I will refer to
the official report as '1971 Municipal Survey', and to
information from the individual returns as '1971 Municipal
Survey Household Returns'.
4
When it was prematurely terminated for reasons
outside of my control
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interviews, and a questionnaire submitted to the
•landlords' of the compound's plots. This latter
activity was unfortunately halted because the Municipal
Council wished to carry out their own survey. The small
sample that I was able to collect (Just under 5%) was
statistically inadequate, but I have used the information
gathered (cross-checked with personal observation and
information from the 1971 Municipal Survey Household
Returns) where I have felt that it served a useful
purpose.
The study is basically broken down into three
sections though they are highly interconnected. By
considering certain aspects of life in a particular,
restricted, urban situation, I hope to be able to draw
out a number of general features related to the develop¬
ment of urban areas in Zambia, and in particular the
complex two-way relationship that exists between the
population of a specific housing area and the wider
environment.
The first section looks in some detail at urban
development in the country from the beginning of the
century. An attempt is made to elicit those factors that
were responsible for the different and changing attitudes
of the policy makers and administrators. In this way we
are able to determine the constraints placed on urban
dwellers and migrants, the limitations on the options
available to them, and how they changed as various
political and economic factors altered. In doing this,
23
we will be able to see how the type of housing available
to the urban population varied over time.
The second section is devoted to a detailed study
of the development of Malota within this historical
framework, and in particular the way in which the social
composition has changed over the last twenty years.
Starting from the assumptions that "population changes
provide a reflection of social change", and that the
social composition of the compound can be viewed as
"emergent from a set of individual choices and decisions
2
subject to a variety of constraints", four specific
demographic variables - sex ratio, plot composition, age
distribution, and occupational patterns - are looked at
over this period of time, and also compared with other
housing areas in the town and in the rest of urban
Zambia. In order to give substance to the general,
abstracted conclusions thus obtained, I then look at the
social composition of twenty individual plots on the
compound in order to show how individual resources,
career patterns, and socio-economic backgrounds are
interwoven with a series of constraints at different
levels to provide a wide variety of patterns and alter¬
natives. In this way I hope to show that slum life can







are by no means the "rural outcasts and urban misfits"
that they are often assumed to be.
The most obvious change in urban Zambia is the
political one - the movement from colonial protectorate
to independent republic. The final section of the study
concentrates on two aspects of political activity on
Malota - the apparent retention of a colonial insti¬
tution, tribal elders; and the section officials of the
ruling political party. Though these two 'institutions'
apparently represent the opposite ends of the political
spectrum, contrasting the modern and the traditional,
tiie formal and the informal, and the strong and the weak,
they share a common feature in that they are both domin¬
ated by particular tribal groups. The apparent signif¬
icance of this was emphasised by the fact that, at this
point in time, it was generally believed that Zambia was
being torn apart by 'tribalism'. By a careful study of
the participants in these two forms of political
activity, I hope to show that this 'tribalism' is a
consequence of a combination of other factors which are
centred on the relationship between Malota and
Livingstone, and between Livingstone and the rest of
Zambia, and which are related to socio-economic divisions
within the urban situation rather than to ethnic
divisions which originated in the rural areas.
The purpose throughout the study therefore is to




in Livingstone, changes in the political and economic
structure caused by the advent of independence can be
related to changes in the social organisation and values
of the population. Thus, for example, I will try to show
how changes in attitudes of those in authority towards
housing brought about changes in the compound's social
composition and how this, in turn, affected its
political development. At the same time I have tried to
avoid the assumption that changes within the compound
can only be a consequence of independence by trying to
trace the relationships between a number of factors that
bring about the decisions of individuals to live on
Malota, and not elsewhere. Thus the structural framework
is seen as imposing a number of constraints within which




URBAN ZAMBIA; 1900 - 1950
2:1 Introduction v
At the very South-Western tip of Zambia lies a
hill from which a man is able to see the boundaries of
four countries simultaneously. Looking over Zambia's own
border and out across the Zambezi river he finds the
heavily guarded border of Rhodesia, the short stretch of
Botswana's Northern borders, and to the West the deserted
Caprivi strip leading into South-African-controlled
Namibia. This view summarises Zambia's geographical
position for, surrounded by eight other countries, it is
a land-locked 'island' in the centre of the African
continent (See Map 1). Covering an area of over 290,000
square miles - three times the size of the United
Kingdom - it has a population of only just over four
1
million. However, a large proportion of Zambia's
inhabitants live in urban areas compared with other
2
African countries. This urban population is almost
■i
Republic of Zambia. Census of Population and
Housing: 1969. First Report, p.A2
Jackman (1973:12). Heisler (1974:32) shows that
the proportion increased from 18% in 1963 to 30% in 1969.
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MAP It ZAMBIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS
Source * Davies (1971J11)
28
totally concentrated In the towns that lie on the
Copperbelt in the North-West and along the line of the
railway that runs down from this area to the capital,
Lusaka and then on to the Southernmost town, Livingstone,
■i
where it crosses into Rhodesia. Yet at the turn of the
century, there were no urban areas of any sort in the
Territory.
Some sort of administrative framework for the
area had first been set up in the decade between 1889
and 1899, with the British South Africa Company playing
2
a dominant role. For many years, however, the Company
showed little further interest preferring to concentrate
its activities South of the Zambezi. Nor were the
area's mineral resources to be immediately exploited for
they were overshadowed by the easily worked 15% copper
ore which had been discovered to the North in Katanga,
and which was the object of very large investment by
Belgian mining interests. For a number of years the
Territory was treated as little more than a border out¬
post, and long-term development was primarily seen in
terms of the area's relationship to its Southern
neighbours. Indeed its major value at first was the
ability to provide large supplies of cheap labour for
4
The railway line was closed at the Zambian-
Rhodesian border in 1973.
2
In 1889 and 1890 Orders-In-Council were issued
which divided the area into North-Western and North-
Eastern Rhodesia and placed the administration of the
territory firmly in the hands of the company. For a
detailed look at the complexities of the country's
establishment, see Gann (1958; 1964)
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other countries. The amalgamation of Northern and
Southern Rhodesia was to become an increasingly popular
idea amongst the administrators, though not with the
settlers themselves who thought that they would be "left
2
to the mercy of a bunch of junior officials." The
effect of these attitudes was that little attention was
paid to the North and it was to be over a quarter of a
century before what are now Zambia's largest cities and
towns became anything more than villages, or even bush.
2:2 The Beginnings of Urban Life
It has always been a popular pastime for urban
sociologists to consider the questions of when a village
becomes a town, or a town becomes a city. In fact, most
cities have very humble beginnings and, administrative
nomenclature apart, develop from one level to another over
x
a period of time. We do not have to look far back in
the history of any country to find small collections of
huts, shacks, or even tents, that have since become large
cities. The original functions may quickly be replaced,
or even forgotten, but these origins are an integral part
of their development and can provide important clues to
According to Berger (1974I12):
"In 1928 the total number of Northern Rhodesians
employed in Southern Rhodesia was 21,334, and
recruitment that year was more than 4,000 men ....
Some 10,500 Northern Rhodesian workers were esti¬
mated to be in Katanga in 1929.
2 Gann (1964:175)
x
There are of course exceptions to this, the
most spectacular being the building of new capitals.
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the pattern and nature of a town's subsequent history.
At the beginning of the century Fort Jameson (now
called Chipata) was the administrative headquarters of
the British South Africa Company in North-Eastern
Rhodesia, with Kalomo as its equivalent in the North-Vest,
All of the first towns in Northern Rhodesia started out
with some specific function such as territorial admini¬
stration or trading. The very first, later to be called
Livingstone, was a small community of traders and
missionaries situated at a spot on the banks of the
Zambezi known as the 'old Drift', Described by Gann as
"a hot, steamy and miserable little place where malaria
and blackwater fever were a constant menace to health and
life", it was little more than a frontier post. Changes
began to occur when the railway from Bulawayo in Southern
Rhodesia finally reached and crossed the Zambezi at the
Victoria Falls in 1904,~ The Company quickly saw the
potential of this new situation and decided to set up the
new town of Livingstone at a point about seven miles from
the 'Old Drift'. This was an unpopular move with the
inhabitants despite the obvious advantages (both in terms
of the commercial potential and the healthier environment)
but when the stands went cn sale in 1905 they were
quickly taken up and the town began to prosper. The




The Falls are now more frequently known, in
Zambia at least, by their Kololo name — Mosi-Oa-Tunya
(The smoke that roars).
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bining their commercial and administrative centres and,
in 1907, Livingstone replaced Kalomo as the 'capital' of
■1
the North-Western territory. The town's importance was
derived from its position as a gateway into and out of
Northern Rhodesia for the country's major resource at
the time - people. It was the main point of exit for
those Africans moving to the labour markets of the
South, and the main point of entry for Europeans who were
beginning to move into the country.
These developments stimulated further important
changes in the town. The country's only newspaper, the
Livingstone Mail, was established there with the result
that whatever political activity there was amongst the
Europeans tended to be based there.'" In 1911 a further
logical step was taken when North-Western and North-
Eastern Rhodesia were combined and Livingstone became
the joint capital of the territory. Though at this stage
less than 5% of the population lived within twenty miles
of the line-of-rail,3 the decision to place the capital
at Livingstone pointed to the fact that the country's
centre of gravity was to be firmly centred around the
A
y
However, it was, as Gann (1964;140) records,
still little more than a village with a population in
1910 of just 277 Europeans (191 men, 49 women, and 37
children). It did however have running water, electricity
and a cold storage plant.
2
The importance of the Livingstone Mail in the
development of the town and the country is further
discussed in Gann (1964) and Allen (1972).
3 Heisler (1974:14).
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railway which had reached the Congo in 1909. The
improvements in communications meant that the country
could effectively be run from one place, and Living¬
stone's proximity to Southern Rhodesia made it easily the
-j
most suitable centre.
The next decade was to bring the idea of amalga¬
mation with Southern Rhodesia to a peak and Livingstone's
future began to look insecure, for such a move would
inevitably make Salisbury the joint capital. As a result,
industrial development remained at a very low level, both
in the town and throughout the country as a whole, until
2
the late 1920s. However, the Company's wish to amalga¬
mate was thwarted and their interest in controlling
Northern Rhodesia declined as their administrative
deficit increased. Eventually it was agreed that the
British Government should take over administrative
control and a Governor was installed in Livingstone,
which was confirmed as the capital.^ This was in 1924
and it led to a commercial boom in the town with a good
Gelfand (1961:179) shows that, even at this
stage, there were less than 1500 Europeans living in
Northern Rhodesia, of which 83% were located in the
North-Western sector.
2 ^
The 1941 Government Report on the Copperbelt
Disturbances commented that, until about 1926, "a native
who wished to earn a wage in excess of something very low
indeed - say 5s. a month with food - had to seek work out¬
side the territory."
Gann (1964:191) summarises the agreement as
follows:
"As far as Northern Rhodesia was concerned, the
Imperial Government promised to relieve the Company
of the Administration of the Territory as from April
1, 1924."
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deal of money being invested. It was not long, however,
before further developments began to overtake the town.
The discovery of copper, and the first serious attempts
to exploit it, were to transform the country.
Copper had been mined in this area long before the
European settlers arrived, possibly several hundred years.
During the 1890s some preliminary exploration was carried
out, and a few small mines were opened. But, dominated
by Katanga copper, the industry lay virtually dormant
until the 1920s when world copper prices began to rise.
At this stage, a good deal of money was Invested, and by
1927 a number of major projects were on hand and copper
was well on the way to becoming Northern Rhodesia's
economic base. It was not long before the Copperbelt's
potential significance became abundantly clear, and the
disadvantages of Livingstone as the base for government
were pointed out. In 1929
the problem arose whether the Administration should
spend any more money on a township where even the
highest in the land were living in appalling
conditions .... Then there was the future to be
considered. Livingstone lay right on the edge of
the Territory, far away from the agricultural
districts North of the Kafue, or from the Copperbelt;
the township would never become a road junction, and
no branch lines were ever likely to start from
there .... In 1929 Anglo-American, Rhodesian Selection
Trust, as well as three Unofficial Members addressed
a memorandum to Government, in which they emphasised
that economic developmexit would centre beyond the
Kafue, that the capital should be nearer to resident
communities having permanent business with
1
For further details of the town's early days
see Phillipson (1975)
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Government, and that local foodstuffs were
inadequate at Livingstone where the climate was
badJ
Despite furious protests from the local population, this
soon became the generally accepted attitude and in 1931 it
was decided to move the capital to Lusaka. Originally
nothing more than a railway siding, it had been made a
township in 1913, and had developed into a minor
p
marketing centre. * Its location as a capital was seen
as desirable because it was near, but not actually on,
the Copperbelt. Ironically, the planner of Lusaka
prophesied that it would never be great or important
city, but. saw it simply as an administrative centre.
Just how low the level of urban development was at this
point in time is summarised by Jackman who, basing her
figures on a population map of south-east Central Africa
5
drawn up by Baker and White, remarks that there were
no concentrations along the railway, in fact the
northern line-of-rail appears to have teen very
sparsely populated. The Copperbelt was taken to
warrant only one dot (5000 people) placed on Ndola;
slightly more people were placed around Kabwe, but
the heavier concentrations were along the southern
'
Gann (1964s257-58). Anglo-American and
Rhodesian Selection Trust were the major mining
interests in the Copperbelt development,
2
Development Planning and Research Unit,
Lusaka (1972:1).
3
The development plan that was drawn up
envisaged a town based on spacious garden city prin¬
ciples with provision made for a population, of 10,000
made up of half Europeans and half Africans.
4
Gann (1964:259).
^ Baker and White (1946)
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line-of-rail near Mazebuka and Choma. Lusaka was
not even mentioned in the description.1
The late 1920s were to be the take-off point both for the
copper industry and for the process of urbanization in
Northern Rhodesia. Fifteen years later, copper produc¬
tion would have risen twenty-fold and the African popu¬
lation in towns would be almost five times as great. This
was to be a very different situation from the first
quarter of the century when the little urban development
that did occur had been very closely related to the needs
of the colonial administration, and had been physically
linked to the railway system,
2:5 The Urban Population
In this brief summary of the origins of Zambia's
urban areas, the emphasis has been very much on the
European population. Though the towns were set up by the
settlers, to satisfy their own needs, they were of course
very dependent on a sizeable African population to carry
2
out certain tasks. By 1931, for example, it was esti¬
mated that Livingstone had an African population of 2100




In 192b the European population was still less
than 6000 and constituted less than a half per cent of
the total.
' Coulter (1967i84). The figure for Livingstone
seems to me to be very inaccurate, but as it is certainly
an underestimation the point remains the same.
36
ment outside of mining was calculated at this time to be
<1
almost 50,000, This is apart from the substantial number
of the population working in other countries. It is
obvious then that, though the process of urbanization (in
terms of the growth of towns) may have been initially
slow, migration in search of wage employment had very
quickly become an important part of the life of the
country's African population. Thus many people had their
first contact with urban life outside of Northern
Rhodesia, and quite frequently by the time they first
arrived in one of their own towns had a good deal of urban
experience behind them.
The initial causes of large-scale migration in
search of work can be found in the introduction, at an
early stage, of a system of taxation. The poll tax was
introduced between 1900 and 1904, though its collection
was enforced gradually, "following the general economic
development of the country beginning in the Victoria Falls
2
and Tonga country." Initially the tax could be paid in
kind, but in 1905 the decision was made that it could only
be paid in cash. This was to have a radical effect for,
from now on, many men would have no other option than to
seek wage employment in order to pay their taxes. The
raising of this tax brought in a good deal of revenue, but
the authorities could hardly have been unaware of its
^ Robinson (1967:156)
Gann (1964:103). The rate varied in different
parts of the country, but was standardised at 10s for
each adult male in 1§14.
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effect on patterns of migrations, and its potential
value in providing a large supply of cheap labour.
Indeed it is possible to surmise that this was one of the
original purposes of the tax, though this was always
2
denied by those who were involved. Whatever the inten¬
tions, the effect was to stimulate, or pressurise,
people to move from their rural homes. However, it was
also a crucial assumption of the early administrators
that Africans were essentially rural people and should
remain so. Any periods of time spent in towns should
have two main features: they should have a purpose -
work; and they should be temporary. The policies that
were to emerge from this basic assumption were centred
on two separate rationales. One was the idea that the
African should be discouraged from remaining in town for
any length of time because this might lead to him
becoming 'detribalised'• As a result, he would be unable
to re-adapt when he returned, as he inevitably must, to
1
The control of tax over labour supply is shown
in the following incident, recorded by Heisler (1974:37):
"At Kasempa in 1909 ••• the tax was doubled partly to
increase the supply of labour to the nearby mine, which
suffered from an acute labour shortage."
2
For example, see Orde-Browne (1938:9-10).
Berger (1974:37), who regards tax registration and col¬
lection as being virtually the 'raison d'etre' of the
early Provincial Administration, records the warning of
Lord Passfield - the Colonial Secretary - in 1930s
"I may remind you that it is contrary to the policy
of His Majesty's Government that any taxation levied
upon the natives should be such that, in its results,
it obliges them to labour for wages as the only
practicable means of obtaining the money to pay
their taxes."
38
his rural origins. The second was the theory that
Africans only came into towns to achieve some short-term
financial goal, such as the payment of tax, after which
they would voluntarily leave for their rural homes until
the need for more capital demanded their return to town.
This is the concept of what became known as the 'target¬
's
worker'. Both these views, though contradicting each
other, were disadvantageous to the African worker, The
implication of the former was that Africans should not be
paid high wages which would only encourage them to remain
in urban areas. The latter takes no account of the fact
that wage levels gave very little scope for the accumula¬
tion of capital, providing little more than a subsistence
2
existence. Nor did it allow for the possibility that the
circulation of labour between urban and rural areas was
based on the rational decision that "it was more profit¬
able for them to divide their labour between work for
1
Baldwin (1966:114-116). Eeisler (1974:28-19)
extends thi3 to a distinction between permanent and
temporary target-workers. Fie says of the former: "When
the planned purchase of consumer durables wss completed
in the towns, where they were cheaper than in the
countryside, the Permanent Target-Workers had accomplished
their missions". Of the latter he says: "It became
increasingly difficult for families to obtain subsistence
in the villages while males acquired capital in the
towns. Town earnings were then consumed for subsistence
rather than capital purposes".
p
Marquard (1967:237) comments that; "Generally
speaking, a month's work enables the tax-payer to
discharge his obligations." Such a statement obviously
ignores the fact that a man has expenses while in town




wages and subsistence agriculture." In its most
sophisticated form it was also possible for those holding
this view of the target-worker to argue that high wage
levels would be bad because they would reduce the labour
2
supply. It was on these assumptions that the earliest
decisions about town life, and the way it was to be
organized, were based.
An urban population has to be housed, and in the
early days of Northern Rhodesia*s towns the two crucial
questions relating to this problem were control and
3
segregation.' The feelings of the European population
on this subject were accurately summarised by Coulter
when he wrote that: "Every White settlement of any size
has its segregated Native quarters. These are usually a
mile or more from the business section, and where possible
across a railway, stream, a flat or other natural barrier
l±
forming a strip of no-man's-land." Nature was to be
called upon to assist segregation wherever possible. As
townships grew and the presence of the African population
became more and more obvious, pressure from the local
European population would mount to have some sort of




This is reflected in the concept of the
'backward-bending supply curve.' See Berg (1961);
Barber (1961:212).
3
' The latter was necessary in order that "the
many abuses inseparable from a mixed community should be




to control the Africans. Once again, this was aptly
summarised by Coulter who, talking of these locations,
said:
Like Topsy they 'just growed* until they became
large enough or menacing enough to command White
attention. Then a location manager was appointed to
safeguard the interests of the Natives in the
interest of the Whites.
Early records of the Livingstone Management Board record
continual discussions on the problem of control, and the
frequent introduction of rules and regulations relating
to permits and passes, restriction of the number of
2
people allowed to live on any one plot, and the pro-
duction and consumption of ♦kafxir' beer.' As early as
1914, Livingstone had introduced a rule that 'natives'
should not be outside their compound at night without
written permission. This was an extension of the Natives
in Townships Regulations that had been introduced in
Northern Rhodesia five years earlier. Under these laws,
no African was allowed to live in the townships unless he
was permanently employed by a European or an Asian.4
These rules were regularised and made more- ctr'ngent with
1 Ibid.
2
It was announced in the Government Gazette
(1915:125) that, in relation to Livingstone, "the owner
or occupier of any stand within the surveyed township
shall be deemed to have contravened these rules if a
greater number of natives than following occupy such
stend for any night. Area of stand not exceeding
66 X 100 4; 55 X 132 5} 88 X 132 7".
/
x
Livingstone Mall, August 31, 191R.
4
Gann (1964:148) points out that "Indians were
accepted as townsmen right from the start."
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the introduction of the Townships Ordinance in 1929 and
the Municipal Corporations Ordinance of 1927. The local
European population of a Municipal Corporation had a good
deal more power than they would have in a Township. They
did not just constitute an administrative board carrying
out the instructions of central government, but had the
right to make their own bye-laws. However, in 1930 only
two urban areas were considered important enough to be
made municipal corporations - Livingstone and Ndola,
Such stringent controls meant that town life was
very rigid for the African population, and in this sense
Heisler's description of the early compounds as •Labour
2
Camps* seems to me to be very apt. A further reflection
of the attitude towards African urban areas was that,
between 1913 and 1929* the compounds came under the
official control of what were known as Local Village
Management Boards. The pretence that an African, being
rural, could not cope with urban life, even for short
periods, was extended by assuming that compounds were
little more than villages in the towns. By the late
1920s, the colonial administration had developed a rigor¬
ous policy, with the necessary rules and regulations to
carry it out, towards African urban life. Essentially
they were seeking industrialisation without urbanization
and its attendant problems. Thus when Africans were in






presence was not strictly necessary, that is if they did
not have work, then they should be returned to their
village. Indeed, even when they were working, they should
be encouraged to return to their villages as often as
possible. One of the main consequences of such a policy
was that everything was done to make sure that town held
no great attraction for the African population. The over¬
all effect was that Africans were;
Denied a permanent stake in urban life Their
natural base was held to be in the native areas
from which they came and to which they were expected
to return. The organization of the economy on this
basis committed Africans - whether or not they would
have been disposed otherwise - to a migratory pattern
of employment.*
At this stage, however, the copper industry began to
emerge with its own particular labour needs, and this was
to have a. critical effect on urban development generally.
2:4 The Urban Compound
In 1927 there were only about 8500 men working in
the mines of Northern Rhodesia. In the following year
this was to virtually double, and would keep on increasing
until it reached a peak of 31,941 in September 1931. New
townships were growing up around the mines, and the older
ones were expanding rapidly. Though the world-wide
depression of the 1930s was to have a drastic effect -
three mines closing and the labour force being quartered






with the Copperbelt becoming the country's most important
•i
urban area. The dominance that mining achieved was to
have an important effect on urban policy and, in
particular, the urban housing system. But what was
urban life like for the African population during these
'boom' years. It seems safe to start from Heisler's
position that, whatever the economic position, "towns
were grim places for family life at least until the
1950S."2
Employment of Natives Ordinance of 1929 made
employers responsible for providing their African employ¬
ees with accommodation. By doing this the administra¬
tion were trying to ensure that sufficient housing would
be available, since it was increasingly obvious that they
themselves could not cope. As a result, there were a
number of different types of compound. The larger
industrial concerns, and in particular the mining compan¬
ies, normally provided locations for their own workers.
The government, the local management, board, some of the
larger commercial firms, and a great many European house-
owners would also build their own compounds. But, as
Wilson noted in his study of Broken Hill, this in no
way catered for the whole urban population - even those
who were employed - and a great number of domestic and





3 Wilson (1941; 1942)
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self-employed, had to find accommodation in the town
locations which were run "by local management boards.
These were the usual provisions that were made in most
townships. They were generally inadequate, and the
Ordinances themselves were difficult to enforce. Berger
has commented that:
Northern Rhodesia, which had seemed a backwater of
imperialism in 1924, seemed even more so after the
depressioii. The Administration was in a permanent
state of crisis caused by poor revenues and shortage
of staff, and its response to problems was soon
conditioned: 'how much?' and 'how many men?' were
the ruling considerations,^
Shortages, and consequently overcrowding, were very soon
a standard problem in all urban areas.
But there were very great differences between
compounds. The Administration quickly made it apparent
that it suited them if mining areas were to become
'company towns', with the mining companies responsible
for the welfare and housing of their employees. The
companies were evidently happy with this arrangement for
it meant that they
obtained full control of their townships, a valuable
privilege; for if outsiders were allowed to come in
and acquire property, they would demand local self-
government, raise rates and wrest the companies*
property out of the shareholders' hands. The mines
thus received land at favourable rates and developed
their own electrical, sewerage and water supplies as
well as houses, roads, cinemas and sports grounds, a






This adoption of essentially governmental functions by
the mining companies had a number of consequences. The
District Officers' role was usurped by the Copperbelt
compound manager, though the former retained legal right
of entry. The mining compounds were recognisably
superior in terms of general housing standards and the
facilities that they provided. This is possibly because
the companies had the necessary experience and resources
(both financial and technical) to make this so, rather
than any major difference in their approach to the
problem of urban labour. But the mine compounds were
different in a number of other ways. This was summarised
by Davis in the early 1930s when he wrote:
In contrast to the mine location there is an absence
of discipline in the life of the town Native com¬
munity. Few general rules exist. Uniformity in
hours, work and pay is absent. Each worker is on
his own with responsibility to his individual
employer. The residents of these locations offer
wide contrasts, The sophisticated and the raw
native, the seasoned worker and the novice, the
well-paid and the unemployed, live side-hy-side
,... It is, moreover, a fluctuating population?
families may be here today and gone tomorrow.''
Though, originally, miners had lived in what were little
more than huts made of sun-dried bricks and roofed with
thatch, these were normally temporary measures and, once
a mine was assured cf a future, much better quality
housing would be eventually provided, constructed of
burnt brick and cement, with some thought given to venti¬






to even the lowliest European housing, they were sub¬
stantially better than the general standard of municipal
councils in towns like Livingstone. Much of that town's
housing was a continual cause for concern and was
regarded as a permanent threat to the health of the
1
town. Coulter drew a graphic picture of a typical
municipal location when he described Ndola's in 1932:
Seventeen hundred conical inud and wattle huts with
thatched roofs and earth floors of varying diameters
have been built by successive families of Natives.
There is no order of arrangement other than their
twelve-feet separation from each other. Stooping to
enter a low narrow door, one finds himself in a dark,
unventilated interior. Some of the smoke from the
central fire issue* through the grass roof and en
route leaves the wall and ceiling ebonised by oTTy
soot. The little family or group of single men
squat about the fire, for the place is innocent of
furnishings beyond the sleeping-mats and cheap p
knick-knacks which one finds in a Native kraal.
The development of the Copperbelt therefore led in its
early days to some small improvements in general housing
standards, but municipal housing remained just as bad and
even probably deteriorated with the sudden growth of the
population.
In theory, the people living on the mine compounds
were miners and their families, and the miner normally
lived arid worked with the same group of people. Wilson
found that, in practice, the compounds were not as
homogeneous as this, and in Broken Hill 21.6% of the men
A
Orde-Browne (1938:62) reported that in a com¬
pound recently taken over by the municipal council "long
rows of cells about 7i ft. square ... built with soft
mortar ... a refuge for ticks, bugs, andall sorts of




living in mine housing were neither miners nor their
<1
families. But, despite this, the population of the
mining compounds did not constitute the "variegated lot
of hawkers, general labourers, domestic servants and its
2
contingent of chancers and prostitues" that frequented
the country's municipal locations.
We can see then that the emphasis placed by the
Administration on the need for all male urban migrants to
be employed, brought about a direct relationship between
a man's job and the type of housing that he lived in, and
that different types of compounds sprang up for different
categories of workers.
Between 1930 and 1950 the urban population was to
be multiplied by ten, and reached a figure of almost a
quarter of a million. By that time Northern Rhodesia had
become one of the most urbanized countries in tropical
Africa in terms of the percentage of its population living
in urban areas. But this very rapid growth inevitably
brought a number of problems. Epstein's informants
described the Copperbelt in its earlier days as being a
place of "hatred and fighting between the tribes", and
they spoke of the "killing that went on in the paths
A
Figures derived from Wilson (1941:20). It seems
likely, for reasons that will be dealt with later, that
this was a higher proportion then to be found on the
Copperbelt generally.
2
Gann (1964:143-44). Figures for Ndola municipal
location in 1932 suggest that about 40% of the population
were domestics; 40% were clerks, shop boys or labourers;
and the remainder were either independent craftsmen or in




leading from the Beer Hall; and of the gangs of young men
who prowled around the compound at night, making it unsafe
for people to appear outside their homes after dark."
Added to this, there was a general discontent on the
Copperbelt due to "grievances about pay, maltreatment,
bad working conditions, and even about the old tax
2
rates." As we shall see in a later chapter, African
political expression on most matters was severely
limited, and what little there was had to be based on a
system of tribal elders that developed on the Copperbelt
during the 1930s - just one more way in which the urban
■3
African's rural origins were constantly emphasised. As
Davis pointed out, "Municipal Councils are, like all
elected bodies, primarily interested in their consti¬
tuents; and since these are Europeans, Native affairs are
made to subserve the interest of the European employ-
i±
ers." What advantages did urban Northern Rhodesia
therefore provide during the 1930s and 1940s that made it
attractive to migrants? For, although the poll tax con¬
tinued to be levied, it was quite apparent that many men
would still make the move into town even if it were not.







Meebelo's study looks in some detail at how the
discontent of Africans with the colonial system was ex¬





In 1920, well before the copper 'boom', the
average wage of the African wage labourer had been in the
region of 7 s 6d a month, with a 2s allowance for food.
It has to be remembered that, in these early days, cash
was normally only one part of a worker's 'wages'. Not
only did the employer have to provide housing (or at
least pay for it), but he was also, until the mid-1950s,
legally obliged to provide rations or pay cash in lieu.
The wage levels themselves varied greatly from one
p
industry to another, " and the value of the rations pro¬
vided could therefore make a very great difference.
Wilson attempted to provide a cash value to the rations
supplied by employers, and he concluded that, overall
(cash plus rations), government employees were the best
off in Broken Hill with an average monthly wage of 34s 2d.
Close behind were the miners with 32s 11d, and the average
for all the workers in the town was 30s 5d. Of course,
these averages hide a wide range of wage scales, from a
starting wage of 5s for juvenile miners and some commer¬




According to Berger (1974:18), the rates in 1935
were highest on the mines where the average was 23s 6d.
This compared with 13s 6d on the railways, 12s 6d at the
Zambezi Sawmills in the South, and between 5s and 10s for
farm labour.
^ Wilson (1942:10-11). It is interesting to note
that, in Broken Hill at least, miners actually received
less cash than any other category of worker except
Management Board employees, but were heavily compensated
by the superior rations they received.
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In Broken Hill miners were paid less than their Copper-
belt colleagues, mainly because the price of zinc was
lower. In an attempt to compensate for this, the mining
company provided five-acre plots of land for 750 of its
employees. These plots enabled a man to have two or more
rooms built, and also to grow corn and vegetables. Most
of the workers seemed to regard this as more than adequate
compensation, and the scheme was copied, on a smaller
scale, by the Railways and the Government for their
employees. Such schemes were, of course, an incentive to
employees to stay longer in town and to become committed
to an urban way of life. This was only one of a number
of signs that began to appear during the 1930s of an
ambivalence towards the whole question of urbanization,
particularly on the mines. Some of the mining companies
felt, for example, that married men made better workers,
and tried to encourage men to bring their wives in to town
•i
with them. By 1933 the proportion of married men had
reached 40?6 in the mining towns, and this in turn
encouraged longer settlement. Thus on the Roan Antelope
mine, where this was a deliberate policy, the average
2
length of stay had increased to something like two years.
It cannot however be said that this was a concerted
effort to stabilise the urban population. The motives
of the mining companies were usually short-term economic
gain based on the assumption that stable married men were
Berger (1974:48).




more productive. On the other hand, the Government was
firmly committed to a migrant labour system, a policy
that had been formed
by the economic pressures of the depression and from
consideration of native policy in a rural rather
than an industrial context. Lack of faith in the
future of the copper industry, fear of the expenses
of large-scale urban administration, devotion to
Indirect Rule, and a wish to circulate money in the
remote and poor country districts away from the line
of rail led the Government to discourage the
creation of a large class of settled workers.1
The mining companies had no real wish to go against this
policy. Their aims were restricted in that they wished
only to reduce turnover rates that were too high to be
economic, not to bring about a stable urban labour force.
In search of the former, however, they were inevitably to
hasten the arrival of the latter, As a result, the
situation was obviously changing by 1940. Whatever the
official policy, a number of senior officials realised
that they must start to seriously consider alternatives,
for the impact of the copper industry upon urban life and
p
values generally v/as becoming difficult to ignore.
The urban system was still very much centred on
the employed migrant. However, though regulations tried
to exclude from town those who did not work, a good pro¬
portion of the population - in Broken Hill - came




As early as 1933, "Dundas remarked: 'It would
seem that at this meeting it was clearly recognised that
the compound system is bad, that detribalisation must be
accepted as inevitable.' " Hall (1965:108) .
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♦unemployed*. The former category, which included those
seeking work in town, was restricted by the issue of
A
visitor's permits by the local authority. The latter
category, which frequently overlapped with the former,
was the most unwelcome and, as far as the authorities
were concerned, had no right to be in town, or to have
access to the facilities available. Indeed, "it was
surmised that the persistently unemployed ... were
2
vagabonds and thieves." The depression had brought
about large-scale unemployment and, combined with the
cessation of organised recruitment in 1931, had led to
•x
there being a constant pool of labour. The problems of
pursuing a policy of non-stabilisation were becoming more
and more obvious. By attempting to run towns along the
lines of Labour Camps, the complexities of urban life and
the wide range of needs of an urban population were per¬
sistently ignored. The rigid rules and regulations may
have been feasible with the small townships of early
years, but they became increasingly inappropriate, and
impossible to enforce, during the rapid growth of the
1930s. This was particularly so as the emphasis moved
away from the servicing of small administrative commun-
^
Heisler (1974:101) notes that "between 1947 and
1956 there were 94,858 convictions for violations of
these pass laws: around 9096 ... were for residing in a




Berger, for example, notes (1974:39) that
20,000 men applied for under 7000 jobs at the Kkana mine
in 1935.
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ities towards industrial production. A town has its own
dynamic. Children are born, individuals develop social
relationships, sexual alliances are formed, political
groupings emerge. Work is but one aspect of urban life.
Even in the mine compounds, it was difficult for the
authorities to serve all the needs of the population, and
as a result there grew up a whole range of 'fringe'
activities that were not catered for by, and did not even
come into the calculations of, those who were in power.
As more and more women and children moved into
towns; as the unemployed/visitor category grew larger and
larger; and as the working population expanded so quickly,
the local authorities found themselves unable to meet the
demand for housing, and overcrowding became a serious
1
problem. Facilities varied greatly, but were normally
much superior cn the mining compounds where the companies
accepted the provision of basic welfare facilities either
as an obligation or as a pre-requisite to a productive
work force. Local authorities on the other hand started
off from the assumption that the African communities
should be self-supporting, a goal which was to be
achieved by using profits from the municipal Beer Halls
2
to pay for social services and welfare facilities.
1
Heisler (1974:92) notes that in the early 1940s
it was estimated that "on average in the urban local
authority areas 8.1 persons squeezed into each housing
unit and 7.3 persons into each room - from which it may
be inferred that only 10.3% of the housing units were




Water, but not electricity, was generally regarded as a
basic facility on most compounds, but sanitary services
were highly variable and generally poor. Some attempt
was usually made to provide health and educational
facilities, but there is a good deal of doubt as to how
2
effective such facilities were. But what is important
to note is that, despite the poor quality of many of these
facilities, the authorities were beginning to think of the
towns within a wider framework. As a result, they began
to make different assumptions about what were essential
services for urban areas.' From the late 1930s onwards,
the authorities were forced to think more closely about
their urban policy and, in particular, about the role of
women, children, old people, unemployed and various other
groupings not really catered, for, except in a negative
manner, under the old ordinances. They were forced to
reconsider whether the policy of forcing people to
continually migrate between town and village was oper¬
ational, or even desirable.
It had been crucial to the success of the policy
of non-stabilisation that women should be severely
restricted in town. The colonial administrators had seen
Heisler (1974:92) notes that: "No piped water
to individual houses was available; except at Fort
Jameson, latrines were communal and only at Kitwe was
there one lavatory seat for aj3 few as twelve persons."
2
For an extended description of facilities on
Ndola's compounds, see Coulter (1967:61-87)
•3
By 1937 the municipal council in Livingstone
\^as even considering the need for a library for Africans.
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from the very beginning that the best way to force men to
retain their links with the rural areas was to ensure
that they retained their obligations there. Though some
of the larger firms began to encourage men to bring their
wives with them, there were many other things about urban
life that effectively discouraged women from leaving the
rural areas. The Employment of ivomen, Young Persons and
Children Ordinance of 1933 deprived women of legal
employment in towns. As it was, very few jobs which
could be done by women were available, and there was a
constant pool of unemployed men on hand for any vacancies
that did occur. Some of the larger industrial concerns
went as far as to offer married women partial rations
but, as Heisler comments, "when confronted with a choice
between sharing cramped urban bachelor quarters with a
husband or remaining in a homestead many a wife preferred
her homestead." The problem of bringing a wife into
town was very much exaggerated if children were also
involved. No provision was made by the authorities in
terms of rations for children, and the extra food needed
had to be paid for out of cash received. Similarly, no
1
Ileisler (1974:123). Wilson (1941:47-48) cal¬
culated that on the mine compound in Broken Hill adult
men made up 71% of the total population, whereas on the
five-acre plots with their increased space and facilities
for providing food, they only made up 44.2% of the total.
The town location and various small compounds had similar
proportions to the five-acre plots (44.4% and 48.8%
respectively). The most likely explanation for this is
that there were opportunities for women to trade there,
and that long-term occupancy of a house was more common
because jobs did not always go with housing, particularly
in the town location.
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extra provision was made in terms of accommodation.
Without a valid marriage certificate, it was
technically impossible for a woman to move into the towns,
and until 1953 these certificates were only issued in the
rural areas. This further restricted the flow of women
into urban areas and virtually ensured that, should a man
wish to get married, he had to return to his home village
in order to do so, thus providing a further long-term
commitment to his rural home. Effectively then, women
were generally discouraged from moving into town, and
married women only tolerated in as much as their presence
was seen as contributing to production by reducing turn¬
over.
2:5 The Development of Policy
The emergence of copper, and the consequent heavy
concentrations of industrial workers, had not been envis¬
aged when the fundamental policy had been laid down. From
19^0 onwards, it was evident to virtually everyone that
the copper industry was to be a permanent, and very impor¬
tant, feature of Northern Rhodesian society. There was
still a reluctance on all sides to view the possibility
of a stabilised urban population, and official policy
introduced the rather amorphous concept of 'balanced
stabilisation' which was defined by the administration as
"stabilisation in the rural areas by such means as we are
now adopting by encouraging peasant settlements ... and
in the urban areas to such a degree as the industry
57
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warrants." But the writing was on the wall once produc¬
tion, and other associated variables such as turnover and
the training of a skilled workforce, became critical
factors. The changes in attitudes began to be changes in
policy with the official recognition in 1945 of the need
for married quarters. The Urban African Housing Ordi¬
nance of 1948 was an attempt to make local authorities
bear more responsibility for housing by obliging them to
provide accommodation for all people employed within the
municipal boundaries. Large employers, i.e. those with
more than twenty-five employees, might be required to
provide housing, or alternatively to pay the full rent to
the local authority. In this way the ordinance attempted
to clear up any ambiguity or confusion as to who exactly
was responsible for whom. Under the same ordinance,
married quarters were deliberately encouraged, and areas
were designed specifically for the accommodation of
o
nuclear families. A Department of Local Government and
Housing was set up, and this drew up what was basically a
family housing programme that was incorporated into the
revised version of the Ten-Year Development Plan,
Also by the mid-1940s, the Administration was
beginning to take more note of the unauthorised housing
that had appeared both in the Labour Camps and,
1
Berger (1974:69)
Seymour (1976:59). Since 1944 the housing
standards had laid down that the minimum for a married
couple was to be a two-roomed unit.
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"1
increasingly, in the peri-urban areas. This normally
catered for those groups, - such as the self-employed,
the old, and the unemployed - who had no claim against
any employer. For such individuals the idea of 1African
Townships' was developed. These were to be built near
all the major urban centres, and planning began in 1943.
Houses were to be built either by the owners themselves
according to approved standards, or by the local autho-
2
rity and then distributed appropriately. It was also
accepted that such schemes might appeal to a better-paid
category of worker who might wish to "avoid the disci-
plined atmosphere of locations." In fact, similar
schemes had been developed previously for this particular
group of workers when the Administration had set up
"African villages in the vicinity of townships, where
clerks, capitaos and traders could lease plots at low
rates and build their own houses." This new scheme at
last officially acknowledged that there were categories
other than 'employed* within the urban population.
These changes represent the phase when Heisler's
Labour Camps disappeared and were replaced by what he
5
terms 'Towns for Africans'. Whether it was in reality
the beginnings of a policy of permanent urbanization, as
1
Heisler (1974:117); Waddington (1976:60)
2
For further details, see Conyngham (1951)
3 Gann (1964:384)
U




Gann suggests, is open to debate. Certainly the old
ideas on circulatory migration were disappearing, and a
determined effort was being made to stabilise the work
force. But employment was still the critical factor
around which the policy was based, and to which housing
was tied - even if employment was given a less narrow
definition. Thus no steps were taken to allow Africans
to acquire their ovm land and housing on the open
2
market. The Government had every intention of retain¬
ing a tight control of all available housing. It is
therefore very doubtful that the authorities intended to
promote permanent urbanization as such. They realised
that the individual would spend longer and longer periods
in town, and make fewer and fewer trips home, but they
\vere equally certain that he would eventually return to
his rural base. By 1951, two-fifths of the men on the
Copperbelt had lived for ten years or more in urban
areas. I would rather see the policy steps of the 1945-
1950 period as a reluctant acceptance of the inevitable,
than as a positive commitment on the part of the colonial
administration to the process of urbanization. In effect,
it was little more than an attempt to regularise what was
already happening amongst the urban population, in an




Heisler (1974:19). Even at independence, in
1964, only 78 Africans were permanent owner-occupiers,
3 Heisler (1974:15)
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situation. The idea that you can bring people together
in large numbers in towns to service your needs, yet at
the same time ensure that they remain as they were
before, was fated from the very beginning. All this is,
of course, closely linked to the political framework of
the colonial system. Though a number of minor conces¬
sions had been made in order to allow some sort of
expression of African opinion, there was no intention by
1950 of permitting Africans to gain any sort of political
control. Northern Rhodesia was still very much a British
Frotectorate, and the role of the African population was
to provide a supply of labour that would allow the set¬
tlers to achieve their goals. It was still essential that
the Europeans retained strict control of this population,
and this policy of what can best be called 'stabilisation
without urbanization' was seen, by both the Administration
and the mining companies, as being the most logical next
step.
2:6 Livingstone
As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the
first twenty five years of Northern Rhodesian history
were dominated by Livingstone, But subsequent discussion
has centred on the Copperbelt. This is probably inevit¬
able. By 1969* 62# of the country's total urban popula¬
tion was living on the 'Copperbelt, and this made up 17%




arid the movement of the capital to Lusaka had a
disastrous effect on Livingstone, virtually halving the
population. A number of firms ceased activity in the
town and, exaggerated by the depression, the early 1930s
were probably the low spot in the town's development.
Fortunately, the Zambezi Sawmills opened up on a large
scale in the years immediately before the Second World
War, and within a decade it was to become the country's
2
largest non-mining industrial enterprise. It has also
been the source of various ancillary industries around
the town, most notably the production of hardboard. The
increasingly intensive farming in the Southern Province
also helped the town, which became the main tobacco-
grading centre for the whole country. As was to happen
in many parts of Central Africa, the Second World War
provided a boost for secondary industry and, by 1930, the
town found itself expanding again. In the twenty year
period between 1931 and 1951, the European population of
the town expanded from 1596 to 2316, and the employed
African population had more than doubled, from 4786 to
9610. When McCulloch carried out her survey in 1952, she
estimated the total population to be in the region of
1
Gann (1964:254) notes that in 1933 the Living¬
stone Mail was forced to call for soup kitchens to be set
up in order to feed the "thousands of unemployed in the
Maramba Compound."
p
The firm, drawing its timber from the teak
forests of the N0rth-West, produces timber and furniture
both for the home market and for export.
62
MAP 2: URBAN ZAMBIA
63
1
21,000. Livingstone had, therefore, also experienced a
sudden upsurge in population, if on a less dramatic
scale than the Copperbelt towns. But, in the absence of
the type of housing provided by the large mining compan¬
ies, the town appears to have had even greater problems
with the accommodation of its African population,
A number of rules and regulations were intro¬
duced over the years which attempted to rigorously
control all African housing. Under the 1927 Municipal
Corporations Ordinance, these were incorporated as the
2
Livingstone Native Location Bye-Laws and included the
following:
4. It shall be lawful for the Municipality to lease
lots in the location where natives may erect
their own huts or dwelling houses,
8. The Location Superintendent shall record in a
book every complaint made to him by any native
residing in the location.
13. It shall be lawful for the Municipality to limit
the number of persons resident in any rented
house, hut or room in municipal quarters.
15. It shall not be lawful for the registered occupier
to sub-let the said quarters or any part thereof
except with the permission of the Location
Superintendent.
18. It shall be lawful for the Municipality to limit
the number of outbuildings and buildings on any
plot and to limit the number of persons resident
on such plot and the number of residents in any
building on such plot.
23. It shall not be lawful for the occupier of a plot
to sell or lease any building or out-building on





Government Gazette 1931, Volume 21, p.349.
64
Obviously, very careful provisions were made to ensure
that a tight hold was kept on what was going on in the
<1
town's compounds. Outside of the mining compounds,
urban housing was generally described as being in "a
p
deplorable and chaotic state." In Livingstone it
appears to have been even worse than normal and It was
generally agreed that, on the v/hole, housing conditions
had lagged behind those of other centres on the line of
rail. We shall see in later chapters that there were a
number of peculiarities in Livingstone's housing system,
but the general story was the same as elsewhere. It was
perhaps worse because all the working population was out¬
side the framework provided by the mining companies, and
an even larger number of individuals than normal were not,
until 1948 at least, catered for by the various ordi¬
nances.
Livingstone was subject to the same policies,
ordinances, and regulations as other urban areas in
Northern Rhodesia. Because its employment structure was
very different from either the mining towns or the
capital, there were a number of unusual features, Includ-
The poorly paid Location Superintendents, who
were "expected to 'make bricks without straw'" ^Gann
(1964:298)] were the watchdogs of all this. A popular
story told by some of Malota's older inhabitants was of
the 'compound manager' who sometime during the 1940s,
committed suicide in a spectacular manner by riding his
bicycle over the Victoria Falls. It was generally"
believed that he had done this either because the job had
driven him insane, or because he had been misappro¬
priating funds.
2
Native Affairs 1937, p.48
^ Native Affairs 1960, p.73
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ing Malota compound which forms the focus of this study.
But such peculiarities can be found in any of the urban
areas. Emerging from a set of general economic and
political factors, the towns develop a cluster of unique
characteristics based on local and historical factors.
Livingstone *s relatively long history; its early focus as
an administrative centre; its later dependence on agri¬
culture and secondary industry; all make it a very
different phenomenon from Lusaka, the Copperbelt towns,
or Broken Hill, despite the strong common influences to
which all of these towns have been subjected by virtue of
being based within the same political unit.
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CHAPTER 3
URBAN ZAMBIA; 1951 -1971
3:1 Introduction
This chapter is focused on two major factors.
Firstly, the developments that occurred as a result of
the changes in attitudes towards urban stabilisation in
the 1940s. Secondly, the major economic and political
changes brought about by the move towards, and the
achievement of, independence. The most obvious measure
of the effect of these factors has been the significant
increase in the number of urban dwellers such that, by
1969, almost 30% of Zambia's total population were living
in urban areas. This, in turn, has had important effects
on the overall quality of urban life. This particular
phase of urban development in Zambia has been fairly
extensively studied by social scientists. A number of
surveys were carried out of Northern Rhodesian towns
during the 1950s which show how effective (or otherwise)
was the policy of stabilisation. The political changes
leading to, and resulting from, independence have been
1




exhaustively covered, and give a great deal of insight
into the relationship between urban development and the
whole question of self-government. More recently, there
has been a good deal of literature on the emergence of
2
squatter areas around the country's towns and cities.
Such studies will be used in an attempt to show, not only
that there are more urban Zambians, but also that there
have been substantive changes in the nature of Zambian
towns.
3s2 The Stabilisation of the Urban Population
•Stabilisation' is basically a demographic term
which "is significant only against the background of
labour migration. A population becomes stabilised in
town when people no longer make intermittent journeys
back to their rural homes."3 The concern of the colonial
Administration was to achieve somehow a certain level of
stabilisation, a necessary adjunct to their administra¬
tive and economic goals, without bringing about major
changes in the behavioural patterns of the African popu¬
lation, They wished, in effect, for the worker (despite
all his new experiences) to remain - socially, cultur¬
ally, and politically - much as he was, i.e. essentially
rural. But in this they made the crucial mistake of
1
Epstein (1958); Tordoff (197^); Pettman (197A).
2




viewing 'urbanization* and 'change' as one and the same
thing. To them the major change going on in the country
at the time was the development of new towns and cities,
and as such it was the towns and cities that were bring¬
ing about the other changes - industry, transport, educ¬
ation and so on. They thus viewed the town as the
primary innovator and generator of change. In contrast,
they saw the rural areas as static and unchanging. The
error lay in not realising that the changes brought about
by the introduction of a colonial administration and a
capitalist economy were effective, to a varying degree,
throughout the society. Thus the rural areas were also
subject to changes, becoming bound up economically (as
both consumer and producer) with the towns, and, through
the process of labour migration, being subjected to new
behavioural and ideological influences. It is in this
sense that Little argues that "it is not from the town
but from the system encompassing it that vitality, force
and impetus come." As a result, attempts to restrict
persistent and permanent access to urban areas (which was
the underlying assumption even in a policy of 'balanced
stabilisation') will not necessarily prevent a commitment
on the part of individuals to the values, beliefs and
behavioural patterns that are so prevalent in to\ms. In
very general terms, a man does not have to live all his
life in towns to become 'urbanized', and therefore a




can also never guarantee to prevent him from becoming
♦urban'.
The studies of the towns of Northern Rhodesia in
A
the 1950s show that circulatory migration was still an
important factor, though it was also apparent that a
variety of changes were taking place. The number of women
who nov lived with their husband was increasing; the sex
ratio was more equable; the average size of the family
household was greater; and the number of older people
2
was mounting. Such measures reflect a high level of
stabilisation which Kapferer attempted to quantify in his
1964 study of Broken Hill, Using as his indices of
stabilisation, "length of continous residence in Broken
Hill, period spent away from a rural area, the percentage
of working life after the age of 15 spent in town and,
finally, the current attitudes people have towards
remaining in town or returning to their rural home", he
was able to conclude that the Broken Hill figures differed
substantially from similar data collected by Mitchell
eleven years earlier. Thus Mitchell in 1953 had found
55.5% of the population to be 'labour migrants'; in 1964
this figure was only 23,4%, The 'temporarily stabilised*
group had grown from 37.9% to 59.6%, and the 'permanently
1





stabilised1 group had nearly trebled from 6.6% to 17.1%.1
Such data shows very clearly that, in the decade before
independence, the pattern of migration between Zambia's
urban and rural areas had altered significantly. The
housing policy, however, still remained very much opposed
to the permanent stabilisation of the workforce for, by
perpetuating 'institutional' housing which was tied to
employment, it retained the underlying assumption that
2
workers should eventually retire to their rural homes.
Built into the new policy was the commitment to
provide all urban workers with some form of housing. This
was something the authorities had not been able to do in
the past and, ironically, their new policy only exagger¬
ated the problem. In the years between 1951 and 1962,
the urban population was, once again, to double reaching
an estimated figure of over half-a-million. There was no
longer a concerted effort to prevent women from coming
into town and, as Heisler points out, "family housing
units did not merely bring women and children to towns to
join husbands. Once there they helped commit a worker to
4
town life." Despite a very heavy building programme, it
-1
According to Kapferer (1966:53), labour
migrants have "no intention of staying in town longer
than is necessary"; the temporarily stabilised are
"staying on in town but will eventually go home"; and the
permanently stabilised "have no intention of returning







was inevitable that the authorities would not be able to
cope. But the very nature of the policy excluded other
forms of accommodation such as private housing, unauth¬
orised settlements, and - except in a very few cases -
areas of land on which workers could build their own
homes. Though any of these could have helped to alleviate
the problem, they were regarded as the sort of housing
that would encourage, and permit, attitudes of permanency.
As such, they were to be discouraged. In effect, then,
the policy loosened control on patterns of migrancy
(leading to further, rapid urban expansion), but tried to
retain a tight control on the type of housing available.
5:3 The Urban Housing Market
During the 1950s the emphasis was placed on
building permanent housing on municipal locations. A
concerted effort was made to rid the urban areas of
-i
temporary and semi-permanent structures. Livingstone's
housing structure was somewhat unusual in that it
emphasised self-built housing and employers* compounds,
with fewer domestics and virtually no unauthorised
housing. As a result, there were fewer people than usual
living in municipal housing, though the figure still
1
Bettison's study of Lusaka [Bettison (1959)
quoted in Seymour (1976:28-29)] showed that 49# of the
population were living in accommodation supplied by the
Municipal Council; 19% in employers' compounds in non-
African parts of the city; 14# in similar compounds in
other areas; 5% in authorised self-built housing; and the
remainder in a number of unauthorised, compounds. The
Africans living in non-African areas were mainly domestic
servants.
constituted approximately k0% of the total African popu-
*i
lation. On the Copperbelt, raining townships inevitably
continued to dominate with as much as 68^ (in Mufulira)
and as little as hf% (in Kitwe) of the African population
2
residing in them. However, in 1959 the Municipalities
of Kitwe, Luanshya, Mufulira and Chingola started work
on a scheme that would lead to the taking over of the
mine townships and their facilities by the municipal
authorities. The trend then was, even on the Copper-
belt, to make all housing the responsibility of local
urban authorities, even if the traditional segregation
between the employees of the large companies and other
urban residents was maintained. It was also apparent
in the years prior to independence that the idea of
L
African Townships had not been at all successful. The
blame for this was placed on the fact that they were
5
normally some distance from the main urban area, and
transportation charges to work were therefore high. In
no case did more than 5% of a town's population live in
one of these adjacent townships, which means that many of






Barclays Bank Overseas Survey. (1960:90)
^
Kay (1967:9?) provides figures which show that
on the Copperbelt rates of occupation of available stands
went as low as 6^ (for Kasompe in Chingola) with a
maximum of only 3Q% (for Chibuluma in Kitwe),
5
Fisenge, for example, was four miles out of
Luanshya.
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where. The expansion of municipal compound housing during
the 1950s seems to me to be the most likely explanation
for their failure, for the Townships were originally set
up to cater for those individuals who had no employer to
provide them with housing. The new municipal compounds
•i
were also able to serve this function.
Despite central government financing, the urban
housing stock in the years prior to independence became
increasingly inadequate for the large numbers of people
now flowing into the towns. Too large a proportion of
the resources were consumed in trying to improve upon the
deplorable standards of the previous two decades, and to
provide superior housing for those who were already there.
This was a perfectly legitimate goal, and might well have
been achieved if the population had remained constant or
increased only at a slow rate. This was not the case and,
though some improvements were made and general standards
rose, the authorities were unable to cope with the numbers
2
of people now in need of accommodation. To add to the
problem, the amount of money made available for municipal
housing declined considerably in the years immediately
before independence, possibly because of political
A
Indirectly connected with this was the increas¬
ing number of people who, during the 1950s, chose to pay
their own rent rather than having it paid by their employ¬
er, By doing this, they were saved from eviction should
they lose their Jobs. McCulloch (1956:5) calculated that
one in five men on Livingstone's largest compounds were
doing this.
2
Heisler (1974:49) comments that improvements in
the towns, resulting in improved health standards, acted
as a 'positive inducement' to migrants, thus exaggerating
the problem even further.
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•1
uncertainty. Inevitably, this was the sort of situation
in which unauthorised housing and squatter settlements
might be expected to thrive. However, there was a deter¬
mined effort to at least contain, if not prevent, any such
developments. This was generally successful within urban
boundaries, and even in the peri-urban area of Lusaka the
growth rate for unauthorised housing was kept down to 5%
per annum - a figure lower than the general growth rate
2
for the city. But such housing was undoubtedly very
attractive to many migrants because of the lower rents,
and also the fact that it was not normally attached to a
particular employer or job.
3:4 The Urban Population
The average house, made of sun-dried brick, plastered
and lime-washed outside and inside, with concrete
floor and corrugated iron roof, had two rooms. Each
room usually had one window, and there was a bed, a
table, a few chairs, an oil lamp, perhaps a battery
radio, a few dishes and cooking utensils, and a wire
bin to protect food from insects. A picture of Queen
Elizabeth was likely to be on the wall •••• The
orderly rows of white houses and the lack of trees
and flowers seemed to me to lack a pleasing esthetic
quality. But the Africans thought the houses a great
improvement over their traditional village homes.3
A
Barclays Bank Overseas Survey, (1963:82)
comments: "tfhe value of building plans passed by munici¬
palities and in peri-urban areas continued to fall ... to¬
tal plans passed were valued at £1,864,000 compared with
£2,915,000 during the same period of the previous year
and £4,032,000 during the whole of 1961," Stren (1975:





Hortense Powdermaker* s study of life on the Luan.3hya mine
compound in the mid-1950s concentrates on the rapid
changes being experienced by the population, and suggests
that this period brought about some major improvements -
social, economic, and political - for the urban African
worker. Some of the towns must certainly have been
unrecognizable to someone who had not visited them for
twenty years. Towns like Chingola end Ndolfc grew to be
almost seven times larger, in terms of population,
between 194-4 and 1963. Copper remained the base of the
country's economy, and in the period 1954-1961 was the
2
source of 4b.5% ox the Gross Domestic Product. In terms
3
of employment, however, its impact was less considerable.
But generally many more people were becoming involved in
the wetge-eax-ning sector. Figures from Heisler suggest,
however, that although the number of African wage-earners
in the country increased by 69$ in the period 1946-1961,
the number of Africans in town increased by an enormous
4
242%. The implication of this, of course, is that by
1
Berger (1974s16)
2 Baldwin (1966s35). This average actually hides
quite significant variations. The 1955 figure reached a
peak of 56.8%, and three years later it had dropped to
only 32.6%.
Baldwin (1966:43) shows that Mining and quarry¬
ing generally was responsible for 15.9% of the total wage-
earners; a figure exceeded by agriculture (16.9%) and
closely followed by a rapidly expanding building and
construction industry (12.6%). Kay (1967:69) suggests
that, at that point in time, the building and construction
industry was going through a major depression and that,






independence msny oeople must have been either unemployed
■i
or self-employed. The problem of uroan unemployment
became increasingly important after the mid-1950s.
Census figures show that, by 1963, 27,500 men were
♦actively seeking work* in town, a total of 18% of the
actual urban labour force. Inevitably, the problem was
greatest on the Copperbelt where, for example, in 1961
there were twenty men applying for each vacancy at the
Roan Antelope mine." Much of the problem has been
attributed to significant increases in wage levels during
ii
this period. Just how great these were is shown by the
fact that, while African real earnings actually decreased
by 21% in the period 1930-45, they increased an enormous
300% in the next fifteen years. Increases were greatest
in the copper industry where the trade union became an
increasingly effective force, and where earnings were
related to a cost-of-living index after 1950. But large
increases v/ere recorded in most sectors (see Table 3:1).
•I
The figure of 242% includes women and children
who v/ould not normally seek wage-employment. But,
equally, only 60% of the wage-earners v/ere in town [Kay
(1967:70)], so the general point - of a gap between Jobs
and applicants - remains.
2
Kay (1967:70)
^ Baldwin (1966:105). Berger (1974:209) quotes the
African Personnel Manager at Nchanga mine as saying that
there were, in 1960, "well over one thousand (increasing
daily) chasing 20-30 Jobs (the majority hungry, frus¬
trated and penniless)."
4




AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS OF AFRICAN EMPLOYEES







Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 41 88 115
Mining and Quarrying 132 367 178
Manufacturing 76 203 167
Construction 74 153 107
Commerce 73 194 166
Transport and Communications 86 2.41 180
Services 77 196 157
Domestic Service 56 98 75
ALL EMPLOYEES 78 191 145
Source: Derived from Kay(1967:71)
Pay rises, of course, are likely to increase the flow of
people into town, particularly if they further widen the
gap between urban and rural wage levels. But, on the
other hand, they are likely to reduce the available Job
opportunities in terms of numbers because they increase
an employer's costs. Thus improved wage levels can have
a deleterious effect on urban life generally by increasing
the demand for work, whilst simultaneously reducing the
78
A
supply of jobs. A migrant must then balance the possi¬
bility of gaining a well-paid job in town against the
possibility of joining the ever-increasing ranks of the
urban unemployed.
However there can be no doubt that, for those
people who did have jobs, and particularly for those who
were working on the mines, things were greatly improved.
This was reflected in major changes in rates of turnover,
and a general trend towards a higher level of stabili¬
sation of the workforce. Thus the annual turnover rate
of Africans working on Copperbelt mines was reduced from
o
60.1% in 1952 to only 8.3% at independence. This meant
that more people were staying in town for longer periods
of tiaie. This was virtually a universal conclusion in
all the studies at that time, though there were variations
between different age groups, different compounds, and
4
different towns.
Kay (1967:69) points out that the total work¬
force decreased from a peak figure of 271,000 in 1954 to
only 225,000 in 1963. For a detailed, analysis of the
relationship between wages, unemployment, and migration,
see Harris & Todaro (1970).
2
Berger (1974:208)
^ For example, Sklar (1975:131) has calculated
that by 1961 the average length of service of all African
mine-workers was 5.6 years.
14
Mitchell (1954:17) found a much higher level of
♦permanent urbanisation* on municipal townships than on
mine locations. Bettison (1959:78) found a similar
difference between municipal and industrial locations in
Lusaka, and also noticed significant differences in length
of period spent in town by different age groups.
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3:5 The Effect of Independence
During the 1960s two censuses were carried out in
Zambia; one just before independence in 1963, and the other
in 1969. In this period of time, the total population of
the country increased from just under three-and-a-half
million to over foup million, at a rate of growth of 2.5%
per annum. In 1963 urban dwellers comprised about 20% of
the total African population; six years later this figure
was almost 30%. In percentage terms this represents a
very rapid rate of growth, but when we consider it in
terms of actual numbers the full significance becomes
evident. It meant, in effect, that during the 1960s
p
almost half-a-million more people moved into the towns.
A number of factors associated with independence were
responsible, in part at least, for this dramatic increase.
In itself, the achievement of independence was a
substantial stimulus. In the fight for freedom from
colonial rule, many promises and many predictions had
been made, and in the years after 1964 people were
impatient for results. The towns were the places where
changes were most noticeable, and where the effects of
self-government would first be registered. It was to the
towns, therefore, that people flocked to gain access to
the rewards of independence; to become part of a new and
very different Zambia.
-i





The attitude of the new government towards the
urban population had, of course, to be radically different
from that of its colonial predecessors. No longer could
the towns be seen as a separate part of the country, with
the African population merely there as a source of labour
necessary for the achievement of European goals. The
urban areas were now to be run by Zambians for the good
of Zambians. Though, for the time being, control of
economic resources was to remain largely outside of
Zambian administrative control - the making of policy -
was firmly in the hands of Zambians. This was to have a
radical effect on the housing situation.
One of the first things to happen was that many
laws and municipal bye-laws were revoked because of their
discriminatory nature. For example, the concept of the
•African Housing Area' contained within the 19^8 ordi¬
nance was, obviously, no longer supportable. Africans
must have access to all housing, if they could afford it.
Nor could there be any question of Africans being expected
to return to the rural areas either if they were unem¬
ployed or if they retired. Towns were places for people
to live, not Just v/ork. Such ideas were built into the
very notion of self-government.
Though such ideas may have unfortunate - though
frequently predictable - consequences, they cannot be
<1
This is not to say that colonial values
disappeared overnight. Van Velsen (1975:307), for
example, comments on the antagonism of trade unionists
and politicians to migrants.
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denied. A county breaking away from colonialism is
obliged to show its own population, and the outside
world, that it is substantively different from its pre¬
decessors. The same problem was to crop up with the
question of employment in urban areas. Rural develop¬
ment was an obvious priority, and the government was
aware of this. Thus President Kaunda stated in 1967
that: "The objective is to make the agricultural sector
as productive and profitable as the mining industry -
only more permanent." A year later, he was even more
specific about the relationship between rural and urban
life in an independent Zambia when he said that "Humanism
2
in Zambia is a decision in favour of rural areas." But
how successful have the Zambians been in carrying out
this policy? One problem has been that there have been
equally strong demands to increase the level of urban
employment, and a]so to bring wages to a higher level. As
Berger reports:
The Government naturally supported higher wages in
reaction to the dual wage system which had held
African wages down and was closely connected with
colonialism. Higher wages seemed to urban workers
to be a legitimate reward of self-government, and
political leaders could scarcely deny this in the
heady years after Independence.3
One of the objectives of the First National Development









year period. But, as a 1964 United Nations report
pointed out: "There is really a choice for Zambia: in
the next 5 years it can have big increases in wages or
p
big increases in employment, not both."" The political
demands of independence meant that, originally at least,
3
such advice was ignored. But the vital importance of
restricting wage increases was soon realised and by 1966
the official policy had become centred on "increases in
real wages and salaries not greater than five per cent
per annum for the low income group and three per cent per
4
annum for the high income group." Despite this, the gap
between urban and rural incomes increased considerably in
5
the years after independence." As a result,
such lack of opportunity in the rural areas has
increasingly gained recognition among villagers and,
not surprisingly, they have voted with their feet by
migrating to a new (though often disappointing) life




Quoted in Berger (1974:219)
" Thus in 1964 earnings increased by an average of
19.4* and the number of Jobs by only 13,000 whereas "there
would have been a possible increase of 49,800 Jobs if the
increase in average earnings had been limited to the
increase in productivity, say about three per cent."
[Quinn (1969:152)]
l'
First National Development Flan (1966:7)
5
Heisler (1974:111) nrovides figures of per
capita income for urban areas of £90 in 1969 (compared
with £43 in 1964); and for peasant farmers of around £13
(compared with £12 in 1964). Berger (1974:225) points
out that the average earnings of African wage-earners
outside of the mines was over four times that of the





But it is not only men in search of work who have brought
about this upsurge in the urban population. Higher wage
levels and less restrictive housing policies have made it
easier, by previous standards, for a man to bring his wife
and family into town. A large percentage of the migrants
arriving in town for the first time in the period between
1963 and 1969 were women. Seymour has estimated that the
"extra migration of women and their children during this
period probably had the effect of temporarily increasing
1
the rate of urbanisation by 5% per annum." This had the
effect of reducing the sex ratio in towns from 179 males/
100 females in 1963 to a figure of 111 in 1969.2 Related
to this was an upsurge of wage-earning women who nearly
quadrupled in the same six-year period.
The problem of providing work for this dramati¬
cally increased population was only one of the dilemmas
thrown up by the achievement of independence. Even more
serious, in some respects, was the question of how to
cope with housing half-a-million extra people. Two major




The 1963 figure is taken from Kay (1967:81);




In 1951 it was stated that:
Local authorities are willing to accept in principle
the need to provide areas where Africans can build
their own houses to approved standards, possibly with
money lent by the authority; but somehow v/hen it
comes to providing the actual site and laying down
the conditions little progress is made.1
This sort of scheme was a development of the self-built
employers1 compounds that were to be found around some of
the towns, and which were specifically encouraged by the
1948 Municipal Ordinance. A small number of house-owner¬
ship schemes had been attempted which showed the
attractive possibility of placing the capital cost3 on
p
the occupier, even over a twenty five year period.
Before there was any sort of national policy, the govern¬
ment developed a few areas such as Mapoloto and Old
Chibolya in Lusaka. However, such schemes were developed
on an ad hoc basis, often as temporary resettlement
schemes, and were not very successful, at least in their
3
early years. Only minimal facilities were provided, and
no financial assistance was given. The lack of enthusi¬
asm on the part of the authorities in the pre-independence
era was almost certainly because they were seen as
encouraging individuals to take up permanent residence in
town. But as the housing shortage became increasingly
^
Native Affairs 1951, p.83
2
Two schemes in Ndola, involving 76 stands, were
set up. The houses cost, in 1957, between £452 and £916.
There was a 5% down payment and monthly payments over 25
years.
3
Development, and Planning Research Unit, Lusaka
(1972:70)
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acute after independence, it began to be apparent that
self-help housing could provide a useful long-term
solution. The basic idea was taken one step further with
the introduction, in 1965, of the 'Aided Self-Help'
housing programme into the official housing policy. This
specified that all local authorities should have plots
made available and serviced by early 1967. As this was
to become the main focus of the official housing policy
in the period 1965-1971, it is worth noting some of the
main points. The objectives were given as:
To build large numbers of houses for owner
occupation using the labour of the occupant and his
family.
To obtain the cooperation and participation of
the people.
To encourage building by the provision of
serviced sites, technical and other advice, and loans
for building materials.
To encourage building aleo by cooperation with
people and groups locally., and by the introduction of
a simple and acceptable form of land tenure.
To keep costs down to a level which could be
afforded by the majority in the lowest income
brackets.
Selection of people entitled to take part in such schemes,
known as Site-and-Service housing, was based on a number
of practical considerations. The participant must already
be on the council's waiting list; be earning at least K20
and have K20 cash to buy building materials; and be pre¬
pared to work with at least half-a-dozen other people for
a minimum of eight hours a week. The services provided
by the local authorities were to include graded and
gravelled roads, piped water to each plot, and some form
86
of sanitation. Occupants would have a ten-year lea.se
which could be renewed, and were entitled to sell their
plots if no money was owed to the Council. Failure to
pay loan charges or services could mean eviction, as could
1
sub-letting or failure to complete the house.
The United Nations mission of 1965-66 advised
that something in the region of 30# of new housing should
be made up of serviced plots, but this figure was
increased to 75# in the First National Development Plan
of 1966. For a number of reasons, both general and local,
2
it has been difficult to put these schemes into practice,
and in 1967, for example, only 20# of intended site-and-
service houses were actually completed. But the 1968-72
housing programme still planned that three-quarters of
new housing should be of this sort. In the late 1960s,
the schemes were essentially experimental with various
1
Development and Planning Research Unit, Lusaka
(1972j70)
2
With reference to the Kaunda Square scheme in
Lusaka, the Development Planning and Research Unit report
makes the following, fairly typical, conclusions:
Various reasons were advanced to account for the
slow development:
- lack of education, social and commercial
facilities ... dislike of the small plots and
low standard ablution blocks. The validity of
this reason is suspect because of absence of
facilities, large plots and high standards in
the unauthorised areas from which people were
to be resettled.
- resentment of the tendency to label the area as
a 'squatter resettlement scheme'.
- A possibility that the loan is inadequate,
resulting in families taking a long time to
save money to complete their houses.
- The unnecessarily complicated and drawn out




ideas being tried out, and a whole range of problems
being encountered. Inevitably, mistakes were made and
development was slow. But 'Aided Self-Help' housing is
still seen as a crucial element in the transition from
the colonial housing structure to something more appro¬
priate to an independent Zambia. It acknowledges the
right of all men to own their house, and does not auto¬
matically assume that a man's stay in town is temporary.
However, it does not totally reject the relationship
between occupancy and employment because of the financial
pre-requisites that are laid down. It would probably be
argued, that this is because of technical factors, rather
than ideological assumptions; a man needs to be regularly
earning money if he is to take on a financial commitment
of this nature. But the effect is the same and those who
are not working, or do not have long-term job security,
are likely to be excluded from such schemes. So, though
it is undoubtedly an improvement in principle on colonial
housing policy, the adoption of site-and-service schemes
as the linch-pin of the housing programme may not be the
radical breakthrough it has sometimes been made out to be.
It has left many people still not catered for, and would
have done so even if it had been carried out in the
quantities intended. As a result, many urban dwellers
must look elsewhere for thei r accommodation.
For a discussion of the problems encountered
with similar schemes in Kenya and Tanzania, see Stren
(1975:269-70)
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3:7 Unauthorised Housing and Squatter Settlements
Unauthoi'ised compounds in Northern Rhodesia were
compounds that had grown up with the consent of the land¬
lord, but which were illegal because they broke the
various laws and municipal regulations relating to urban
settlement. Superficially, squatters are a very differ¬
ent phenomenon because they normally also involve
illegality of tenure. Unauthorised housing had a number
of attractions in the pre-independence era because very
often, unlike municipal housing, it was not attached to
employment and therefore allowed migrants to remain in
town when they were unemployed, self-employed, or even
retired. Their presence, therefore, allowed and probably
encouraged the permanent stabilisation of certain sectors
of the population. These unauthorised compounds were
almost all to become squatter compounds in the years after
independence, when the population stopped paying rent to
the landlords. These landlords were normally European
and Asian, and in their drastically weakened post-
independence position, with squatting being promoted by
the political parties, they were unable to make any
effective resistance to such moves. Squatting had pre¬
viously been strictly controlled, and what little there
was had taken place within the confines of the unauthorised
compounds.
Employers had not been very conscientious in the
years before independence in controlling housing on their
own compounds. MeCulloch noted in Livingstone, for
example, ,1a number of employer's compounds, small, semi-
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A
legal, and frequently unsalubrious.M With the arrival
of independence, they were to give up virtually any
control at all, thus providing an obvious base for
further squatter development.
Finally, the vastly increased urban population
meant that the area of land needed for housing had to be
expanded, and many squatters were to settle on previously
unoccupied areas, particularly in the peri-urban sections
2 \
surrounding the cities. The squatter compounds grew so
rapidly that, by the turn of the decade, about 40% of the
total population of Lusaka - almost 100,000 people - was
living in such areas.
We can see then that post-independence policy has
been no more successful in coping with urban housing
shortages than its colonial predecessors. The rapidly
increasing influx, exaggerated by the discarding of
various control regulations, has led to a demand for
housing that has never been remotely met by the official
supply. This has not been helped by a tendency to have





Seymour (1976:5) shows that the growth rate of
squatter areas in the capital in the period 1963-69 was a
phenomenal 32.5% per annum (compared with an overall rate
for the city of 13.4%) and, though this was reduced




middle-level housing. The realisation of this inability
to meet the demand brought into the limelight the idea of
aided self-help housing which, by its very nature, tends
to exclude a large number of people, often the ones most
in need of housing. The consequence was the rise of
squatter compounds which provided the flexibility, as well
as the quantity, that rapidly expanding urban areas must
have.
This then was the general situation in Zambia at
the time of this study. Using the general framework pre¬
sented in the last two chapters - in which I have parti¬
cularly concentrated on the relationship between official
policy, migrancy, employment and housing - I wish to look
at the question of urban development in more detail by
considering a particular compound that has the peculiar
distinction of bridging virtually the whole historical
period with which I have been dealing. It was probably
the first compound to be built in Northern Rhodesia, and
is by far the longest lasting. Yet it also has a very
modem aspect in that it has, in recent years, come to be
regarded as a squatter compound. By studying the growth
and development of this compound, particularly during the
period 1951 - 1971, I hope to throw more light on the
general process of urbanization in Zambia.
-I
Seymour (1976:39) points out that in the period
1966-70, for example, twice as much money was spent on





As we saw in an earlier chapter, Livingstone's
decline of the 1930s was halted and the post-World War II
era saw some expansion. In less than twenty years the
population doubled from about 21,000 in 1952 to 43,000 in
1
19^9. However, compared with other Zambian towns, this
is not as impressive as it might appear. The town's
growth rate between 1963 and 1969 was 31.5#, the second
2
lowest of all Zambia's towns. There is a good deal of
doubt as to the town's future and many would agree with
McGlashan's comment that "it owes much to byegone
days .... Of all the large towns of Zambia, perhaps
Livingstone has the least prospect for growth."-^ There is
a certain irony when we look to why this situation should
have arisen. The very factor that made it an important
town in the first place - its position on the Zambezi




Ibid. Luanshya had the lowest rate.
3 McGlashan (1971:108)
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the Central African Federation in the early 1960s, Zambian
independence, and the deterioration of the relations
between Rhodesia and Zambia after the former's Unilateral
Declaration of Independence, the town's proximity to
Rhodesia is no longer a positive stimulus to growth.
Indeed, it may well have been a negative factor. This
has certainly been the case with the tourist industry
which, centred on the Victoria Falls, was deliberately
developed in the 1950s, and became the mainstay of the
local economy. An extensive hotel and curio trade was
developed, but this has been drastically affected by the
drop In the number of tourists, from 52,000 in 1962 to
only 12,000 in 1967.'' Attempts to compensate for this by
introducing manufacturing industry to the town have not
been as successful as was hoped, though this can probably
be attributed to the dominance of Lusaka, Kitwe and Ndola
as centres of Industrial growth, rather than Livingstone's
position. A number of new industries have been intro-
2
duced, and the long established textile and clothing
industry has seen some expansion (being responsible, in
1969? for almost 60% of the town's manufacturing estab¬




A biscuit factory was opened in 1963 and a
factory producing radios and record players in 1965. In
1969 the town had six establishments dealing with food
products; one with beverages and tobacco; twenty-one with
textiles, clothing and footwear; four with timber and
furniture; one with paper and printing; one with non-
metalic mineral products; and two with metals and
engineering.
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large Fiat vehicle assembly plant, the town's economic
future remains bleak, and it will probably remain so
until political developments restore Zambia's links with
its Southern neighbours. Livingstone's population is very
much aware of this state of affairs, and their concern is
reflected in a vigorous campaign to have the status of
the town raised to that of a city. Such a move had
gained a good deal of support and momentum in the years
after independence, to the extent that the District
Governor, the government's political representative i.n
the Southern Province, was forced to conclude in a speech
made at the 1971 Labour Day rally that "it is obvious that
we must move towards city status in the very near future,"
4:2 Housing in Livingstone
Livingstone was no better, probably even worse,
than other Northern Rhodesian towns when it came to coping
with the housing needs of the African population. By
1951, however, it was claimed that the authorities had
been able to demolish the "last of the Unauthorised
aggregations of hovels on the periphery of the town."
The following year, McCulloch recorded a total of twenty
compounds with a population of nearly 16,000. Of this
total, 56% were living in three municipal compounds known
as Maramba, Libuyu and Malota. There were two large
employers' compounds belonging to the Zambezi Sawmills
Ltd. (with a population of 1750), and the railways (with
1
Native Affairs. 1951, p.75
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a population of 1340). There were five compounds attached
to smaller industrial firms in the town, plus separate
locations for such groups of workers as Police, Boma
messengers, and sanitary workers. All told, these
fifteen smaller compounds housed less than 4,000 people.
The general policy of the stabilisation of the labour
force was reflected in the setting up, in the same year,
of a site for an Industrial Compound where employers
could erect their own housing for their employees. The
standards on the different compounds varied greatly.
The newest of the municipal compounds Libuyu, consisted
mainly of two-roomed concrete block houses with asbestos
roofs and their own kitchen, whereas Maramba was mainly
Kimberley brick houses (which are much less permanent)
and thatched roofs. The large industrial compounds had
both barrack-type rows of houses for single men, and
sections containing two-roomed houses for married couples.
The poorest quality housing in the town tended not to be
in the compounds themselves but was usually the accommo¬
dation provided for domestic workers on the plots of their
4
European employers. The following decade was, officially
at least, the beginning of significant changes in atti¬
tudes, and eventually regulations. In 1960 it was
reported that:
For some years housing conditions at Livingstone
have lagged behind those in other centres on the line
of rail, but now considerable progress is being made




has been completed the greater part of the backlog
will have been met, and the old 1grass' huts can be
pulled down."'
Such optimism, though heard many times over the previous
thirty years, seemed possibly more justified. The number
of permanent local authority administered houses had
increased by 45% in only two years and the number of
temporary buildings of all kinds had decreased by 57% in
2
the previous five years.
TABLE 4.1
HOUSING TRENDS IN LIVINGSTONE: 1955 - 1961
Permanent Temporary and 'Grass'
1955 1961 1955 1961
Local Authority 2252 3279 981 205
Contractors - - 190 39
Government 462 174 - -
Self-built 405 464
Source: Derived from Annual Report of Local Government
and African Housing department. Lusaka. 1961.'
However, if one looks more closely at the figures given
in Table 4.1, it is apparent that the total housing stock
in the town actually decreased by almost 5% in that period.
1
Native Affairs. 1960, p.73
2
In fact, there was no building of any sort
between 1955 and 1959, though It had been established
that at least 1,000 new houses were required just in
order to cope with the demolition of temporary housing
that was going on at the time, and with no real allowance
made for an increase in population. It was only In 1960
(595 new houses) and 1961 (425 new houses) that any real
action was taken.
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The significant difference, therefore, was not the
quantity, but the type, of housing that had become avail¬
able. The drop in quantity would not have been too impor¬
tant if the population had remained stable, as the new
council accommodation was undoubtedly larger and better
quality than the housing it replaced. But the town's
population increased by over 60% between 1952 and 1963
and quantity was therefore a crucial aspect of the
town's housing problem. The Council's 1960 claims to
have met the housing shortage must, as a result, be
treated with a great deal of caution. The following
years showed further drastic reductions in spending on
housing, and the emergence of the 'Aided Self-Help'
building programme as a possible solution to the worsening
problem. Livingstone's 'Site-and-Service' scheme was set
up in 1967 when a site was prepared at Dambwa on the edge
of the town but, as in other parts of the country, it has
not been the success that was hoped for. Despite exten¬
sive publicity, only one-half of the plots had been taken
up by 1970. There were a number of reasons for this,
some of which reflect the general needs and attitudes of
the population in terms of housing. Two of the problems
were essentially practical and had arisen because of a
lack of forethought on the part of those who had planned
the scheme. The site of the compound was partly on top
of an old. graveyard and many people were unwilling to
live on, or near, the graves of their ancestors. This
was well known throughout the town, but the attitude of
the authorities was that such 'traditional' concerns
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could not be allowed to interfere with the town's
development, particularly, as one official put it, "if
Zambia wished to show that it was a modern state." The
second problem was not a question of differences in
attitudes, but simple bad judgement. During the summer,
Livingstone experiences a good deal of rain in a short
period and the 'Site-and-Service* scheme is located in
such a way that it quickly becomes waterlogged and
occassionally impassable. There are other problems which
are not quite so obvious. The scheme was intended to
cater particularly for those people living in the housing
areas around the town that were considered sub-standard.
It has emerged gradually that many of these people, for a
variety of reasons, are not able (or do not wish) to take
part in the scheme. I will be reconsidering this point
when I have looked more closely at the housing needs of
the population.
By the end of the decade, Livingstone had 35,000
people living in high density housing around the town.
Despite its many problems it can be said that, in certain
respects, it appears to have achieved a relatively high
standard of housing by Zambian standards. Table 4,2
compares the type of housing available (as defined by
rent payment) with a number of other towns. It shows
Livingstone to have a very high proportion of housing
administered by the government and the local authority
and, as one might expect, a low proportion of company-
owned housing. In terms of quality, Livingstone compares
favourably with the capital Lusaka, as far as the
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TABLE 4.2











Livingstone 67.1 14.7 19.4 22.5 43.4
Mufilira 85.3 7.1 64.0 8.9 21.1
Ndola 66.9 7.1 31.7 17.1 44.0
Lusaka 60.3 25.8 9.8 27.0 37.4
ALL TOWNS 71.9 9.4 43.5 13.5 33.4
Source: 1969 Census, First Report, p.B65.
provision of facilities such as electricity (45% of all
dwellings in 1969 compared with Lusaka's 32%), flush
toilets (60% compared with 42%), though it does fall far
behind both Lusaka and the national urban average in the
provision of private water taps. In terms of the size and
quality of its housing units it is not significantly
worse, or better, than other urban areas. Its superiority
over Lusaka can be partially attributed to the fact that,
unlike the capital where "40% of its population live in
2
unauthorised settlements", there are no squatter com¬
pounds in Livingstone. There is, however, one large
-1
Thus, for example, Livingstone in 1969 had an
average of 2.34 rooms/dwelling, which compares favourably
with Lusaka's 2.24 but less favourably with the overall
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housing area which though it is the responsibility of the
Municipal Council and, as such, is not 'unauthorised' has
reached such a deplorable state that the town's Senior
Health Inspector was obliged to comment that it "is
virtually a 'squatters' camp and constitutes a problem
<1
which is common to most local authorities today." This
is Malota compound which forms the basis of this study.
4.3 Malota Compound
Malota is quite definitely neither an unauthorised,
nor a squatter, compound in the sense that I used these
terms earlier. The use of the word 'squatter' in this
context reflects a set of attitudes much wider than the
relatively simple matter of legality of tenure. A good
deal of the concern which led to the compound being
2
declared a 'disaster area' was related to questions of
health and sanitation, and much was made publicly, even
in the national press, of the physical appearance of the
compound with terms such as 'eyesore', 'shantytown', and
•tumbledowns* frequently used. But, more importantly,
this physical chaos was linked up with assumptions of
social and political disorganisation, and the compound
was regarded by the authorities and the general population
as a centre for political opposition; as the refuge of
prostitutes and criminals; and as a general threat to the
welfare of the town. The development of the idea that
Senior Health Inspector to Town Clerk: 16/8/1967
?
Times of Zambia, 21/1/1971
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Malota was a 'squatter1 compound was related to a belief
that physically, socially, economically, and politically-
it was separate from the town as a whole. Thus the term
squatter was used to define a cluster of attributes
which, in this case, had nothing to do with the legality,
or illegality, of the tenure of its population.
There is no doubt, however, that in some respects
Malota is unique not only in Livingstone but probably in
Zambia. One of the most notable features has been that,
for many years, it was the only area in Livingstone where
Africans were able to lease land on which they could
build their own houses. This can still be done, and any
structures built become the rroperty of the 'landlord'
and may be rented out, or sold, without interference. In
her survey McCulloch called it the 'Grass Compound', a
reference to the high proportion of buildings with
thatched roofs at that time. Officially it is known as
Maramba Central, being surrounded on three sides by the
large, council-built Maramba Compound which is close to
the Maramba River. But, over the years, it has acquired
the name Malota, a Nyanja word for the hedge euphorbia
•i
that grows around many of the compound's plots. Malota
predates surrounding Maramba, or any other existing com¬
pound, by many years. Its actual origins are much dis¬
puted, but it is generally accepted that it was the first
compound to have been built by the newly settled European
Reynolds (1962:1) remarks that the Lozi equiva¬
lent ^uzwezl is also used in referring to the compound,
but there was no evidence in 1971 that this was still so.
102
community at the beginning of this century. Reynolds
comments that "it is known, however, that it was already
in existence in 1913." A small number of men living on
Malota claimed to have been there for over fifty years,
but they were unable to clear up the dispute and provided
a variety of dates between 1907 and 1922.2 It is known
that the town's first location was set up in 1907 and that
there was a charge of one shilling per head. This
location was intended for any African working within the
town. What was to be done with those who were unable to
find work, or who had just arrived in town, was still under
consideration, though the general public was assured that
the "supervision of natives within the precincts of the
4
town is to be effectively performed." Even at this early
stage, the compound's problems were beginning to emerge
and, in a report of a Livingstone Management Board meeting
in late 1911, the Livingstone Mail remarked:
The only matters that were discussed that were of
general importance related to the taking over of the
cemetry and the native 'compound' near the Maramba.
With regard to the latter the chairman undertook to
interview the Administrator and to urge that it be




Two informants in particular were adamant that
the compound was not built until 1922 and I was, initially,
tempted to accept this. Official sources and local
legend, plus other oral evidence, eventually outweighed
them. The problem lies in the changes in name over the
years and the fact that all the compounds built near the
Maramba river seemed to have been called, at one time or
another, Maramba. On balance I feel certain that Malota
is the original compound.




date. Complaints of insanitary and other objection¬
able conditions arising from overcrowding render
this step necessary.''
Complaints had also begun to come in to the Management
Board that unauthorised compounds were beginning to
spring up all around the town. Having accepted authority
for the two existing compounds, the Board began to
develop its influence and introduce changes. It was
decided, for example, that all huts should be roofed with
corrugated iron, rather then thatch, despite the extra
cost (which was at present about £5 for each hut).
Stricter regulations were brought in with the introduction
of compound managers and inspectors, passes and permits,
the limitation of numbers on any one plot, and a variety
of rules relating to the day-to-day existence of the
compound^ inhabitants.
Malota was first set up when the housing of
Africans in town was a new problem to the European
administrators, and the lessons learnt in setting it up
seem to have provided the basis for future policy
decisions particularly in terms of the need for the strict
control of compound life in virtually all respects. It
appears to have been at a very early stage that the
Livingstone authorities decided that, besides actually
building houses for Africans, it would be a good idea to









In its early years, the compound was known as
Kashitu and consisted of the four sections now known as
A, B, C, and D, At the end of 19^0 it became necessary
to expand by adding a fifth, smaller section that is now
called E. It is apparent that, evan at this stage, the
quality of housing was regarded as poor, for the Council
built an 'experimental' house of thatch and sawn timber
that they hoped would serve as a standard for the rest of
the population, Reynolds reports that, because of the
high cost (£13)# the experiment was a failure. At about
the same time, a further overflow area was built with
■z
seventeen plots on it. This was destroyed in 1960,
The monthly rent paid by the landlords has not
varied very greatly over the years, though the per capita
system of earlier days changed as more men brought their
families onto t" e compound. Until 1960 the rent charged
had been, for many years, 2s 6d per plot per month. In
that year it was increased to 7s 6d so that the inhabi¬
tants might bear more of their share of the cost of the
1
One of the earliest of the long list of Living¬
stone hative Location Bye-Laws stateds "It shall be law¬
ful for the Municipality to lease lots in the location
where natives may erect their own huts or dwelling
houses." I have been unable to trace exactly when this




The owners of these houses were given, on
average, £29 as compensation.
105
1
services that the municipality provided. However, these
services have always been very basic and certainly have
not improved in the last three decades.
In 1951, McCulloch felt that Malota closely
resembled the *African Townships' that had recently been
set up on the Copperbelt. She noted the wide range of
house types that were to be found; from "good brick
houses with glass windows" to simple "mud huts or cor-
2
rugated iron shacks". She also noted the frequent
existence of more than one hut to a plot, in which
relatives, friends, or children would sleep. Her name
for the location, the 'Grass Compound*, is an obvious
reflection on village-like appearance that it presented
to the rest of the town. Ten years later, it had not
changed much with the houses ranging from "dilapidated
shanties or aged pole and daga huts, worth a few shil¬
lings, to substantial multi-roomed brick buildings worth
up to £500 or more." Basic facilities do not appear to
have changed much at all for many years. In 1971» as ten
years earlier, there was communal piped water provided
through a total of 28 taps scattered around the compound.
Sanitation was very primitive, with a dozen communal
bucket latrines situated around three sides of the
In fact, in 1912 the cost was 1s 3d per capita
plus a charge for sanitary services of 1s 3d/month, So,
in relative terms, the cost of renting plots had, until





compound. Reynolds mentioned the existence of "sewerage
lines passing through or rather beneath the compound" ,
though this was persistently denied to me by the
authorities. Reynolds also mentioned that "the compound
2
is regularly served by garbage lorries," But the 1971
report of the Municipal Council admitted that:
Malota is not a clean township because there is no
regular lifting of refuse. Refuse vehicles are
unable to make the required trips due to the fact
that the condition of the roads is harmful to the
vehicles as the reads are subject to severe erosion.
No large scale repair of roads was undertaken because
the fate of Malota was unknown,3
It Is undoubtedly true that the heavy rains that fall
between December and March cause a good deal of erosion.
However, there is also a distinct political element to
the problem. Officials in the office of the Town Clerk
make no secret of the fact that they had been trying to
get rid of Malota for many years and admitted that the
Council had been deliberately lax in such matters as
refuse collection and sanitation. It Is obvious from
Reynolds' report that as early as 1961 it was firmly
believed that Malota was very soon to be demolished, and
he talks of the way in which people were trying to increase










Despite the attempts of individual Malotans to
improve the standards of their own plots, it is apparent
that little has changed on the compound and, if anything,
conditions have deteriorated. This is despite a general
rise in the standards of municipal housing in Zarahian
urban areas. The low status of the compound has been
exaggerated by two factors. Firstly, there has been a
change in expectations on the part of the population
because of the development in recent years of large
municipal compounds that have made the possession of
individual water and electricity supplies, as well as
water-borne sanitation, much more widespread. Secondly,
there has been the attitude of the local authorities who,
wishing to rid themselves of the compound, have resorted
to inactivity but have not been able to achieve their
goals.
The problem caused by this reluctance on the part
of the Council to improve facilities has been dramatised
by the large increase in the compound's population over
the last twenty years. At the time of McCulloch's survey
in 1951, she estimated there to be 1,870 inhabitants
which, in view of the strict limitations on the number of
people to a plot that we noted earlier, was probably
something like the number that the compound had been
built for. Ten years later, Reynolds commented:
j
1
McCulloch (1956:7). This is an average of just
under four to a plot.
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Originally, only one- main building or dwelling house
was permitted to be built on each stand. Over the
years this was relaxed, or rather, not sufficiently
enforced. Control is still exercised over the
population, however, and periodically the numbers are
reduced and excessive building is stopped.1
The relaxation meant, however, that the population had
increased by 2594 to a total of 2,404, or that there were
Just over five people to a plot. Of these, 2,292 were
permanent residents and the remainder, less than 5%, were
•visitors*. Independence in 1964, and the removal of
•discriminatory clauses1 in bye-laws had an even more
dramatic effect with the population estimated to be 4,119
2
by 1971, an increase of almost 70%. There has been no
parallel Increase in the number of plots available which
means that the number of people living on a plot has
risen to an average of Just under nine. But Just how
intense the problem of overcrowding has become cannot be
understood until it is realised that on some plots there
are over twenty people living on an area of land that
McCulloch claimed would not allow "for more than two or
three (houses), however closely together they are built.
This deterioration in standards, hastened by the
rapid increase in the compound's population, has resulted
in a good deal of antagonism both within the compound and
within the town generally, and many have demanded its




Municipal Council Survey. 1971
McCulloch (1956:5). McCulloch uses the term
•house' to mean building in the context of Malota.
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things were "being said. For instance, the 1937 edition
of Native Affairs was mo3t explicit when it commented*
The compound is squalid, the sanitation fetid, and
the site morbid ••• until it is decided for whom the
local authority is under an obligation to find
housing accomodation ••• it is idle to discuss the
transfer of the Livingstone compound to a more
salubrious site, or to afford such amenities as
lights, libraries and canteens.
The following year the Municipality put forward a scheme
to the Government which entailed "the laying out afresh
2
of the present location, but on the old site," It is not
recorded what happened to the plan, but over twenty years
later African Affairs commented that:
No progress has been made on a proper owner-housing
scheme, though there are many Africans would like
to see this come about and are ready to support it.
Some have, in fact, built quite good houses in the
grass compound which has been in existence probably
since the town started. This area is popular because
it is cheap but it must be replaced and a sub¬
committee of the council has been appointed to go into
this whole problem.3
Such comments recur throughout Government and Council
records and Reynolds* comment in 1961 that, "over the
years, therefore, the decision has crystallised that
4
Malota must be demolished" is something of an under¬
statement. A number of ways of solving the problem were
suggested during the following decade. These included
building a new 'African Township'j the gradual demolition
of Malota section by section, with transit housing and
1
Native Affairs, 1937, pp 46-48
2
Native Affairs, 1938, p.37




eventual resettlement in new accommodation on the old
site; and a new and cheaper Site-and-Service scheme near
to Malota. Yet in 1971 the compound still remained, and
with a much larger population to be resettled should
demolition take place.
In 1970 a special meeting was convened to review
the situation. This was attended by the Southern
Province's most prominent political figures and resulted
in the following resolution:
That a petition be presented to his Honour the Vice-
President of the Republic of Zambia, S.Kapepwe,
Minister of Provincial and Local Government,
requesting in the most urgent possible terms that in
order to deal effectively with the problem of Malota
compound, in which area thousands of people are
living in heart-breaking conditions, the area be
declared a disaster area, and that as a consequence
the government make available all resources
financial or otherwise to deal with the area in the
manner in which disaster areas are usually dealt
with.1
At this stage the problem of Malota had taken on a rather
wider perspective for many people believed that it
Jeopardised Livingstone's status in the country. This
attitude is best summed up in the following newspaper
article which had the title "Malota - The Speck of Dust
in the City's Eye?"2 It said:
As Livingstone's bid for city status gathers
momentum, the slums of Malota compound are fast
coming into focus of worried health authorities.
A typical comment on the eyesore shanty town
came yesterday from the Council's Officer of Health
Dr.S.Paul, •Malota is our headache when it comes to
achieving a high degree of cleanliness. If Malota
1
Minutes of an extraordinary meeting of
Livingstone Municipal Council: 9/5/1970.
2
Times of Zambia, 29/12/1970
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remains as it is, it will not be possible to do
Justice to Livingstone*.
Malota, it is obvious, is not a squatter compound
in the sense that it is either unauthorised or illegal.
But its long history of poor housing conditions and
inadequate facilities stretching back over fifty years,
in contrast to the gradually improving standards of
housing in the town generally, has caused it to become
regarded as such, even by those responsible for the wel¬
fare of its inhabitants. By its very appearance, which is
thought by many to suggest that it is little more than a
village planted within the boundaries of a town, it is
considered unacceptable in a modern and Independent
Zambia. Physically, it has changed very little during
its history and the buildings and facilities have not
improved to any great extent, perhaps even the opposite.
As a result, many of Livingstone's citizens believe it to
be backward and see it as supporting, and being a
repository of, the traditions that must disappear if
Zambia is to progress. It is in this sense that Malota
has become, in the eyes of the rest of the town, a
'squatter* compound. Such attitudes throw up a number of
interesting questions. In general terms, to what extent
are such perceptions a true picture of what actually con¬
stitutes a 'squatter* compound? More specifically, is
Malota really like this? And, finally, drawing on the
answers to the first two questions, to what extent is Malota
similar to other squatter compounds in Zambia? In the next
chapters I want to look more closely at some of the
112
characteristics and activities of Malota's population in
order to answer these questions.
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CHAPTER 5
PLOTS AND TENANCY ON MALOTA
5:1 The Flots
The compound is surrounded on three sides by the
large Council-built Maramba compound, and on the fourth
by empty and unbended land which stretches over the town
boundary into the neighbouring countryside. One of the
first features that a visitor notices is the large amount
of vegetation, trees and hedges, that grows as compared
with the surrounding areas. Similarly, the symmetry and
order of Maramba, where each plot has a single building
of standard design, provides a stark contrast with the
apparently random placement of Kalota's buildings, and
the great diversity of architectural style. The disorder
is partly an illusion in the sense that, unlike most
squatter areas, there is a basic underlying grid of equal
sized plots and clearly l&id-out pathways that has been
there since the early days of the compound and which, with
few exceptions, is still adhered to. In this use of
straight lines, which "have had an over-riding influence




has much in common vith the resferity of official housing
areas; in the country. The plots are all of one size,1
but within that area may lie as many as six buildings of
totally different styles, constructed from a variety of
materials, and arranged vith no apparent logic other than
the pressing need for accommodation.
At the time of McCullcch's study, she estimated
2
that there were "about 500 small plots" though, according
to her sample, only 453 of these were actually occupied.
Ten years later, Reynolds stated that there were 475
stands of which ten were used for communal latrines, one
for water, and one for the church of the Jehovah*s
Witnesses. In 1971 T calculated, using personal obser¬
vation and Ordnance Survey maps, that there were 476
plots. Six of these were being used for communal latrines,
eight of them had no buildings on them, and one plot had'-
once had a latrine but this had recently been demolished.
Three of the plots had not had anyone living on them for
a considerable period of time, and one other plot
remained the base of the Jehovah's Witness sect. This
left a total of 457 plots that were being used for resi¬
dential purposes. We can see that, in terms of basic
physical layout, there has been very little change on the
1
McCulloch notes (1956:5) that each plot is
50sq.yds, in size (i.e, ©bout 21* x 21*) whereas Reynolds
states that they are 50* x 50* (i.e. 277sq.yds.)« Both
personal observation and Ordnance Survey maps suggest
that Reynolds, though slightly over-estimating, has a
much more accurate figure.
2 McCulloch (1956:5)
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compound over the last twenty years.
Though the compound has obviously been laid out
with symmetry in mind, the different sections are not
equal in size. Sections D and E also have a smaller pro¬
portion of their plots actually occupied, in the first
case because a number of plots have been used for
communal facilities, and in the latter because a number
have had their buildings demolished, (See Table 5.1),
A web of pathways separate the plots into groups
of 14 (10 on E section and 15 on B section), and indi¬
vidual plots are usually enclosed by a combination of
walls and hedges. This gives the plots an air of being
enclosed, and provides a degree of privacy that one would
not expect with such overcrowding. Neither the pathways
nor the yords have been tarred or concreted, though
individual yards are normally swept and provide few
problems even during the rain®. As we have already seen,
this cannot be said of the pathways which are the
responsibility of the Council. A good deal of rubbish
accumulates and this is only infrequently, and haphazardly,
cleared away. During the rains, streams and large pools
form quickly and certain parts of the compound become a
morass. With the inevitable flooding of the bucket
toilets at this time, the general state of Malcta deter¬
iorates rapidly during the first three months of the year,
with the after-effects lasting several more months. It is
a credit to many of Halota's plot-holders that they manage




POPULATION AND LAYOUT OF MALOTA, BY SECTION:
1961 - 1971






1961 and 1971 1961 1971 1961 1971
A 98 96 96 434 875
B 112 107 110 615 985
C 98 92 97 500 892
D 98 94 90 510 770
E 70 62 64 345 586
TOTAL 476a 45115 457 2404c 4l08d
Sources: 1961 - Reynolds (1961:3)
1971 - Municipal Survey 1971
Notes: a) Reynolds says that there are only 475 stands
but the compound is laid out in such a way
that I feel that this must be an error on
his part and 476 was the real figure.
b) Twelve plots were excluded from Reynolds1
analysis because in ten cases the absence
of the householder meant that there was
insufficient data, in one case the house¬
holder would not cooperate, and in the other
the householder had two stands.
c) This figure includes visitors as they are
not distinguished in the 1971 figures.
d) This figure is derived from the actual
household returns of the Municipal Survey,
In the case of section population figures,
my calculations do not always coincide with
those in the Council's final report, though
the differences are minor.
5:2 The Facilities
Reynolds (1962:6) makes the comment that Malota
"occupies a valuable site which is very favourably
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situated with regard to the central amenities of
Mararaba." Major facilities such as schools, shops and
churches are normally the same as those used by people
living on other parts of Maramba. Malotans have easy
access to a number of schools, a variety of churches,
and the large, open, Maramba market is only about a
quarter of a mile away. There are several bars around,
though not on, the compound and until the beginning of
1971, when it was closed to make way for a welfare
centre, there was the large Maramba Beer Hall opposite
the market. All these facilities are clustered to the
East and South-East of Maramba (see Diagram 5.1). Though
there are no proper roads passing through Malota, it is
surrounded by a good road system and the inhabitants
have easy access to transport to take them to other parts
of Livingstone.
Though there are no shops and no market on the
compound, many of the inhabitants have set up their own
businesses which they run from their plots and it is
possible to buy a wide variety of goods including vegetables,
fruit, beer and a range of domestic articles. The pro¬
duction of illegal beer is an important activity on the
compound, as is tailoring, curio-carving and black-
smithing. All these businesses are run from the plots
which serve as workplace and market. The compound is in
no way self-sufficient and for the provision of basic
services such as education, health, spiritual welfare and
the majority of consumer goods, the Malotan is dependant




































population. It may very well be that it is this easy
access to a wide range of comparatively good facilities
that has made Malota attractive and difficult to get rid
of, despite its obvious disadvantages. For example, a
number of parents I met were very unhappy about moving up
to Dambwa slte-and-service scheme because of the inferior
educational facilities. We can see then that in a wide
variety of situations a person living on Malota becomes
as much a Maramban as any person living in the new council
housing that surrounds him.
5:5 The Houses
Under colonial regulations, any house that was
built had to have a permit which described it, and the
materials used in constructing it? which defined the
number of people to live in itj end which stated specifi¬
cally where the location superintendent would allow it to
be placed. Such regulations strictly controlled both the
physical layout and the social composition of the plots.
Technically, a man could build as many buildings as he
liked on his plot providing he gained permission. The
main restriction was on who was able to live in them;
workmates and relatives were strlctl}' not allowed. Like
any laws, they were broken, and the frequency with which
this happened increased quite rapidly during the 1950s.
The eventual revocation of all these regulations gave a
great deal of freedom to the individuals who rented the
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plots from the Council, and many of them were quick to
make use of it. There were now several possible courses
of action not previously open to them. The number of
units built, and the number of people living in them, was
no longer determined by anyone but the plot-holder and it
became possible to build as many houses, and accommodate
as many people, as was physically and economically
viable. The major change was that housing could be sub¬
let without permission (previously rarely given), and it
became a relatively simple matter to leave the compound
whilst continuing to obtain rents from property owned
there. Subsequently, sub-letting has become an important
source of income and many plot-holders prefer to have a
number of smaller units on their plots for renting out,
rather than a large single unit for the housing of them¬
selves and their immediate family.
An important need that frequently dictated extra
housing units was the obligation to provide accommodation
for relatives and 'brothers* arriving in the town looking
for jobs, avalting a house on one of the better compounds,
returning to their rural homes after working in the North
or in Rhodesia, or passing through on their way to the
Copperbelt or Lusaka. Such people have to be catered for
and the revocation of crucial housing regulations ensured
that accommodation was available at all times. Housing
needs are a variable factor subject to ad hoc changes as
other factors, such as income or family obligations,
alter. Colonial regulations took no account of this or
were deliberately inflexible. With their removal, the
120
consequence (probably unintended) has been to introduce a
flexibility that has led to over 75# of Malota's plots
now having more than one residential unit.
The lack of facilities such as water and elec¬
tricity supplies means that even the best houses on the
compound are of a very basic nature, and the worst may
consist of little more than four walls and a roof, The
Council Report of 1971 commented that: "Most of the
houses are made of poles and dagger with galvanised zinc
roofs.1' This is an exaggeration for, though pole and
dagga is still used, Kimberley brick, burnt brick, and
concrete blocks have taken over as the primary building
materials. The former, which is a sun-dried brick, is
liable to erode if exposed to the elements and is only
semi-permanent. However, a house built with such a
material can last a long time if well built, with good
foundations, overhanging eaves, and plaster to protect
the bricks. ' It is popular because it is cheap (one ngwee
per brick in 1970), and relatively easy to make. During
the dry season, large areas of the compound were covered
with bricks that were being made. The official policy for
Maiota during the 1960s was that no new permanent houses
could be built and that only repairs to existing struc¬
tures were allowed. This policy was quite blatantly
ignored by the citizens of Malota, particularly as it was
only too easy to blur the distinction between repairing
1
Municipal Council Report.. 1971
2
Development Flanning and Research Unit, Lusaka
(1972:136)
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and building. Houses can be built very cheaply for as
1
little as K20 , and more importantly they can be built
quickly. Inevitably, they are structurally inferior,
and every year a number collapse during the rainy season.
In recent years an increasing number of men have set up
in business on the compound as ♦bricklayers' in order to
cope with the increased need for cheap housing. The low
quality of the housing has been exaggerated by the
persistent awareness that Malota might soon be demolished,
and an uncertainty as to how plot-holders would be com¬
pensated (if at all) were this to happen. Many plot-
holders were quite explicit in blaming rumours of demo¬
lition (supported by the refusal of the authorities to
improve facilities) for the poor quality of their own
housing. They felt that the authorities, and not Malota's
inhabitants, should be blamed for the deplorable conditions
and several claimed that they had been strongly 'advised*
by Council officials not to waste their money, time, and
energy on improving their housing from as early as 1962.
Equally however, many landlords felt that they had been
receiving warnings for so many years without anything
happening that it was unlikely that the compound would
ever be demolished. Some of them were annoyed that,
because of Council 'advice*, they had spent nearly ten
years living in poor conditions when they could have
1
The DPRU (1972j142) found that "65.3* of the
houses in Nguluwe cost less than K40 to build and 49.9$
of those in George cost less than K49". Over a quarter
of the houses in Nguluwe cost less than K20.
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afforded much better.
But in a large number of cases the problem is a
simple question of economics. Many plot-holders have an
income that is too low to enable them to carry out a
major project such as building a reasonably large,
permanent house. Even if they were able to raise the
necessary capital, the returns from two or three smaller
units, if they are sub-let, are greater. For a number of
reasons then, the housing standard is generally low with
an increasing tendency for plot-holders to build a number
of small, cheap units. This trend is well summarised by
the comment of one politician who said: "Most often what
matters is the number of houses that a landlord has,
rather than the quality of the house."1
Houses show great variations externally in size
and design. Roofing is normally made of sheets of gal¬
vanised zinc though the standard is erratic, sometimes
being carefully constructed so as to be an effective and
permanent protection against the elements, but in other
cases seeming to have been thrown together haphazardly
with no thought to either permanence or protection.
Though Malota could no longer be called a 'grass compound*
in McCulloch's sense of the word, there are still a
significant number of buildings with thatched roofs, and
certain parts of Malota retain a distinctly rural aspect
with whole plots being built in traditional style.
A similar comment was made in the 1971 Council
Report.
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However, even Malotans are on the whole against this,
believing that such structures are mainly responsible for
the traditional, conservative image that the compound has
gained. Inevitably, such housing exaggerates the view
that many have of Malota as being a ♦village in a town*.
The exteriors of the houses are normally simple
with little elaboration, though they are often plastered.
In shape, the buildings are most often L-shaped or oblong.
Their outsides reflect the basically functional nature of
accommodation on the compound. Colours are usually
♦natural* though during the late 1960s there was the
emergence of a phenomenon that had been noted on com¬
pounds in the capital, when a number of individuals
painted colourful, and frequently attractive, designs on
the outside walls of their houses. But such buildings
reflect only part of the wide range of structures to be
found on Malota. At the other end of the scale were a
number of units, the design of which sprang from European
rather than African sources. A few in fact could well be
described as 'bungalows'. Such plots stand out from the
rest of Malota as much as the compound does from surround¬
ing Maramba. These buildings are substantial, with up to
ten rooms, and sometimes worth over K1000, despite the fact
that they still do not have some of the basic facilities.
A notable feature of some of these units is the presence
of glass-filled windows, something that is not found very
often in Malota's buildings.
As is the case throughout Africa, household
activity is rarely confined within buildings on Malota.
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Buildings on a plot are often spaced in such a way as to
leave a courtyard, and the remaining land is heavily
\
utilised for work, cooking, storage, washing, brewing and
so on. Some of the plots have small vegetable gardens.
Many of the plots are used for business purposes, and an
extra building is often set up for sewing machines,
blacksmith's bellows and so on. A great deal of social
activity takes place within the courtyards of the plots
which, though separated off by hedgc?s, have their
entrances facing onto the public pathways and are there¬
fore open to passers-by and neighbours. The large number
of trees scattered around different plots provide excel¬
lent focal points for friends, neighbours and relatives
to meet, talk and argue.
The Intensive use of land and the great physical
variety serve to create an impression of disorder and
chaos; an impression which is often extended to the social
and political life of the compound by those who live else¬
where in the town. The physical disorder also acts to
exaggerate the view that Ke.lota is a completely separate
community providing a stark and vivid contrast with the
uniformity of the rest of the town's newer housing areas.
5:4 The Occupants
A series of changes at the national and local level
have meant that Malota's population has more than doubled
in the last twenty years. However, such changes did not
make it inevitable that the population should increase so
rapidly. After all, the compound is not, on the surface
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at least, a highly desirable residential area. Other
factors are involved that make Kalota the only acceptable
or possible option for a large number of people.
During the 1960s the population of Livingstone
grew rapidly as people moved from the rural areas, and
particularly from the Southern Province and Barotseland,
into the town in order to find the jobs and opportunities
promised by the politicians in a new, independent Zambia.
Livingstone *s Municipal Council, like its counterparts
throughout Zambia, was unable to cope with the demand for
new jobs ana the consequent needs for housing, and there
has developed a waiting list for Council accommodation
that will take many years to deal with. In 1971 this list
involved, in what seemed to be a conservative estimate,
about 3,000 people. Prior to independence, with jobs and
housing being interdependent, men arriving in Livingstone
who were unable to find employment within a short period
would find themselves under a good deal of pressure, both
formal and informal, either to return to their village or
to move on northwards to Lusaka or the Copperbelt. This
has now changed, though the rents of Council accommodation
on the newer compounds (as much as K12 a month in 1970)
would probably still be great enough to deter those who
did not have a regular income. In any case, the waiting
period is so long that the likelihood of a man getting a
house before a job is very remote. However, the ability
of plot-holders on post-independence Malota to build and
sub-let extra housing has made it unnecessary for indi¬
viduals without housing to return home or to move on to
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perhaps greater problems in Zambia's other urban areas.
Sub-letting allows a man, and his family if necessary, to
have temporary accommodation until he finds a job and,
possibly, alternative accommodation. A few years before
independence Epstein commented that* "Where so much
depends upon having a job, unemployment must count as a
major hazard in African urban life." Though unemploy-
2
ment is still a major problem in Zambia's towns, its
effect on individuals is lessened by accommodation
situations such as Kalota where housing is cheaper and
where they can set up in business for themselves. Such
a function is served by the squatter compounds of other
Zambian towns, but Malota is the only area in Livingstone
where these things are possible, sub-tenancy being
severely restricted elsewhere.
As a result of these factors, the tenancy system
on Malota is based around four categories; the 'landlords',
the 'sleeping landlords', the tenants, and the sub-tenants.
Though they cannot be understood as social groupings, they
do share certain characteristics.
5:5 The 'Landlords'




The whole question of what actually constitutes
'unemployment', and whether in fact it is a relevant term
will be dealt with in Chapter 6.
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A
landlords are in some ways the most important group of
men for they have access to one of the town's scarcest
resources, accommodation. The 1971 Council Report
considered that they "have their hearts on their plots."
Any buildings on the plot are the property, and the
responsibility, of the landlord. When a plot changes
hands, the incoming landlord is required to buy these
buildings, even if it is his intention to destroy them.
Though no provision is made for such actions in council
regulations, the "township authorities, although aware of
2
the transaction, do not interfere unless rent is overdue."
In such a situation the council would probably offer the
plot to anyone who was willing to pay the back rent.
Because property is very scarce, the amount of compen¬
sation paid to an outgoing landlord may be surprisingly
high. A single Kimberley brick building of very elemen¬
tary design with no glass windows may cost a prospective
landlord as much as K200. In effect the buyer is paying
for the right to rent land from the council, thus
acquiring for himself certain facilities apart from accom-
A
The 'landlords' are not technically landlords.
They themselves rent a plot from the Municipal Council for
the sum of 75ngwee a month. Though some of them subse¬
quently sub-let, this is only optional and therefore a
more correct term would probably be 'plot-holder*. The
1971 Municipal Council Report, however, constantly refers
to them as 'landlords', and the high incidence of sub¬
letting has caused them to be seen as such by the general
population, irrespective of the factual accuracy of the
term. I will therefore follow this line and use the term
♦landlord* for convenience sake but on the assumption




modation. Frequently the first action of the new landlord
is to raze the existing buildings and replace them with
more, or superior, structure. When plots do change
hands, it is normally an informal transaction between the
two parties involved. Only rarely are plots advertised
publicly (usually a notice pinned to a tree), and changes
occur sometimes literally overnight with a minimum of
fuss. Such changes may occur for a number of reasons. A
landlord may die; he may move to higher standard accom¬
modation elsewhere in Livingstone; he may move to the
Copperbelt or Lusaka; or he may return to his rural home.
The 1971 Council Report comments that the "plots have
either been bought or inherited from parents or relatives
who first pioneered Livingstone". This is in fact the
case with only a small minority of plots. Reynolds found
that 393 landlords (87%)^' obtained their plot by purchas¬
ing it from their predecessor; AO were given their plot;
four had been occupants from the very establishment of
Malota; one site was inherited; and eight others were
asked to come and take over the plot in the absence of
3
the owner.*
An Interesting sidelight on this is the fact
that it is compulsory for all Malotans to raze their
buildings if they leave to live ill the Dambwa site-and-
service scheme. Inevitably, this, with the subsequent
loss of compensation, has been a further deterrent for
those who might consider leaving Malota.
2
Reynolds actually uses the term 'Occupier'. In
1961 this was essentially the same as 'landlord',
3
Though I have no way of checking it, the figure
of one for plots inherited seems very low, and it seems to
me that some of the forty plots that come under the cate¬
gory of 'given' might easily be regarded as inherited.
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Because plots rarely come on to the market,
particularly in the last decade, it is usually the case
that a man has to live on Malota - either with relatives
or as a sub-tenant - before he can get the opportunity to
acquire a plot of his own. This tendency has been accen¬
tuated because knowledge of the availability of plots is
usually obtained through informal links on the compound,
links which are best developed by living there, A small
number of the landlords I met had obtained their plots by
going from house to house and having the good fortune to
contact someone who intended, or could be persuaded by
i
financial means, to leave the compound.
In 1961 Reynolds found that in a small number of
cases (just over 5%) the rent was being paid by someone
other than the landlord. The municipality itself was
responsible for six of the cases, (presumably their
employees) and the Mission Societies were paying for three
others. By 1971 a very different situation was in evi¬
dence. At that stage only 73% of the occupied plots had
their landlords present, which meant that over one plot in
four did not have the official landlord, as registered
with the Council, living there, A review of council
records made it possible to trace the whereabouts of the
landlord in about three-quarters of these cases. Four of
the absentees lived elsewhere on Malota, renting two, and
There were a number of rumours that certain
individuals had obtained plots by placing pressure on
those who were living there, sometimes of a physical
nature. Though I chose not to follow up the topic, I am
certain that, in a very limited number of cases, this has
happened.
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in one case three, plots on the compound. A fairly
substantial number, twenty three, lived on surrounding
Msrainba compound and another fifteen had houses in either
Libuyu or Dambwa compounds. A small group of less than a
dozen lived in various other spots in Livingstone, and the
rest were scattered throughout Zambia (with the exception
of one man who was living in Rhodesia). Thus about 60#
of the absentee landlords still lived in the town, in
most cases having moved from Malota as accommodation on
the never and tetter compounds became available, but
having retained their rights on Malota. These plots where
the landlord is absent fall into two categories; those in
which the landlord is defined by the authorities as a
'sleeping* landlord and those where the plot has an
officially registered tenant.
3:6 The ♦Sleeping* Landlord
In recent years, particularly since independence,
the phenomenon of 'sleeping* landlords has emerged. This
term means that the landlord of the plot, on moving away
from Malota, retains the rights snd responsibilities of
the plot. He continues to pay rent to the council but
also continues to collect the rents of any sub-tenants
who might be living there. Such men are described in the
1971 Council Report as "the worst exploiters of man by
man". Though in a number of cases this is an unfair
remark, sleeping landlords are often able to make a good
deal of money from sub-letting their properties. Thus
the average number of sub-tenants living on plots run by
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•sleeping' landlords is 2.3 compared with a figure of 1.3
for the whole compound. Similarly only 7% of such com¬
pounds have no sub-tenants at all, compared with a figure
of 37% for all plots on Malota, A number of these land¬
lords have found themselves in this position after having
obtained employment in an organisation that provides them
with accommodation on one of the better compounds.
Retaining a plot on Malota provides them with a not
inconsiderable supplementary income (as much as K25 a
i
month), or in other cases with the opportunity to help out
relatives who have their own accommodation problems. The
Council Report qualifies its critical comment by saying
that sleeping landlords are only ''few in number, about
100." In fact, this is an oVerestimation and there are
only 70. But, though this may be a small number in
absolute terms, It represents just over 15% of the total
number of occupied plots on the compound. Moreover, it
appears to be a category that is increasing quite rapidly,
McCulloch provided no statistics on this category, but it
is possible to make certain conclusions from Reynolds*
report, though he never actually us©3 the term 'sleeping'
landlord. He was able to interview and obtain data
directly from 425 (out of a possible 461) landlords - i.e.
the people actually paying rent to the Council, In ten
other cases the rent was being paid by various institu¬
tions; ten more by the relatives of whoever was living on
the plot; leaving only sixteen cases where there was any
possibility of a sleeping landlord, a figure of 4% at the
very most. It seems safe to assume that the figure was no
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higher ten years earlier and that the emergence of
sleeping landlords as a significant category is a conse¬
quence of the removal of regulations at Independence.
5:7 The Tenants
The third category of plot-holder are those
people described as tenants'. These are individuals
who, though not owning the property on a plot, pay the
monthly rent directly to the Council and are officially
acknowledged by that body. There are 32 tenants on
Malota and, witnout exception, they have acquired their
tenancy through relatives or friends who have left the
compound. In 1961 Reynolds noted only eight cases of
people who had been asked to occupy a stand in the
absence of the owner, a figure of less than 2% of all
plots compared with 11% in 1971. In the majority of
cases involving tenants there is an understanding, if only
implicit, that the arrangement might only be temporary
and that, were the previous landlord to return, his
position as payer and receiver of rents would be immed¬
iately restored. A limited sample of twenty tenants
showed that 60% of the original landlords were living out¬
side of Livingstone, a substantially greater proportion
1
than for 'sleeping' landlords. The 1971 Council Report
says of the tenants that they are mostly middle-aged and
this suggests that, in many cases, the tenant has taken
•1
These earlier figures were for all absentee
landlords, including tenants. In fact, over 70% of
'sleeping' landlords have remained in Livingstone.
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The fourth category - the sub-tenant - has in
recent years become, numerically at least, the most
significant. In 1961 Reynolds had commented:
In all but a few cases (friends, servants) the
residents of a stand are related to the Occupier,
either directly or by marriage. Naturally, the
majority are wives and offspring. Parents and
brothers or sisters are also frequently to be
found.2
Residents outside of the landlord*s family were a rare
phenomenon, sub-letting virtually non-existent. Once
again, independence was to change all this and ten years
later there were 580 sub-tenants on Malot's. A totel of
288 plots had at least one sub-tenant (i.e. 63% of all
plots) and sub-tenants made up 14% of the total popula¬
tion of the compound. The sub-tenants rent units,
normally of a low standard, from the landlord at a cost
of between K5 and K5 per month. Normally the reasons
that they gave for living on Malota related to the lack
of housing elsewhere in the town. Many hod rejected the
possibility of living on the Dansbwa site-and-service
scheme. Others, particularly those with dependants, had
found themselves in the position of being offered employ¬
ment by one of the companies in the town, being told to
-1
This is by no means universal. I recorded two
cases where aged parents were acting as tenants for their
sons who were working elsewhere.
Reynolds (1962:4)
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see the Council's housing department about accommodation,
and then finding themselves at the end of a very long
waiting list. In this situation they must either refuse
the job or quickly find ♦temporary* housing on Malota.
Many of the men who find themselves in this position are
young men arriving in Livingstone for the first time, and
the majority of sub-tenants are between the ages of 18
and 30. A relatively large percentage are single, and it
is these men who have particular difficulty in obtaining
accommodation elsewhere in the town. Sub-tenants are
much more likely to be working for the large firms in the
town and in this respect, as we shall later see, they
represent a major deviation as far as employment patterns
on Malota go.
5:9 Conclusion
Table 5.2 shows the relative significance of the
four categories of tenancy that have been discussed in
this chapter. The question of accommodation on malota
can be partly understood in terms of changes in the
significance of each of these four categories.
Under the colonial administration, the majority
of adult males coming to Malota were - by the very nature
of the regulations - also 'landlords', and an individual
choosing to live on the compound normally expected to
acquire a plot of his own. The situation now is that
there are many more adult males than there are plots.
Becoming a landlord is therefore no longer virtually
inevitable. Vacancies for plots are rare and prices
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TABLE 5.2
LANDLORDS, TENANTS, AND SUB-TENANTS ON MALOTA IN 1971
A B
SECTION
C D E TOTAL
Number of
occupied plots 96 110 97 90 64 457
Plots with
landlords present 76 75 71 66 47 335
Plots with
official tenants 11 18 7 10 6 52
Plots with
•sleeping* landlords 9 17 18 15 11 70
Plots with
sub-tenants 65 72 61 49 41 288
Total of
sub-tenants 128 163 119 97 73 580
Source: Household returns of the Livingstone Municipal
Survey, 1971.
consequently high. But, equally, it is no longer essential
to become a landlord, with all the financial commitment
involved, in order to remain on the compound. Some
individuals, whose Intention is to stay on the compound
only temporarily, may choose to continue as a sub-tenant
even if the possibility of becoming a landlord should
arise.
As a result Malota now caters for a wider range of
housing needs than before. Though It still tends to
serve those who have been excluded from other forms of
housing in the town, it presents a number of options that
have attracted certain categories of individuals who would
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previously have had no chance, or no wish to, live there.
The effect has been to drastically alter the social and
demographic composition of the compound and it is to this
that I now wish to turn in more detail.
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CHAPTER 6
THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF MALOTA
6;1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters I have looked at
certain historical and physical features of the compound
and have attempted to show that there are a number of
phenomena which are peculiar to Malote as far as compound
life in Livingstone is concerned. But the compound is not
a static and isolated unit. Its inhabitants arc Involved
in wider contexts outside of its boundaries - political,
industrial, familial etc. - and therefore have been inti¬
mately involved with the dramatic changes of the last
twenty five, and particularly the last ten years. The
town has seen enormous changes since McCulloch's study,
and it would be impossible for Malota not to have been
affected in some manner. For example, the increase in
population size alone must have had an enormous impact on
those who live there. Yet in many ways the authorities
perceive Malota in much the sere way as in the past. They
acknowledge that it has deteriorated physically; that it
is older, dirtier, and uglier. It still stands out like
a sore thumb from the rest of the town, and this contin¬
uing physical marginality gives the superficial impression
that, socially, it does not change. These perceptions are
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reflected in the unwarranted 'squatter' status, with its
implications of illegality of tenure, that has recently
been attributed to the compound. There has been little
real attempt to understand the structural changes that
have taken place; to see how the compound has changed in
relation to the rest of the town; or to understand it in
terms of contemporary Zambian society. In this chapter I
wish to look at certain features of the compound's social
composition between the years 1951 and 1971. Starting
from the assumption that "if population provides a
reflection of society, population change provides a
A
reflection of social change." , I hope to show, by re¬
working the statistics from the three studies of 1952,
1961, and 1971» that there were radical changes in the
compound's demographic structure, and that Malota in 1971
is a distinctly different phenomenon from the Grass Com¬
pound that McCulloch surveyed nearly twenty years earlier.
If the compound is still unique within the town, it is a
different form of uniqueness.
In attempting to describe certain features of the
compound's social composition, I have drawn heavily on
Kapferer's idea of social composition as being "an emer-
p
gent property from an ongoing social process." He argues
that the description of social composition is not separate
from analysis, but part of the analytic framework. The






Blau who defines emergent properties as being "essentially
relationships between elements in a structure. The
relationships are not contained in the elements though they
could not exist without them," A simple example given by
Blau to illustrate the point is that age distribution is
an attribute that only exists at the group or social
level, for individuals do not possess such an attribute,
only an age; yet individuals are obviously needed for this
phenomenon to exist, Kapferer extends the concept in
order to describe the social composition of a small
Zambian clothing factory. He comments;
I view the clothing factory as a social organisation
which straddles a number of life, migratory and Job
careers which are at different points of development.
Its social composition at any given time is viewed as
emergent from a set of individual choices and
decisions subject to a variety of constraints.2
Individuals arrive in a particular situation or environ¬
ment as a consequence of a series of choices, decisions
and actions made in the past. Differences within a popu¬
lation can be related to differences in the choices and
decisions that individuals make. This is summarised by
Garbett who says:
The individual is conceptualized as pursuing multiple
objectives in different contexts. The choices the
individual makes in relation to the various alterna¬
tives are seen, in varying degrees, as constraining
one another. The individual is envisaged as moving








Such choices take place within a framework of constraints
operating at the macro-level, some of which may remain
constant and others which may he changing over time.
It is through this sort of orientation that
Kapferer believes he can solve the problem that he first
poses himselfj "How can I describe the changing social
composition of the factory without introducing a consid-
i
enable element of unwanted stasis into my description?"
It is in the particular respect of change that his concepts
are of interest to this monograph, for if Malota has
changed in the last twenty years, which it undoubtedly
has, it has not changed as the result of some organising,
directive body. It has altered because tije individuals
who live there have, in certain ways and as the result of
certain factors, changed, as have the normative constraints
within which they must operate. Viewing Malota's social
composition through the conceptual framework provided by
Kapferer allows us, firstly, to avoid seeing it as some
sort of functional system or sub-system, but at the same
time prevents us from considering it simply as the conse¬
quence of the characteristics of a large number of unre¬
lated individuals.
Kapferer's work deals specifically with a formal
organization, which of course Malota is not, But, as he
Insists, his approach was developed in order that he might
avoid studying the factory as something that was an entity




general environment. In any case, it seems to me that the
general point that Kapferer makes, i.e. that differences
in situation and context may be related through an under¬
standing of the decision making processes of the individ¬
uals involved in them, is universally applicable; a
conceptual tool with a dynamic component that is particu¬
larly valuable to the urban researcher. It is particularly
valuable in allowing us to integrate within the same frame¬
work the demographic measures by which we quantify urban
growth and development, and also the sociological processes
which constitute 'urbanization*.
Over the years there has been a continual flow of
people onto, and away from, Malota. At the same time there
have been, as we saw in the preceding chapters, major
changes in the social, economic, and political framework
within which Malota's inhabitants must live. If aspects
of the social composition of the compound, for example age
distribution, have changed, it is because of the inter¬
connection of a number of major factors at different
levels. Through a consideration of these factors, I hope
to be able to understand how it is that certain categories
of people are disproportionately represented on Malota and
why, for example, some people become sub-tenants rather
than plot-holders. In particular, I wish to look in
detail at the relationship between changing accommodation
patterns and various factors such as age and occupational
status.
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6:2 Malota's Population - Demographic Characteristics
The most striking features of the Grass Compound popu¬
lation, compared with the overall population, are:
the preponderance of men in the older age groups, and
the comparatively balanced sex ratio; the considerable
numbers of children and other dependants and co-
residents living on the plots; the presence of a large
proportion of skilled men and traders and of men who
were self-employed; and the presence of a comparatively
large number of men and women whose attitudes to town
life suggested that they were 'permanently stabi¬
lised' . '
These conclusions, made in 1952, show how very
different Malota was from the rest of the housing areas in
Livingstone. At the same time they tell us much about
urban life generally at that particular time for they
implicitly describe what was not happening elsewhere in
the town. They give a picture of Malota that suggests it
was virtually a refuge for certain categories of the popu¬
lation that were poorly represented in other housing
areas; in particular women, children, older men and
dependents. They suggest that circular migration was still,
generally, the dominant pattern and that the workforce was
by no means stabilised. On the other hand they show us
that these sane categories were by no means totally
excluded from urban areas despite official colonial policy.
The implication here is that the authorities had been
inclined, or forced, to acknowledge the existence of these
groups, and to make some sort of provision for them.
Though, as we have already seen, urban policy was going
through some sort of transition at this stage with a trend




existence of Malota (with the peculiar demographic
composition that McCulloch described) suggests that the
need for such policies had been cbvious for a much longer
period of time, and that the authorities had been, reluc¬
tantly perhaps, aware of this. It Is difficult to know
twenty five years later whether Malota was a consciously
devised institution set up by the authorities at the local
level in order to introduce flexibility into a policy
imposed on them from abovej or whether it was an admini¬
strative anachronism which the local population took
advantage of. My own impression is that it was princi¬
pally the latter, with the municipal authorities taking a
passive role by tacitly accepting the position because
they could not provide, or even see, an adequate alter¬
native. What is certain, however, is that the compound's
unique demographic characteristics were a result of its
unusual role within the overall urban housing policy.
This can be most dramatically shown by the consideration
of one particular measure, the compound's sex ratio,
6t3 Sex Ratios in African Urban Areas
One of the most universal features noted by
researchers in urban Africa has been the numerical pre¬
ponderance of men over women. Relative to other develop¬
ing areas such as South America and Asia, where 58% and
40% respectively of the total female population live in
towns, Africa's women are under-represented in urban areas
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with only 17$ of them living there.1 Within Africa (and,
as we shall see, within countries and even individual
towns) there is great variation in this imbalance with
figures as high as 213 males per 100 females in Kenya,
2
and as low as 112 per 100 in Accra. In regional terms,
West Africa tends to have the most balanced ratio, and
East Africa has on average the greatest preponderance of
■*
men. Needless to say, there are a number of exceptions.
Di Giacomo and Stanley found that women outnumbered men
in Addis Ababa and concluded that an excess of women over
4
men was a characteristic of many pre-industrial cities.
These exceptions are, however, relatively few and the
numerical dominance of women by men is a virtual * given*
in urban research in Africa.
This has been particularly so in Zambia where
colonial urban policy was, In practice at least, fre¬
quently centred on the exclusion, or very reluctant
acceptance, of women in towns. Over the years there was
a good deal of vacillation on the question of the role of
women in towns but, despite the occassional efforts of
some of the mining companies and certain individuals, the
commitment was to migrant labour and consequently a pre¬
dominantly male society in the towns. The policy was based







Di Giacomo and Stanley (1960) quoted in Gugler
(1971:16)
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rural links; and that work in the modern employment
sector could only be done by men. If women had eny role
at all, it was to provide a stable environment for their
husbands.
When the emphasis began to change in the post-war
period, women began to move into the urban areas in
increasing numbers and on the Copperbelt, for example,
between 1948 and 1951 wthe number of African miners who
lived with their wives in the towns owned by the mining
companies increased by one-half." Similarly, McCulloch
noted in Livingstone that there was a "very large pro¬
portion of married men vho had their wives living with
2
them" on the town's Municipal Compound. These comments
can be deceiving. On the Municipal Compound, for example,
the sex ratio remained very high at 182 males to every
100 females, slightly higher than for the town as a whole.
This was because women still only had an indirect right
to be in town; they were normally dependent upon their
husbands, and their generally poor level of education,
the very limited .job opportunities, and various forms of
restrictive legislation ensured that they remained so.
Livingstone at the time of McCulloch's study had
a particularly high sex ratio compared with other urban
areas in Northern Rhodesia (See Table 6.1). There were a
number of factors that contributed to this. McCulloch







SEX RATIOS ON SELECTED COMPOUNDS IN LIVINGSTONE;
LIVINGSTONE; THE COPPERBELT: 1951-1969
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Zambezi Sawmills 228 118
Livingstone 171 119
Copperbelt 128 109
Sources* The 1951 figures for Livingstone and its
compounds are from McCulloch (1956*70)
The 1951 figure for the Copperbalt i3 derived
from Mitchell's 1951 survey as quoted in
McCulloch (1956*15)
The 1969 figures are from the 1969 Census
returns.
ratios as being a primary factor in the variation between
Livingstone and the Copperbelt, In Livingstone, men out¬
numbered women in all age groups in contrast to the
Copperbelt where this was only the case in the over-thirty
age category. McCulloch explained the difference by
reference to two main factors: the large number of Tonga/
Toka men in Livingstone, and the role of Livingstone as a
'relay* town. She suggested that the Tonga/Toka, who are
the dominant group in the nearby Southern Province, were
archetypal 'target' workers vrho came to town when they
were very young and stayed only a relatively short neriod
of time. They had no intention of staying in town longer
than necessary, and would leave as soon as they had
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acquired sufficient capital to set up as farmers in what
is a relatively prosperous cash cropping area. This means
that many of the men from this group are single, and that
there is a disproportionately high percentage of them in
the 15-24 age category. As a result, in the Southern
Province "the outmigration of women was almost non-
4
existent". McCulloch argued that this group of young,
single, or unaccompanied Southern Province men altered
the balance between the saxes In the town. The other
factor was the position of the town on the migration
route to the South. McCulloch commented that: "Men
migrating southwards from all areas pass through the town,
and some spend a few }rears there before proceeding south-
2
wards."" She suggested that these men were mainly younger
and in the early stages of their migratory career but,
because of the lack of job opportunities and lower wages
in the town, Livingstone was for many of them nothing
more than a temporary stopover. Such men, even if they
were married, would be likely to wait until they had found
something more settled before they brought their women
into the town. These two factors were undoubtedly contri¬
butory, but there is a third factor, which McCulloch does
not consider, that I feel might be of even greater
importance. This relates to the type of employer (and
employment) in existence in the town at the time. The






Railways. Both had large compounds for their employees,
the populations of them making up almost 20% of
McCulloch's sample. Both these compounds were notable
for the very large percentage of * grass widowers* living
there. In each case, almost one-third of the men were
married but living apart from their wives. This compared
with figures of only 9% for the Municipal Compound and
less than 6% for Malota. The inevitable result of this
was high sex ratios. This was particularly the case on
the Sawmills Compound where there was also a dispropor¬
tionately high percentage of men in the 15-24 age cate¬
gory, and a resultant sex ratio of 228 men to every 100
women. The very high proportion of grass widowers can
primarily be explained by the high proportion of what
McCulloch terms the * Other Bilateral* group of tribes -
i.e. the collection of tribes, other than the Lozi, who
live in Barotseland in Western Zambia, On both compounds
they make up about one-third of the population, compared
with 18?0 for that town as a whole. This group contains
substantially less married men, and twice as many grass
widowers, as any other group. Two factors were probably
responsible for this. Firstly, the regulations controlling
Barotse women were even stronger than elsewhere in northern
1
An interesting point to be noted here that throws
some doubt on McCulloch*s first argument is that the Rail¬
ways Compound has many more Southern Province men than the
Sawmills, hut a much lower sex ratio.
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Rhodesia and, secondly, this group were the poorest paid
of any of the groups in the town with nearly three-
quarters of them being labourers. Combined, these two
factors were probably a substantial deterrent to women
coming into town. A similar situation is to be found on
the small conglomeration of mainly employers1 compounds
that come under the category of 'Other Compounds' in
2
McCulloch's study. Once again, there was a high propor¬
tion of 'grass widowers' and a resultant sex ratio of 207
males per 100 females. In this case, however, the
explanation cannot be attributed to the dominance of
Barotseland workers. The dominant group on these other
x
compounds was the group from the Western Province. The
interesting factor here, however, is that, next to the
'other Bilateral' group, the Western Province tribes were
the poorest paid in the town, and similarly had a high
proportion of labourers. In fact, combined, these two
groups provide over half the labourers in the town. In
view of these factors then, it seems likely to me that
the important influence that is common to all these
compounds is the high proportion of poorly paid labourers,
and the large percentage of men who have not brought
A
Women were only allowed to travel with a pass
from the Barotse authorities and this could only be
obtained when their husband was in employment. Added to
this "councillors are periodically sent from Barotseland
to collect women who are in town without permission and
escort them personally back home." [McCulloch (1956:19)1
o
A list of these are given in McCulloch (1956:11)
x
The Mbunda, Nkoya, Luchazi, Luvale, Kaonde, and
Chokwe.
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their wives with them. The Immediate conclusion here is
that many men simply could not afford to "bring their
wives to Livingstone, This may, however, be an over¬
simplification of the problem. It may well be that
migrants prefer their wives to remain in the rural areas
where they can maintain a farm in order to supplement
their husband's low income, and also ensure that at a
future date when the migrant might find himself sick or
unemployed (a probable event if he is an unskilled
labourer), he has some form of income to fall back on.
As Garbett points out, "in sickness or in old age, a
man's only ultimate security is to be able to return to
-i
subsist on the land." In summary then, I would suggest
that the employers' compounds tended to have high sex
ratios because their population tended to be dominated by
poorer labourers who frequently left their wives in their
rural homes.
The essential difference between the Copperbelt
end Livingstone, it seems to me, was to be found in the
attitudes towards housing on the part of employers.
Livingstone's Municipal Compound may well have been
accommodating an increasing number of women as a result of
policy changes, but Livingstone's employers were slower to
change, Berger has commented that: "khen the Government
and employers belatedly recognised in the mid-1950s that
large-scale permanent urban settlement was a reality, a





workers which was not easily changed - or improved.n
But the mining companies had been well aware for many
years of the potential advantages and disadvantages of
allowing women and children into town. They not only had
their own experiences (some companies never discouraged
women), but they also had a wealth of comparisons avail¬
able in the Congo, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa.
With their enormous facilities and organizational
capacity, the companies were in a much better position to
decide on, and relatively quickly put into practice, new
policies. It is no coincidence that Heisler's earlier
comment on the dramatic influx of women onto the Copper-
belt related only to mining compounds. In contrast, the
Livingstone employers had always tended to take the
♦labour camp1 approach, providing mainly barrack-type
housing. Nor did the smaller companies have the capital
available to change overnight. Thus it would not be until
well into the late 1950s that the new policies would but
put into practice as far as housing was concerned. As a
result, women would still have difficulty in moving in
with their husbands.
Thus in analysing the reasons for the generally
high preponderance of men over women in Livingstone at
the beginning of the 1950s, it is necessary to take into
account the origins and distribution of the town's popu¬
lation, the physical location of the town, and the nature




of Malota? In the midst of a particularly male dominated
town, we have a compound with a sex ratio, 109 males for
every 100 females, that stood out in contrast even to the
relative balance of the Copperbelt towns. What was the
source of this balance?
Though she does not pursue the point in any great
detail, McCulloch does contribute a number of suggestions.
She points out that Malota was the only piece in Living¬
stone where an unmarried woman could defeat the employ¬
ment/housing equation used by the authorities, and find
<!
accommodation. She also points out that it was possible
for women to inherit plots fro© their husbands. Though
these factors do not, in themselves, contribute greatly
to the actual number of women on the compound, they do
suggest a very different attitude towards the presence of
women in town, one in which a woman1s role need not
necessarily be defined in terms of her husband. This
potential independence was extended by the opportunities
that Malota provided for self-employment amongst women.
Women in towns are frequently expected to contribute
to the household budget in order to maintain even basic
subsistence levels, but on the other hand they tend, even
now, to be excluded from the wage employment sector.
Their response is to turn to self-employment,^ Frequent¬
ly, however, and this was certainly the case in Living-
-1
'
McCulloch (1956:19). She recorded very few
employed women, though she does mention a nurse who
obtained a house through her ^ob.
? See Little (1973*31-38)j Papanek (1976:60)
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stone in 1952, regulations prohibit women from setting
up their own businesses (or at least make it very
difficult for them). Even after independence, in legal
residential areas in Lusaka, "the main forms of female
self-employment were still subject to official harass-
•i
ment". As with men, Malota was the one place in Living¬
stone where women could become self-employed and could, if
they wished, run businesses from their own (or their
husbands*) plots. This was, inevitably, a major attrac¬
tion both to men and women for "some men were reluctant
to live with women who did not have Jobs because the level
of male wages was determined with a view to the needs of
2
bachelors and not heads of family units," Though I have
no data to show the exact effect that this had on the
compound's sex ratio, it is interesting to note the
finding in Lusaka that, in those illegal squatter areas
where there were self-employed women, the sex ratio was
116 compared with the official housing areas figure of
128 males per 100 females.-' These opportunities for
women on Malota must have acted as an encouragement to men
to bring their wives into town. Indeed situations can be
envisaged where this possibility of further income might
have persuaded individuals to choose Malota, even when
accommodation was available elsewhere. To a limited






if they lived on Malota, and they had a number of options
that were not available elsewhere in the town.
McCulloch's data shows us that the number of
single men on Malota was low, only 18$ of adult males,
and that nearly 60$ of the adult male population was over
35 years of age compared with a figure of 37$ for the
town as a whole. The compound also had the highest
percentage of permanently stabilised adult men. It is
not particularly surprising therefore that there should
be more married men, more wives, more children and so on.
But why is the compound so radically different in the
first place? The answer lies in the compounds employment
structure. This will be dealt with in more deteil at a
later stage of this chapter but, briefly, the ma^or
difference between Malota and other compounds was the
highly disproportionate numbers of traders and skilled
workers who made up almost two-thirds of the compound's
adult male population. Almost two-thirds of the town's
ptraders and 28$ of it3 skilled workers lived on Kalota.
A massive 43$ of the compound's men came into the skilled
category. McCulloch's data shows that, of all the
occupational groupings, these two tend on average to be
the oldest, the best paid, and the most occupationally
mobile. These are, of course, related factors. Skills




McCulloch (1956:71). McCulloch, because of the
lack of highly skilled workers, merges the two categories
'skilled' and 'semi-skilled'.
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and migrants arriving in town for the first time are
unlikely to find employment either as traders or skilled
workers. But why should these two groups find Malota so
attractive? With traders it was a relatively straight¬
forward matter. In 1952, 95% of them were self-employed.
Most of the compounds in the town were employment-based,
and even the Municipal Compound was heavily oriented
towards those who earned an income from an employer.
Added to this, municipal bye-laws severely restricted
trading except on Malota, though there were some traders
on the Municipal Compound. As a result, trading and
Malota went hand in hand. Traders were not the only self-
employed workers. The physical layout of Malota*s plots
made them a vary practical base for small businesses
because they were large enough to allow small workshops
as well as residential units. The category of 'skilled
worker' includes such skills as tailoring, blacksraithing,
and carpentering, all of them skills which may be used
either in the wage 3©ctor or in the pursuit of aelf-
employraent. For much the same reasons as traders, self-
employed craftsmen find Malota the moat preferable, if not
the only, option. These men helped to make up the large
proportion of skilled man on the compound, The large
group of employed, skilled workers had different motives
for being on the compound. As we will see, many of them
preferred to rent their own accommodation on Malota rather
than accept housing offered them by their employers. This
gave them a security which their job situations frequently
lacked, and also the flexibility and independence that
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many of them desired.
The physical and administrative structure of
Malota made it very attractive, even essential, to these
two groups. In these groups, because of the very nature
of the Jobs, the men were likely to be older and therefore
more frequently married; to be able to remain settled in
town longer because they were not so subject to the whims
of employers; and to be better paid, thus having the
financial resources to bring their family into town. On
top of this, by living on Malota they had much more scope
to provide accommodation according to their own individual
needs. Combined, all these factors meant that it was more
likely that a man would have a wife and children, that he
would have the resources to look after them, and that he
would be able to provide adequate accommodation for them.
This must inevitably h8ve had an important effect on the
compound's sex ratio.
A consideration of the factors affecting sex ratios
in 1952 shows us a number of things apart from the limited
role that women were allowed to play in towns at that
time. One thing in particular that it demonstrates is
that, though Heisler might claim that in 1945 and 1946
"the decision was taken to build instead the infrastruc-
<1
ture for a settled urban society", the ability to put
policy changes into practice varied greatly between
regions and between towns within Zambia. It also demon-
strates that peculiar local factors may have an even




this is to take the subject out of its historical context,
and does not negate the possibility that the differences
were essentially one of degree, and thc-t the trend
tov/ards a more balanced urban sex ratio that was notice¬
able on the Copperbelt was in fact universal throughout
the country.
By the time of the 1969 Census, very definite and
universal trends were obvious as can be seen from Table
6.1. Though most of the housing areas in Livingstone
still had men outnumbering women, the ratios were much
1
reduced and in no case exceeded 120 males per 100 females.
As has already been stated, women appear to have moved into
towns in larger numbers than men in the years immediately
after independence. This was particularly pronounced in
Livingstone, fcr example, where in the twelve months
before the 1969 Census the female population increased by
15.89(: compared with a figure of 10,4# for the male popu-
2
laticn. It is difficult to tell whether this is mainly
women coming into town to join their husbands, or whether
independence litis brought about significant changes in the
role of women in urban areas. In general terms, African
women make up only a small proportion of industrial
workers, with rarely more than 10#, and frequently less
vc
than 4# of them being involved. It has actually been
^
Ohadike (1969:111) has calculated that in 1963
the sex ratio for all urban areas in Northern Rhodesia
was down to 128 males per 100 females.
^ 1969 Census, p.B30
3 Little (1976:80)
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argued that a country*s development may well have an
adverse effect on women and that "modernization may
maximise the differentiation of sex roles and enhance the
status of men while lowering that of women," The
statistics on the subject are difficult to interpret,
Heisler, for example, comments that:
The cash earnings of women are a startling new fact
revealed by the 1969 Census, One reason is that the
nationalist turmoil of the 1960s did much to smash
the conservatism of women, and of men*s attitudes
towards women, and so their cultural lag behind men
in adjusting to capitalism seems to be on the point
of vanishing,2
One of the problems is to have a realistic definition of
work. As Papanek points outi "It is clear that the work
of women is not accurately reflected in statistics con¬
cerning the labour force, because only part of it is
carried out in those sectors of the economy which these
•*
statistics are designed to measure," For example,
according to the 1969 Census figures, 16,296 of women in
Livingstone were *working* and another 12.996 were 'seeking
work*. Of those who were working, about half came into
the category *Unpaid Family Worker* (that is women who
worked without pay in the family business), 5% were self-
employed, and the rest were employees. As a group, women
made up 6.8% of all employees in Livingstone, almost








country. In terms of the wage-earning sector, it is
obvious that women still play a limited role. One of the
problems has been that there may have been a noticeable
Increase in the number of Jobs available, but there has
also been a dramatic increase in the number of women to
take them. However, the fact that as much as 30$ of
women, if we include those who are seeking work, are
involved in some way in the work sector is suggestive of
some sort of change. The role given to women previously
had been, at the most, a passive one. Women were only to
move to town to Join their men, and then only if regula¬
tions and policies allowed them to do so. Little has
forcefully argued that a substantial difference has
arisen in the attitudes of women, and that many of them
have rejected this passive role. He says:
Irrespective of how their traditional role is
construed, African women are now on the march. They
wi3h for themselves a significant place in the new
society taking shape, and these aspirations have been
fed by the spread of urban influences into the
countryside. In fact, urbanization and the women's
efforts to alter their position go hand in hand
because the growth of urban economic and other
institutions automatically holds out new and extra
opportunities of achieving status.2
x
He, like Heisler, feels that in the present day situation
the women have potentially more to gain from urban life
than men, and that they are probably less inclined, having
reached town, to leave again. Though this might be an
A





overstatement of the argument, there is no doubt that we
can no longer view the movement of women to, and their
stay in, towns from the assumption that they remain in
town only as long as their husbands agree.1 Nor is there
any question that, in any decisions made about movement
to, from, and between towns, women will play a positive
role. Thus the trend towards a balance between the sexes
in Zambian towns is not just a question of the removal of
regulations at independence allowing women to move into
town to join their husbands. The removal of colonial
restrictions has enabled women to become an integral part
of the migration to, and growth of, towns.
The sex ratio in urban areas varies greatly accord¬
ing to a number of factors, both local and national. It
varies between geo-political units; within a nation-state;
between urban and rural areas; between towns, age-groups,
occupations, and so on. Given these variations, howe\'er,
we have seen that in Zambia it has principally, and
almost -without exception, varied over time. The last
twenty years has ahovm an unmistakable trend towards a
balancing of the ratio between men and women. This can
be attributed to a number of changes which have removed
constraints, opened up options, and brought about a
number of attltudinal changes on the part of both men and
women towards the role of women in town. The one excep¬
tion to all this has been Malota. Throughout ell these
changes, the compound's sex ratio has remained, virtually
1
See Kapferer (1966:55); KcCulloch (1956:62)
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unaltered, and it has taken even the Copperbelt twenty
years to approach it. I have tried in this section to
show that changes in a demographic measure such as the
sex ratio reflect a variety of changes, and are linked up
\d.th alterations in other demographic measures. Does the
lack of change in Malota's sex ratio mean that it has not
changed in other respects, that it has virtually stood
still whilst the remainder of Zambia has caught up? It is
to this question that I now wish to turn.
6:4 Cogmosition of Plots on Halota: 1952 - 1971
It has repeatedly been stressed that major changes
occurred in urban areas when colonial regulations were
removed, and that a mora flexible approach was taken
towards the renting and building of accommodation. 3efore
this, Malota had been well ahead of the times in that it
had not tied housing to employment, had not excluded
women, and had allowed continuity of tenancy despite
unemployment and even death. But a number of changes were
inevitable, even on Halota, and these were particularly
noticeable in the field of plot tenancy. The available
data on this subject for 1952, 1951, and 1971 are not
always strictly comparable, mainly because things have
changed so much. For example, McCulloch and Reynolds, with
very few exceptions, were not dealing with sub-tenants,
tenants, or 'sleeping' landlords, and their infrequent
comments on these matters tend to refer only to the lack of
these categories. By reworking the data it is, however,




COMPOSITION OF PLOTS ON MALOTA: 1952 and 1971
Category 1952 % 1971
Children 34.6 45.9
Landlords 24.9 8.3





Others 19.0 40.8 28.5
TOTAL 100.3 99.9
Sources: McCulloch (1956:70)} Municipal Survey household
returns 1971.'
Note: N/A is 'Not Applicable',
The most obvious change is in the category of
'landlord', that is the person who normally lives on hia
plot and pays rent directly to the Council. As a percent¬
age of the total population, this category has been
reduced in significance by two-thirds. McCulloch assumed
in 1952 that all the plots had resident landlords, and
As I have said, the two sets of data are not
strictly comparable and a certain amount of caution has to
be used in interpreting them. McCulloch's data are based
only on a 10% sample and some of her total projections,
e.g. total population, can only be approximate. Figures
such as wives, which are derived from these projections,
must therefore also be approximate. However, I have tried
to make satisfactory allowances for this and feel that the
inaccuracies are minimal, certainly not enough to negate
the overall conclusions.
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Reynolds* findings essentially support this, though he did
find a small number of plots where it was possible that
tenants had been installed. At the very most, however,
this would represent less than one per cent of the total
population. For the 1952 situation, therefore, I have
taken there to be one landlord for every plot. The
dramatic change over the next twenty years came about for
two reasons. Firstly, there are of course a fixed (or
relatively so) number of plots and, as such, there is a
definite maximum number of people who can pay rent
directly to the Council - one for each plot. As a result,
any increase at all in the number of people on the compound
will lead to a decrease in the proportional significance of
landlords. This has been exaggerated by the second factor,
the appearance of what I have called ♦sleeping1 landlords
and tenants who have reduced the number of resident land¬
lords by over 25%. But even without this, the 126%
increase in the population would still have meant that the
proportion of Kalotans who could actually rent a plot from
the Council would have been severely restricted. The
significance is that, whereas one person in four living on
Malota in 1952 was able to regard their plot as their own,
in 1971 less than one in twelve could do so. In more
general terms, it represented a significant change in the
role of landlords on the compound, and the position of
Malota within the overall housing framework in Livingstone.
The term •landlord1 13 deceptive, suggesting as it
does an individual who rents out property. In the early
days of Kalota the compound had been little more than a
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working man's hostel, and the people living there could not,
in any v/ay, be seen as landlords. Access to the available
accommodation was based on the individual's ability to
contribute directly to the goals of those who had built
and administered the compound.
The introduction of the lease system in the 1930s
brought in the idea of what might best be described as the
plot-holder. From now on the emphasis was placed on the
renting of land, rather than accommodation, to the
individuals and, though rules and regulations prevented
the plot-holder from doing many things (including becoming
a landlord in his own right), it gave them a good deal of
flexibility end a certain element of independence that had
not existed before, and which did not exist anywhere else
in the town. Within certain limits set by the authorities,
the individual plot-holder had a resource which could be
2
used by him to his own advantage. As we have seen, the
result was that many of the people who moved onto the com¬
pound were those who did not contribute directly to the
■*
colonial goals. One of the consequences was a high pro¬
portion of women and children, and the impression gained
1
A cynical, but maybe realistic, view of the
actual role of Malota's earlier inhabitants is given in the
following comment from Native Affairs 1937,46 which
recommends the need to provide native labour with a "more




It is for this reason that Reynolds' term
'Occupiers' is too passive and does not give a real
impression of their role.
^ This is not to say that they did not serve a very
useful purpose within the town, Often they were indispen¬
sable .
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is that the compound was, to a very great extent, centred
around the family rather than the individual male migrant.
19% of the compound's population did not fit into the
categories based on the nuclear family, i.e. landlords,
children and wives, Using McCulloch*s data we find that
these are mainly male, end from the comments of both
McCulloch and Reynolds it would seem that they are mainly
relatives who were seeking work, alternative accommodation,
or ;}ust visiting. McCulloch mentions that some "lease¬
holders who build second houses on their plots have
relatives and workmates living with them, although this is
2
not officially permitted." It is of course possible that
a certain degree of sub-tenancy existed, but was not
admitted. Plot-holders discovered renting out rooms were
likely to lose their leasee, and it was normally a last
option that was based on personal obligation rather than
simple monetary advantage. It was therefore very rare, if
it existed at all. Plot-holders were allowed to take in
short-term visitors, but in this case the 3d a week
lodgers' fee went directly to the municipality rather than
to the plot-holder himself, In 1961, about 5# of the com¬
pound's total population was made up of these visitors.
The remainder cf the co-residents on the plots were mainly
relatives of the plot-holder, McCulloch, speaking of
In order to make the figure for 'wives' as





Livingstone as a whole, comments that?
Nearly 18% of the married quarters in the sample
contained such co-residents, the greatest proportion
being in the Grass Compound. Almost all were rela¬
tives of either the household head or his wife, and
the majority were children who had come to town to
attend school.1
Ten years later, Reynolds found very much the same
situation when he noted that:
In all but a few cases (friends, servants) the
residents of a stand are related to the Occupier,
either directly or by marriage. Naturally -the
majority are wives and offspring. Parents and
brothers and sisters are also to be found, and it
is to be noted that nephews particularly are
resident.2
We can see that the relative freedom in this second stage
of the compound's development brought about a change from
male domination imposed as a result of the needs of the
authorities, to a kin-orientation which reflected the
ability of the individual to make a number of limited
choices according to his needs. It was this range of
options that made the compound into a refuge from inflex¬
ible housing policies.
Apart from the landlords, the third stage of
Malota's development - as shown in the 1971 figures in
Table 6.2 - presents three other significant changes.
Firstly, the proportion of children, always high compared
with the rest of the town, increased by over 10% to 46% of
the total population. The most likely explanation for this




Reynolds (1962:4). This is supported by
McCulloch1s figures (1956:79)
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noted that Livingstone appeared to have the highest level
of infant mortality of any town or provincial area in
Northern Rhodesia. In 1951 there were less children on
Malota in the 5-1A age category than in the 0-4 group.
This was exaggerated by a tendency to send children back
to the rural areas as they got older. Schooling facilities
in the 1950s were very limited, growing children an econo¬
mic burden in town, and as they got older they became
increasingly useful in the rural areas. As health and
educational facilities have, comparatively sneaking,
improved; es wage levels have increased; and as the urban
population has become more stabilised, the number of
children on Malota has increased in proportion, to the
extent that it is now in line with the figure for the
2
country as e whole.
The second ma3or change is, as we saw in the
previous chapter, the emergence of sub-tenancy. It is at
this point that the compound began to acquire •landlords*
in the literal sense of the word. The rights given to an
individual by virtue of renting land from the Council could
now be turned to direct monetary advantage. This does not
happen, and is not allowed, in any of the other housing
3
areas in the town. Researchers have noted the similar
emergence of this phenomenon on two of Lusaka's earlier
1
McCulloch (1956:17)
~ 1969 Census, p. B29.
3
An illegal construction workers' compound near
to Malota, but outside of the tow's boundaries, appears
to have a number of sub-tenants.
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unaided self-help schemes, New Kanyama and Chibolya,
where figures indicate "the growth of a private rented
housing market .in these two areas, where the City Council
has not succeeded in enforcing rules forbidding sub-
•i
letting of Council houses or plots." Chibolya seems to
bear some resemblance to Malota in the sense that "any
control which had initially been exercised over the siting
of buildings had not been strictly applied more recently
and the layout resembles that of an unauthorised rather
2
tliart an authorised area." Surveys of Ifaw Kanyama showed
extensive sub-letting of property. In both cases, the
original purposes of the housing areas had been extended
by the residents themselves. Without the strict enforce¬
ment of the various controls and regulations, the areas
came to serve a valuable function within the city housing
market. Once they became established in this way, their
populations grew so large that there was "little hope of
demolishing them and resettling the population elsewhere
when the official housing programme was constantly lagging
■5
behind the demand." There is of course an element of a
spiral to this problem. A shortage of housing leads to
sub-tenancy which then increases the compound's population
to the extent that the compound cannot be replaced, yet at
the sama time the resultant overcrowding makes it even
more imperative that it should be replaced. The liberall-
*





sation of housing rules (however unintended) brought about
sub-tenancy on Malota, but the same act also took some of
the emphasis off Malota as a refuge. Jobs were less
frequently tied to housing and, though employers* compounds
remain, the concentration has been on the development of
municipal housing, open to all those who can afford it.
However, the very great number of people arriving in the
town during the 1960s has more than compensated for this.
Housing shortages, rather than housing standards, have
become the focus of attention. The question of spare rooms
repeatedly crops up in conversations in the market, the
beerhall, and the bars, and high prices can be obtained by
anyone who does have spare accommodation. As a result,
Malota has become a place not only for men looking for a
plot for their family, but also for younger men who need
temporary housing.
The third change is in the proportional signifi¬
cance of co-residents who, as a percentage, are now two-
1
thirds of what they were in 1952. This does not mean that
they have decreased in number for there are actually 60#
more in real terms than they were twenty years ago. Lack
of sufficiently detailed data makes it difficult to do
anything more than hypothesise. As far as wives are con¬
cerned, I would suggest that the increase in the proportion
of children and younger men is bound to decrease the pro¬
portional significance of this category, though the large
*
It is an unfortunate aspect of the 1971 Municipal
Survey that it includes no data on wives. Indeed the final
report mentions women only once, end then only in a meta¬
phorical way.
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increase in total population means that there are undoubt¬
edly more of them in real terms. The other co-residents,
who will normally be relatives or close friends (otherwise
they would be paying rent), have probably not Increased
much in real terms. In the same way as the number of
landlords is restricted by the number of plots available,
so are their relatives and they are very unlikely to
increase in real terms, despite overall changes in popula¬
tion figures. The changes of the last twenty years mean
that it is neither easier, nor more difficult, for a plot-
holder to have his relatives to stay with him. Combined,
I believe these two factors are mainly responsible for the
decrease in the statistical significance of the co-
residents.
In the third stage of its development, Malota has
remained in one sense a refuge. This time, however, it is
from the considerable post-independence housing shortage,
rather than housing policy as such. Many of the people
now living on Malota could easily live elsewhere if the
housing was available, and these are the people to whom
sub-tenancy is particularly attractive. This is not to
say that those categories to whom Malota used to be impor¬
tant are not still living on the compound. The traders
and self-employed workers, for example, still see Malota
as the main option, ae do many older people and, to a
certain extent, unaccompanied women. But the compound's
population has become more heterogeneous, attracting a
wider range of people.
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6:5 Age Distribution on Malota
One of the major effects of this increased
heterogeneity has been to substantially alter the age
distribution on the compound between 1952 and 1971. I
have already noted McCulloch's comments on the unusually
high proportion of younger migrants in Livingstone at the
time of her study, and discussed her explanations. As a
result of these factors, 28.8# of the town's adult male
population lay in the 15-24 age category compared with
only 23.3# on the Copperbelt (See T^ble 6.3). In the
25-34 category the situation was reversed with figures of
41.9# on the Copperbelt and 33.9# in Livingstone. This
meant that both areas had over 60# of their adult male
population under the age of 35. This was not particularly
surprising. Men came into town in order to work, and it
was only therefore to be expected that the majority of
them would be found in the lov/er age groups. From the age
of 40 onwards, a man's job prospects tended to diminish
culte rapidly, and a return to his rural home became,
increasingly, a likely alternative if a decision had to be
made. At this stage of a man's migratory career, unemploy¬
ment was more drastic and the possibility of further intra¬
urban or inter-urban moves more remote. For example, men
who came into town in their youth, maybe with great
ambitions, but who have been unable to maintain a job for
any period of time, or who have been unable tc acquire any
skills, will find it an increasingly attractive proposition
to return to their rural homes. One would therefore expect
to find an increasing number of migrants after the age of
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15, reaching a peak probably in the 25-34 age group and
declining slowly in the 35-44 category, with a rapid
acceleration after the age of 45. This general trend is
shown in the early 1950s* figures for Livingstone and the
Copperbelt, despite the previously mentioned variations
between the two areas,
TABLE 6.3
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ADULT MALE POPULATION:
THE COPPERBELT, LIVINGSTONE, A''D MALOTA-1951/2
Age Group Copperbelt Livingstone Malota (%)
15-24 23.3 26.7 20.9
25 - 34 41.9 33.9 20.9
35 - 44 27,4 22.4 28.4
45-plus 7.5 15.0 29.8
TOTAL 100.1 100.0 100.0
Source: McCulloch (1956: 15,70)
It is equally apparent from Table 6.3 that the
situation on Malota was very different from either the
Copperbelt or Livingstone, with the peak not being reached
until the 45-plus age category. There are a number of
possible explanations for this. At that time it was
necessary, in order to obtain a plot on Malota, to buy the
property from the existing plot-holder. This, of necessity,
meant a capital investment which would not be attractive,
or even feasible, to many young men beginning their employ¬
ment careers. In the case of Southern Province men, for
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example, it would have been positively contradictory. The
compound, as a result, had the lowest proportion of this
4
group, 6.2% compared with 18% for the town as a whole.
Younger men were normally looking for a wage-earning job,
and the possession of such work usually meant that one
would have some form of accommodation on one of the other
compounds. If it was not possible to obtain employment,
the most reasonable action would be to move on to some
other labour centre, rather than to invest capital in the
hope that some form of employment would be forthcoming.
Young men come into town primarily to gain a skill or to
acquire cash, and in the pre-independence situation this
necessitated finding employment. Malota was therefore the
last place that they were likely to choose to live.
The difference at the other end of the spectrum, in
the 45-plus age category, is even more striking, with the
Malota figure being double that of Livingstone, and four
times that of the Copperbelt, McCulloeh attempted to
explain the difference between Livingstone and the Copper-
belt by reference to the fact that the former was an older
settlement, and that the population would therefore be more
stabilised, Malota is virtually as old as the town, and
we therefore need some further explanation for the very
significant difference between the town and the compound.
If employment is tied to housing, an Individual who is
having difficulty finding work will also have trouble
1
McCulloch (1956:70). McCulloch (ibid., 32) uses
the term 1Central Matrilineal* to describe the tribes of
the Southern Province.
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finding somewhere to stay in an urban area. As men get
older, they become increasingly unacceptable to employers,
and retirement becomes a valid alternative. In 1952 this
most frequently meant a return to the village. Even now,
pension schemes and welfare services are far from being
automatic - except in some of the large mining companies -
and a man is expected to take advantage of the welfare
system that his family and village should be able to
provide. For example, a man who is ill may frequently
return to his home, only returning to the urban situation
when his health is restored. At the sane time, less than
5% of men in the 35-44 age group remain unmarried, and an
unmarried man has greater pressure placed on him to aim
2
for security both of employment and housing. With the
/
passage of time, it becomes increasingly difficult to move
to another urban area in order to find these things. By
the age of 40 a man will have acquired a skill if he is
ever going to do so, and his previous career will act more
heavily as a constraint on his future expectations. If he
has remained an unskilled labourer for over twenty years,
it is unlikely that he will ever become anything more than
this. Equally, a forty year old carpenter will rarely
become a plumber or a blacksmith. Thus, as retirement
becomes a realistic possibility, an individual is increas¬
ingly faced with the need to weigh up the advantages and





older man has a greater commitment to the urban situation
than anyone else. He is probably at the end of a long urban
career, and time itself is a form of investment. On the
other hand, a young man who is just beginning his urban
career still retains very active links with his rural
background, and many of his expectations and values derive
from a rural, rather than an urban, source. As a result,
their commitment to a particular urban situation is
frequently limited. Epstein has commented:
Obviously the pressures of the urban system do not
weigh so heavily on the younger men who are still
bachelors or have only recently married, and are
relatively recent arrivals from the rural areas; and
it is within this category that the highest rate of
labour turnover is found.*
A newcomer is not committed to any great extent to a parti¬
cular set oif personal relationships within the urban
context. Nor is he initially constrained in his search
for employment by the acquisition of some sort of skill
which would restrict the scope of the choices available to
him. A man with a long experience of urban life has, on
the other hand, an investment in such factors, and his
commitment is often considerably greater. Yet, in 1952,
he was still dependent upon security of housing and, there¬
fore, in the majority of cases, employment. The security
provided by a return to his rural home increasingly became
a gain which balanced out the costs of giving up his
investments in the urban situation, particularly the network




period of his residence. As his employment possibilities
deteriorate, this becomes the crucial factor in his ability
to make a decision.
With these things in mind, we can see that in the
pre-independence situation Malota provided a very differ¬
ent, and very attractive alternative. Furthermore, by
moving to the compound the individual increased his commit¬
ment to staying in town for he now became the owner of
property, with the consequent security of accommodation.
Also the plot was a potential source of income for, should
he become unemployed, he not only retained his house but
he could, If he so wished, set himself up in business.
His continued existence in town was not therefore totally
dependent upon an employer, The point at which the gains
from returning to the village clearly outweighed the costs
of leaving town were bound, therefore, to be different for
inhabitants of Malota, The age distribution figures for
Malota in 1952 suggest that fewer Malotans were forced to
make this decision, or were at least able to postpone it
to a much later point in their urban careers, I met a
number of men on Malota who, when faced with the decision
to leave town, searched out a plot on the compound as an
attractive alternative to returning home. To some people,
the cost of moving from one compound to another within
the same town is much less than a complete break from
urban life.
For further discussion, see Kapferer
(1972*103-113)
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Data from Reynolds* 1961 survey cast further light
on this subject, as is shorn in Table 6.4. The most evi¬
dent point is that Malota was very rarely the first place
TABLE 6.4





Over 42 years ago 7.5 3.S 0.0
Over 32 years ago 28.2 14.6 4.5
Over 22 years ago 50.5 31.1 10.6
Over 12 years ago 85.1 63.1 31.8
Over 2 years ago 99.5 96.7 89.4
2 years ego or less 0.5 3.4 10.6
Sources Derived from Reynolds (1962:5)
that people stopped on their arrival in Livingstone. Only
about one-third of the plot-holders who had arrived on the
compound within the previous two years had been in Living¬
stone for less than two years. Similarly, though over
half the plot-holders had first come into town over 22
years ago, only Just over 1C$ had been on Malota for that
period of time. This same trend is reflected throughout
the data, which consistently suggests that arrival on
Malota occurs at a later, frequently much later, stage of
an individual's urban career. We can also see that a very
large percentage of the plot-holders had been in urban
areas for more than twelve years, a considerably greater
figure than McCulloch had found for Livingstone's adult
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male population ten years earlier.1 A two-thirds majority
of the sample had been on the compound for a comparatively
medium length of time of between two and twelve years.
Reynolds also found that over three-quarters of the plot-
holders "rarely or never visit their home village", and
of the 17% who claimed to return frequently he comments
that "the supplementary question as to when they last
visited showed that the intention is not always ful-
2
filled." In summary then, Reynolds1 data are suggestive
of a number of things that demonstrate the unique role
played by Malota in the years before independence. The
majority of plot-holders were older men who had spent a
good deal of time in urban areas, and who had arrived on
Malota only after considerable movement within Northern
Rhodesia generally, and within Livingstone. It is obvious
that Malota was not likely to be the first choice of
migrants arriving in towns but one that would become
increasingly attractive with the passage of time as
individuals began to perceive the insecurity that age
brings.
By 1971, the situation had changed radically, as
we can see from Table 6.5. The 1971 figures for Malota
are much more in line with the figures for the town as a
whole twenty years previously, with a substantially
greater proportion in the younger age categories. This
1
She calculated (1956:51) that only 47.1% of the
town's men had had their first contact with urban life





AGE STRUCTURE OF ADULT MALE POPULATION







15-34 65.2 62.6 41.6 57.2 65.7 52.7
35-44 27.4 22.4 28.5 23.4 20.3 19.7
45-♦ 7.5 15.0 29.9 19.3 14.0 27.6
TOTAL 100.1 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0
Sourcesi Pre-Independence data from McCulloch (1956*15,69)
Lusaka and Zambia from 1969 Census
Post-Independence Malota from 1971 Municipal
Council Survey
must be seen as reflecting the dramatic increase in the
number of younger men who make up the majority of sub¬
tenants now living there.1 It was the significance of the
plot-holder, both socially and statistically, that was
responsible for the abnormal proportion of older men on
Malota before independence. The decline of this group,
and the emergence of sub-tenancy has brought these changes
in distribution. There is still, however, a bias towards
p
the older age groups compared with Lusaka, and this
■1
Reynolds does not give equivalent figures for
1961, but he does note that there were 168 'Occupiers*
over the age of 40. As there were only 647 men living on
the compound at that time, at least 41% of adult males
were over the age of 40 which suggests that the proportion
of men under the age of 35 remained comparatively low until
at least 1961, and that the alteration In the age structure
was a post-Independence phenomenon.
2
The appropriate figures for Livingstone itself
were not available and I have used Lusaka because, accord¬
ing to Jackman (1973*22), "the age structure of population
in line-of-rail urban Districts Is striking similar,
Lusaka being typical of them."
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suggest that the compound landlords still tend to be
older.
Before independence, many of the people who are
now sub-tenants on Malota would have been absorbed into
other compounds. As we will see later, the majority of
adult males on the compound are now employed, and it is
now apparent that a large proportion of the influx of the
last decade are men with jobs, which contradicts the
prevalent feeling in Livingstone that Malota's population
is made up to a great extent by •wasters'. In effect, we
have a reversal of the situation which occurred when
employment was tied to housing. The employer is not now,
in the majority of cases, responsible for housing.
Rather, the employee must find his own housing if he is
to continue in his job, A very long waiting list makes
it unlikely that he will get a place on a municipal
housing area for some length of time, and he must there¬
fore look to Malota as the only real alternative. A man
with accommodation is a much more attractive proposition
to an employer, and to some it is now a pre-requisite
before they will take a man on. Employment has therefore,
to a certain extent, become dependent upon housing rather
than the reverse*
On the other hand, the renting out of plots has
become an important source of income for many landlords.
Single men in particular are not too choosey about where
they live, and the capital investment for a landlord need
not be too great. Sub-tenancy can provide some sort of
income with little or no work involved, For men who are
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retired, or whose employment situation is insecure, the
sub-letting of their plot can be a very attractive pro¬
position. It is once again these marginal categories who
find possession of a plot so attractive, but the source of
the attraction is different. It is not just a question of
Malota being the only compound on which they might live -
all municipal compounds are, theoretically, open to them -
but it now has certain positive features that make it the
most desirable option. It is still therefore men in the
later stages of their life, migratory and job careers who
have the most to gain from obtaining a plot. Sub-tenancy
is most attractive to younger, unaccompanied, men. Those
men who are married and who wish to have their families
with them are less likely to become sub-tenants. Landlords
cannot obtain the same income from a man, his wife, and
his children as they can from an equivalent number of
single men. Not only is sub-tenancy preferable to young
men, they are meet attractive to landlords.
6:6 Occupational Patterns on Malota
In discussing some of Malota's demographic
characteristics, the question of employment, or the lack
of it, has been frequently mentioned and is obviously
intrinsically linked with these other matters. Colonial
The exception to this is the group of self-
employed men who wish to combine their residential and
business premises. Municipal regulations prevent this on
all compounds except Malota and, although they are broken,
there are some businesses e.g. blacksmithing, which cannot
easily be concealed. To such people, Malota is still the
only option.
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policy being what it was, this is hardly surprising. As
with other factors that I have discussed, Malota's employ¬
ment structure differed considerably from that in other
housing areas in the pre-independence period, as can be
seen from Table 6.6, Malota's distinction lies primarily
TABLE 6.6
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ADULT MALE POPULATION:
MALGTA AND LIVINGSTONE - 1952
• Occupation Malota (SO Livingstone









in the large number of trader's and skilled workers, and
the very low proportion of domestics and labourers, that
there were at that tiiae, I have already discussed traders
and self-employed workers and it is to the skilled,
employed workers that I now turn. The acquisition of a
skill has always been a highly regarded thing in urban
society giving, it is believed, a greater choice of Jobs
and more long-term securLty. It was felt- that if a man
had a skill behind him he would have no fear of unemployment
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and therefore no housing problems. Why then would skilled
workers prefer to live on Malota? By 'skilled workers*,
McCulloch was referring to "drivers, tailors, mechanics,
and various workers in the building industry - painters,
bricklayers, plumbers, carpenters etc." These are
skills that can be detached from the workplace and used
in the general commercial sector. They allow consider¬
ably greater potential occupational and geographical
mobility because they are skills that are of use in all
urban centres. This is unlike skills learned in the
mining sector, for example, which are not generally detach¬
able from the place of work. Thus Kapferer comments:
The skill of commercial workers, because of its
detachability from the place of employment, in
contrast to skilled workers in other sectors, may
not reduce their propensity to change jobs but in
some cases could even increase it.2
McCulloch*s data support this argument, for skilled
workers had the highest average number of jobs and were
second only to white-collar workers in their number of
urban shifts. McCulloch says specifically of skilled
workers that "artisans in particular, who are inter¬
mittently out of work, like to rent their own houses."3
Skilled building workers - carpenters, plumbers etc. -
often worked on short-term contracts after which they
might be out of work for a period of time, I met a number







whose occupational histories were scattered with the names
of large-scale building contracts carried out in, and
around, Livingstone over the years. A skill may, there¬
fore, make it easier to obtain a job, but the individual
may well have to accept the need for mobility. As a
result, this group of workers would have been particularly
affected by the inflexibility of colonial housing policy.
Large contractors rarely provided anything more than
temporary housing, and many of the smaller employers had
neither the facilities nor the inclination to provide a
compound. A house on the Municipal Compound would have
been feasible whilst the individual was working but would
quickly have become a heavy burden during the relatively
frequent periods of unemployment. Accommodation on
Malota, however, provided a house, security of tenure, and
a potential source of income (skilled workers frequently
being in the best position to set up in business for them¬
selves), at very little cost. Because of these factors,
one-quarter of Livingstone's skilled workers chose Malota
as a preferable alternative to having to rely recurrently
on employers, or being unable to pay rent when they found
themselves without work. Many of Malota's businessmen*
appear to have been skilled workers who had chosen, or
been forced, either to leave the wage sector altogether,




Seymour (1976:70) suggests that this latter
group might best be termed 'subsistence self-employed*,
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The other unusual feature about the compound's
employment structure in 1952 was the comparatively large
number of men who were not employees. Under this heading
comes traders and self-employed skilled workers, the un¬
employed, and those still attending school. McCulloch's
figures do not show how many of the skilled workers were
actually self-employed, and it is evident that a few of
the traders were employees. As a result, we can only
make the rough conclusion that at least one-third of the
adult male population was not employed by someone else.
This is, however, a much higher figure than for the rest
of the town. It is sometimes difficult to make compari¬
sons in this area because there is a good deal of confusion
and controversy as to whet exactly constitutes unemploy-
•i
ment. Thus, Heisler says that nit can hardly be said
that unemployment exists in a country such as Zambia.
Unemployment is a state when a member of a workforce is
unable to work and cannot earn another income.Start¬
ing with this assumption, he is able to conclude that,
though data suggest that Zambia had an urban unemployment
rate of 18& in 1963, this is only because the assumption
Is made that the sole possible income of urban livers is
wage employment, if one starts with the idea that many
migrants have continuing access tG subsistence income,
however, he concludes that the unemployment rate only
y.







The 1969 Census figures try to overcome these
problems of definition by using three basic categories;
•working1, 'seeking work1, and *not working'. The
•working* category was not based on income and therefore
included self-employed, employees and 'unpaid family
A
workers1. Table 6.7 shows the employment structure of
Livingstone in 1969 as compared with other urban areas.
TABLE 6.7
EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE OP LIVINGSTONE, LUSAKA,
































Seeking Work 11.0 10.6 11.2 11.7
Not Working 12. A 13.4 14.3 15.6
TOTAL 1C0.1 99.9 100.0 100.1
Source: Derived from 1969 Census, pp. B55,B59.
As can be seen, the categories of self-employed, employed,
and employer make up only between 70% end 75% of the total
in the areas under discussion. In effect, this means that
over e quarter of the adult male population is net working.
Changes in policy now mean that a lack of work no longer,
Defined as "those persons who worked without
pay in the family business or on the family farm"
187
In any formal sense, prevents an Individual from coming
into, and remaining in, town. Unemployment, however it
is defined, is therefore a major problem in towns.
Predictably enough, Malota is outside the general
pattern for urban areas, I do not have data from the
1969 Census specifically for the compound, but the 1971
Municipal Survey does break down the male population into
Employed, Self-employed, and Unemployed, providing
figures of 59,5%, 25,5%, and 15,0% respectively for each
of these categories. The major differences between
Malota and the rest of the town lie in the latter two
categories, self-employment and unemployment. Employers
are Included in the category of self-employed but it is
not clear into which category unpaid family workers fit,
though I suspect that it is the unemployed. Self-employ¬
ment is atill highly disproportionate but unemployment
seems to have been reversed in the sense that, whereas
previously it had appeared to be higher on Malota than
elsewhere, it now seems to be lower, and does not seem to
have been so affected by the general post-independence
unemployment boom,
But, as I have said, the data In its present form
does not lend itself to any really meaningful direct
comparisons. It is possible, however, to derive a number
of general hypotheses,
1) Malota is still a focus for self-employed
workers to whom possession of a plot is a
necessity.
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2) Unemployment is not so predominant as
elsewhere because such people are not excluded
from other housing areas; because an unemployed
man on Malota is more likely to move into the
self-employed sector; and because on Malota one
does not need to work to obtain some sort of
income.
3) The large percentage of employed
workers is due to the emergence of sub-tenancy.
In order to look more closely at these hypotheses, I have
tried to approach the 1971 Municipal Survey data from a
different perspective. The unique factor that brought
about the unusual employment structure on pre-independence
Malota was the relationship between tenancy and employment
that prevailed on the compound at the time; more speci¬
fically, the radical difference between tenancy on Malota
and elsewhere in Livingstone. I have therefore reworked
the data from the 1971 Municipal Survey in terms of these
two factors to see what changes have occurred in the
employment structure as a result of the various changes
that we have already noted in tenancy.
In Table 6.8 I have attempted to show the
structure of employment categories in relation to indi¬
vidual plots on the compound. Thus, for example, 27.896
of the plots had no employed workers living there, and
the 37.36 of plots that had only one employed person
(irrespective of other categories) accounted for 28.896 of
all employed individuals living on Malota. These figures
are intended to give us some sense of how the different
categories are distributed in terms of individual plots.
Amongst the most striking aspects is the fact that nearly
three-quarters of the plots (72.2%)had at least one
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TABLE 6.8
CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYMENT ON INDIVIDUAL






























Source: Derived from household returns of 1971
Municipal Survey
employed person living there, whereas only one-quarter had
an unemployed person, and less than a half had e self-
employed person. This dominance by employed workers is
taken one step further when it is realised that over one-
third of plots have two or more employed people there,
compared with less than 10% in either of the two other
categories. As a result, and this is crucial, two-thirds
of employed workers on the compound (actually 71.2%) live
in groups of two or more to a plot, whereas over 60% of
both self-employed and unemployed workers are the sole
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representative of that category on their plot. This
supports the previous suggestions that many of the sub¬
tenants who have come on to the compound are employed
workers, and that self-employment and unemployment are
still dominated by the plot-holders. The 1952 situation
was summarised, in very general terms, by suggesting that
the •average* plot tended to have an individual migrant,
frequently self-employed, with his family, and maybe
unemployed or visiting relatives. The data in Table 6,8
suggest a very different picture for they show that, not
only are there a large number of employed men, but that
they are distributed fairly evenly throughout the plots.
It is not just a question of a small number of oppor¬
tunistic 'sleeping landlords* setting up quasi-labour
hostels. But in one sense the data are only suggestive
for they do not give a total picture of what is happening
on individual plots. After all, there is no reason why a
plot should have only one category of worker, nor does the
data tell us if, for example, the two employed workers
living on a particular plot are both sub-tenants or if one
is a sub-tenant and the other a landlord. Table 6.9 is an
attempt to further clarify the problem by showing the
various combinations of employment categories in relation
to the tenancy structure. Here I show the distribution
of different combinations of employment categories in
terms of two aspects of tenancy - the existence or non¬


























































































































































As far as plots that only have employed people on them
are concerned, there is a fairly even distribution between
the three tenancy categories. Plots with both landlords
and sub-tenants tend to be under-represented which points,
though nothing more, to the possibility that landlords
who are employed are less likely to take on sub-tenants.1
There is a high percentage of plots with no sub-tenants
which only have employed people, but this in no way con¬
tradicts the idea that landlords are prone to becoming
self-employed. As we can see from the Table, an even
larger proportion of these plots have only self-employed
2
workers on them* Indeed, taking the data from a differ¬
ent angle, we find that 71% of all plots with only self-
employed workers have a landlord but no sub-tenants. Of
course, a plot with no sub-tenants is much more likely to
have only one individual that can be categorised, and
this no doubt explains the low representation in the
various combinations of categories. With the plots that
have a landlord but no sub-tenants, the main conclusion
we can therefore make is that the landlord is as likely
to be self-employed as employed.
It is slightly more difficult to interpret the
data relating to plots with sub-tenants, for we are still
4
The assumption here is that if there is only
one category represented on a plot, then the landlord is
a member of that category. Thus if a plot has *only
employed*, then the landlord is employed.
2
There has not of course been any suggestion that
self-employment is universal amongst landlords, Reynolds,
for example, had 4C)% of his plot-holders in wage-earning
occupations.
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not in e position to distinguish directly between the
landlords and the sub-tenants. However, there are a
number of clear deductions to be made. The majority of
plots with both a landlord and sub-tenants (87.3%) have
at least one employed person on them, compared with a
figure of only 47.3% for those plots without sub-tenants.
Nearly one-third of such plots have a combination of self-
employed and employed workers. The three categories -
only employed, self-employed/employed, and unemployed/
employed completely dominate this tenancy group. Though
this data still hides the individuality of single plots
and their unique nature, there can be no doubting the
trend that is apparent for landlords, whatever their
employment status, to take on employed sub-tenants.
Though it is theoretically possible for all the 20% of
plots with employed and unemployed workers to have
employed landlords end unemployed sub-tenants, in view of
what has already teen said, and the case studies of the
1
next chapter, the likelihood is very remote.
Plots that have no landlord, but some sub-tenants,
i.e. those run by tenants or sleeping landlords, follow
the general trend brought about by sub-tenancy. However,
there is an even greater predominance in the *enly employ¬
ed* category. Indeed, these plots account for almost one-
third of all plots with only employed people on them.
1
This is supported by the fact that 705 of plots
with employed and self-employed, and 59% of plots with
employed and unemployed workers, have both a landlord and
sub-tenant(s).
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This strongly supports the idea that sleeping landlords,
having left their plots, are most likely to rent them out
to workers who are employed in the town.
This data therefore points strongly to e number
of basic ideas that have already been presented. Firstly,
that plot-holders are much more likely to be self-employed
than the general urban population; that many plot-holders
take on sub-tenanta, who are frequently employed; and
that there is a close relationship between sub-tenancy and
self- and unemployment. Secondly, there is the wider
conclusion, linking up with the other data presented
earlier in this chapter, that although the survey data
points towards the emergence of wage-employment as the
dominant category on the compound compared with twenty
years ago, the situation cannot properly be understood
without reference to all aspects of employment status,
and the inter-relationships between the different cate¬
gories. Similarly, it cannot be understood without
reference to the system of tenancy on the compound, and
the changes in employment structure since 1952 can be
seen in terms of changes in housing policy.
6i7 Conclusion
What I have tried to do in this chapter is to
show that certain aspects of Malota's social composition
have changed over the last twenty years, and that
independence was a major factor in bringing about these
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changes. I have tried to do this by reference to the ways
in which individuals choose, or are forced to choose,
between a number of alternatives. As people move between
town and country, between towns, or from one job to
another, they are constrained by certain factors. These
are basically linked to the point that an individual has
reached in his life, migratory and job career. I have
looked at how particular factors such as age, skill,
employment status, and sex can act as constraints, and
have tried to show how the general properties of Malota
compound are related to these constraints and consequently
lead to a particular social composition. But Malota and
its inhabitants can only be seen in terms of the overall
housing framework, and in particular the supply of, and
demand for, housing, together with the types of alter¬
natives that are available. Though Malota is a slum com¬
pound, declared by the authorities to be a disaster area,
it is an attractive option to some individuals, and the
only option to others. But the decision to live on Malota
is not, as many assume, a negative thing. It is a
decision frequently derived from the weighing of the
advantages and disadvantages of living there, as opposed
to other housing areas in the town, to other towns, or
to the Individual*s rural home. As I have tried to show,
it is often the case that the cost of living in such an
apparent slum is heavily outweighed by the positive
advantages to be gained by remaining there.
This chapter has concentrated on a number of
demographic abstractions in order to give the overall
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picture at any point in time, and also to allow com¬
parisons over a period of time. In order to give these
abstractions some substance, the next chapter will




THE COMPOSITION OF INDIVIDUAL PLOTS -
scfrifi CASE STUSISS
7 x1 Introduction
What is now apparent, and not of course unex¬
pected, is that Malota does not have an average or
standard plot, either in physical or social terms. The
nature of an individual's tenancy on a plot provides a
framework around which other social relationships and
compositional patterns within this context will develop.
There are a number of possible variations of this basic
framework that we must look at. It was not the intention
of this study to look at all the plots on Malota, or even
to investigate all the different patterns (were such a
thing possible), A large number of plots were visited,
sometimes intentionally but frequently as the result of
a casual meeting or invitation. In all cases I tried to
collect some basic information on the people living on
the plot, but the breadth and depth of such information
was inevitably varied. The case studies in this chapter
are plots that I visited several times, and where I am
i
certain that the data is substantially correct. It is
1
The data has been checked against information
provided by the 1971 Council Survey household returns
and where there was any substantial discrepancy the
examples were discarded.
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in no way meant to be a statistically random sample, nor
does the data allow for any sort of typology. What I
have tried to do Is to draw out, in an illustrative
manner, the processes by which different compositional
patterns emerge from the general framework of tenancy
that exists on Malota.
7:2 Plots with No Sub-Tenants
Most of this particular group of plot-holders
were self-employed men, only one of them working for a
firm in the town. A study of the life histories of some
of the individuals reflects only too well various themes
drawn out in the last chapter showing how, even without
the gains to be made from sub-tenancy, Malota can be a
very attractive option.
Plot A1: The landlord of this plot, Christopher,
is a man of the Kwandi tribe who is aged about 50. He
is a bricklayer and works for a local building firm. He
had learnt his trade on the Copperbelt where he appeared
to have no difficulty in working constantly. In 19^8 he
married and two years later moved to Livingstone where a
number of his wlfe*s relatives, including her parents,
lived. He also had a brother and a sister living in the
town. A 3ob was arranged for him, by his father-in-law,
with a small firm. Apparently, a house on the Municipal
Council was promised him by the firm, but this was not
1
The Kwandi are one of the Bilateral group of




































































forthcoming and his father-in-law obtained a vacant plot
for him on Malota's A section. This was in a poor con¬
dition, but Christopher was unwilling to build any more
property because he hoped to get a house on one of the
other compounds. As this became en increasingly unlikely
event, he accepted that he would have to do something and
was about to build a new house on the plot when his father-
in-law decided to return to his village, leaving his own
plot (which was also on A section) to his daughter and
son-in-law. Because it was in a much superior condition,
they moved onto this, and have remained there since 1955.
Just after arriving in Livingstone, Christopher
had Joined the Church of the New Apostle which has its
meeting place Just off Mslota. By 1970 he had become a
top official, or elder, of the church and a lay preacher.
A great deal of his time was taken up by cimrch-related
activities. This particular church originates in Frank¬
furt and, though the congregation is totally African,
there are very obvious European influences In the way the
church is administered and the services carried out,
This European approach extends throughout the whole of
Christopher's life-style. This is particularly evident
in his plot which has a single, bungalow-type building,
in excellent condition, with glass in (and curtains at)
the windows, a rocking chair, a china set in a sideboard,
bookshelves, and even plotted plants at the front porch.
The effect is very distinctive and the plot is well known
throughout the compound.. This obviously pleases
Christopher who feels that it reflects the high status
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he has achieved through his church.
He has never had any sub-tenants living on the
plot and is adamant that he will never do so. The only
other people at present living there are his wife and
five children. As a bricklayer, he earns about K60 a
month which he feels is perfectly adequate to enable him
to maintain his position in society.
We can see in this case-study a number of factors
at work in bringing this man to Kalota and keeping him
there. Firstly, the influence of kinship and marriage
appears to have been an important constraint on the
options open to this particular individual. Getting
married forced a previously highly mobile, young man to
make decisions in terms of long-term criteria. But his
original choice was to aim for housing on the Kunicipal
Compound. It was the second factor, lack of available
housing, that frustrated this and basically left only one
other option - moving to ?4slota. This in no way appealed
to Christopher, but the alternative cost of moving away
was too great in that it involved breaking off links
with his wife's family (and maybe even his wife). So he
decided to take what was available. Having moved on to
Malota, he has cade investments in terms of time and money
and has developed a network of relationships, centred on
the church, that are of very great, in his view irreplace¬
able, value. These links with the church virtually
guarantee that he has no desire to leave Livingstone. The
possession of a plot (and the low rent) provide him with
long-term security that will not be so badly affected
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should he become unemployed, and will enable him to
remain with the church. He is also in an excellent
position to uss his skill, bricklaying, for self-employ¬
ment should he become redundant. As o result, his
original reluctance to live on Malota has now been
replaced by a positive wish to remain there and he has
recently refused the offer of a house on the Libuyu
municipal compound, because of the long-term impli¬
cations.
The fact that Christopher has remained, and
intends to remain, on Malota is not therefore simply a
question of individual characteristics such as having a
skill, though this is undoubtedly one factor. It is the
way in which the different factors are interconnected
over a period of time in such a way as to constrain the
individual to make investments of sufficient value that
there are, in his perception, no preferable alternatives.
Plot A2: Christopher is unusual in that work, or
rather employment, has not been a significant problem and
is unlikely to become one, even if he is made redundant.
The landlord of plot A2 is in a different situation. He
was born in the Western Province in 1910 and left his
home for the Copperbelt when he was 19 years old. There
he worked in a variety of unskilled jobs before moving to
Lusaka, according to a friend of his because of trouble
with a woman. Having little success in the capital, he
moved down along the line-of-rail working for short
periods in the various small towns and, for two years, as
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a building labourer in Mazabuka. During his, apparently-
frequent, periods of unemployment, he made a living as a
petty trader of various sorts. As he got older, he seems
to have found these periods as a petty trader becoming
more common. He had married a woman of his own tribe,
Chokwe, in 1547, just before he left Lusaka and in the
subsequent years he appears to have been placed under a
good deal of pressure to move to Livingstone which he
eventually aid, in 1S54, "When he arrived, he stayed with
a younger brother who lived a few miles outside of the
town. He claims that he went to Livingstone confident
that he could obtain employment, but by that time he was
44 years old and his only previous employment had been
unskilled. With so many younger, fitter men around, his
opportunities were extremely limited. His brother at
least realised this and advised him to go to Molota to
look for a plot from which he could run some 3ort of
business. He was very fortunate, and within days had
found an old man who was contemplating returning to his
village. The plot on A section that he wished to leave had
very little on it, and the one dilapidated building that
there was had fallen down during the previous rains. As
a result, the plot cost virtually nothing, though he had
to borrow money from his brother to have some accommodation
built. At this stage he had virtually no money and, for
a while, helped a number of other traders around the com¬
pound. Eventually, he got together enough money to build
a small hut, and to set himself up in business. He now
sells fish and cooking oil both on Malota and in villages
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around the town. Though he is still nothing more than a
petty businessman, he has prospered enough to build him¬
self two, fairly substantial, good quality buildings on
his plot. One of these he occupies with his wife, the
other is occupied by two sons (aged 18 and 20) who work
for an engineering firm in town.
He now feels that he is too old to move on else¬
where. He has not returned home, except for two brief
visits, since 1929, all his other brothers having moved on
to other urban centres in Zambia. He feels that, "If I go
home I may die, so I don't like to go there, or to take my
family." He believed that, because he had his own plot
and was financially independent, Malota was now his 'home1.
In this study, it is once again possible to trace
a series of experiences that make the particular indivi¬
dual's arrival on Malota seem almost inevitable. His
inability to acquire a particular skill, and his high
degree of mobility, provided little investment in Job
terms and also guaranteed that his employment prospects
would become Increasingly restricted as he got older.
Undoubtedly, the fact that he was not married until he was
40 contributed to his high rate of mobility. His actions
seem to have been based on short-term criteria until he
did get married. His investment in returning to his
village is limited and the urban situation is a more
attractive proposition providing the costs do not become
too great. The possibility of this happening has been
reduced by the movement to Malota and his investment in,
and commitment to, the compound i3 so great that the chance
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of his movement away is virtually non-existent.
Plots A4 end D3? Both these plot-holders were
self- employed craftsmen, the former a bricklayer and the
latter a tailor. Both of them claimed to be earning in
the region of X50-6C a month which made them, in Malotan
terms, relatively successful. They both lived in rela¬
tively good quality housing which the bricklayer hod
built himself, and which the tailor had hsd constructed
at a cost of over K200. Both had a large number of
children in the 1-17 age category (leaving, in simple
spatial terms, little room for sub-tenants) and both had
lived in the compound for more than 15 years. In each
cese, they had arrived in Livingstone early in their
migratory careers - before they were 21 - and both had
learnt their skills whilst they were in town.
In both cases, they had reached the age, 40-plus,
when occupational security normally becomes more difficult
to obtain. But both of them felt that, for a number of
reasons, it was imperative that they remain in Livingstone.
Ye have seen already how time itself is an important
investment and between them the two men had spent over 40
years in Livingstone, They had acquired property, in one
case built it himself. Of crucial importance to both of
them was the need to have their children brought up and
educated in an urban environment. This in itself meant
that they would want to spend at least another ten years
in town. Because of this, they were heavily committed to
remaining in Livingstone. In addition, they had a good
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deal invested in Malota specifically. Being self-employed,
they depended to a great extent on custom from within
Malota, or from the surrounding Maramba compound. The
bricklayer especially had developed a good trade, parti¬
cularly since independence, and Malota was ideal for the
pursuit of his trade. For both of them, movement away
from Malota would have been an unattractive and costly
proposition which would almost certainly lead to a break¬
down in the network of informal links on which their
incomes were based.
These two men had invested heavily in Malota over
the years, ana their commitment to the compound was high,
for it allowed them to maintain their position despite
the fact that they were close to an age when many men are
forced to decide to leave town. For the time being, their
skills ensured that they had no need to take on sub¬
tenants. The limited financial gains that this would
bring (of less value because of tneir already high income)
was outweighed by the overcrowding and inconvenience that
would result. Equally, however, they were aware that the
day might come when tney would have to taxe on sub¬
tenants. This was, of course, one more factor encour¬
aging them to remain on the compound, for on any other
compound it would not have been feasible.
However, both These men, like many others, had to
face the threat of the compound's demolition and the
destruction of their businesses. The landlord of Ah had,
about eight years previously, seriously considered leaving.
But they now felt that the threats had been around for so
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many years that they were no longer realistic; certainly
not enough to outweigh the gains acquired from remaining
on the compound.
Plot C4t The four previous cases are of men who
have done sufficiently well in their particular line of
business that they have no need, at this point in time,
to take on sub-tenants. It is an option that they leave
open for the future. The same cannot be said of the
fifth case. The plot-holder on C4 was a self-employed
man who made small flower vases from animal horns that he
bought from the local slaughter house. These he then
sold to tourists at the Victoria Falls. He was able to
make four of these each day and, selling them at 65 ngwee
each, he was theoretically capable of earning between K40
and K50 a month. However, a highly fluctuating market,
and a similar workrate, meant that he rarely made even
half this siim. The three buildings on his plot were in a
much dilapidated condition. He needed three buildings in
order to accommodate his wife and three children, his
younger brother, and his mother and her sister. The
mother and her sister were very old and totally dependent
upon the landlord, and the younger brother helped him to
sell the vases. His dependants were a. drain on his,
already limited, cash resources, but the need tc accom¬
modate them also prevented him from obtaining further cash
by sub-lettine, though he would have liked to do this. In
any case, he did not have the capital to build better
quality housing which people would be willing to rent.
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His financial position was, therefore, highly insecure
and showed no signs of improving. Malota was the only
option for him in Livingstone, for it did at least
provide some sort of housing for his dependants, and a
base for his business. He felt that when his elder
relatives died and his children left school, he would
have no hesitation in returning to his village. Urban
life to him was a day-to-day struggle, and its only
advantage was that it enabled him to fulfill certain
obligations to his kin. Malota was, in effect, the last
possible option within the urban context. The major
constraints on this particular individual were his kin¬
ship obligations. Contradictorily, these obligations
made it necessary for him to remain in town, at the same
time making town a less attractive option by reducing his
income and preventing him from taking up the option of
sub-letting.
Sub-tenants are a possible, and not an automatic,
option for plot-holders on Malota. Having sub-tenants can
cause a good deal of Inconvenience and overcrowding which
can easily outweigh the advantages of the income that is
brought in. Suh-tenants, and particularly the younger
ones, can also be a social problem, and many landlords
complained of the behaviour and manners of the people
living with them. To many people, renting out rooms is a
far from ideal situation and one that they would prefer
to avoid until there is absolutely no alternative.
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7i5 Plots with Three or More Sub-Tenants
Once a landlord has, however, decided to take on
sub-tenants, It is a question of calculating how many
people he would like to take and how many people he has
space for. It is at this point that the potential for
exploitation, so prevalent amongst sleeping landlords
according to the Council report, becomes evident. Some
plots are able to accommodate up to thirty people, which
leaves great scope for making money. But the evidence
suggests that there is a lot less of this than might be
expected. There are for example, only four plots on the
whole compound with more than five sub-tenants and all
of them have the landlord living on the plot. On the
other hand, there is no doubt that plots rented out by
sleeping landlords have, on average, more sub-tenants than
those where the landlord is present. 39% of sleeping
landlord-owned plots had three sub-tenants or more com¬
pared with a figure of 26% for ordinary landlords.
Similarly, whereas 49% of plots with the landlord present
had only one sub-tenant, there was a figure of only 30%
for sleeping landlords. However, in these cases we must
take into account the spatial factor: if the landlord,
and maybe his family, are present, there is bound to be
less room for sub-letting. In fact, the average number of
people living on plots rented by sleeping landlords is
slightly less than the average for the compound as a whole.
This is not to say that exploitation through excessive sub¬
tenancy does not exist. One particular example is of the
descendants of a man who was of some importance on Malota,
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and who themselves live on other compounds, who let out
the three plots that they had inherited to a total of 35
sub-tenants at a rent of K4 a month each* Though there
are a few plots where exploitation is very obvious, and
where there is great overcrowding to the financial advan¬
tage of the sleeping landlord, these are no more common
than similar situations where the landlord is present.
But to the majority of plot-holders, sub-tenancy is not a
business in itself and is only one aspect of their plot,
only one source of income. The following examples are
intended to show the variety of frameworks within which
sub-tenancy is fitted, even when there are a significant
number of sub-tenants on a plot.
Plots A3 and B4: Both these plots had a landlord
present, and both were being run, illicitly, as beer
places. The wives of the landlords produced two brews,
known as 'Kachipembwe* and 'Skokiaan", which could be
taken away or consumed on the premises. Both men claimed
that they did not make too much profit from their busines¬
ses; as one of them put it, "Sometimes we win, sometimes
we lose". Because it is illegal to brew one's own beer,
and particularly to sell what you brew, it is a hazardous
and insecure occupation. Though the police are not over-
zealous, there are occasional checks on the compound, with
certain confiscation and possible fines for those who are
caught. It was apparent that an individual on Malota
could not live by brewing alone, and both men rented out
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huts to sub-tenants. This brought in, in one case, K12
a month and in the other K15. Both plots had three sub¬
tenants and a large number of children, and as a result
were very overcrowded. On A3, for example, I estimated
there to be, at one point, a total of twenty people
living there. Each of the sub-tenants on this plot had
his family living with him, though in one case the sub¬
tenant became unemployed and decided to send his wife
and children back to the village whilst he tried to set
up in business as a carver in the 'airport art' business.
The landlord himself was over sixty years old and had
spent a good deal of time on the Copperbelt before coming
to 'see* his sister in Livingstone in the late 1950s,
Through contacts of his brother-in-law he had obtained a
plot on Malota for £65 and since then he had tried his
hand at a number of things, none of them very successfully.
Having sub-tenants provided a minimal form of security,
catering for his basic needs. He had, by the nature of
his business, developed an extensive network of contacts
throughout Malota and Maramba, and this he valued highly.
He saw his sister and brother-in-law virtually every day,
and he was willing to put up with the chaotic and over¬
crowded surroundings in order to continue his present life¬
style. When asked about returning home now that he was
getting old, he would reply: "What more would I find in
■i
It was my assistant's less generous interpre¬
tation that the individuals concerned were simply lazy,
and that having obtained a basic income from sub-letting,
decided to pursue a hobby which would pay for itself.
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my village?"
Plot B4 was very similar in terms of overcrowding,
but the landlord was nearly twenty years younger and had
both his wife and a fifteen year old son living with him.
In fact, he was under a good deal of pressure from his
wife to move to a more secure, and legal, business in
order that they might get rid of, at least some of, the
sub-tenants. She did not like living on Malota and had
put their names down for municipal housing. In an
attempt to force him to do something about the matter,
she had twice left him, and had returned only when he had
promised to try and change. He, on the other hand, had
no objection whatsoever to living on the compound and
particularly enjoyed running the beer place. His career
pattern was very similar to that of the previous landlord,
for he had worked as an unskilled labourer on the Copper-
belt and along the line-of-rail before coming to Living¬
stone to work on a large building contract. He argued
that his present situation, though not ideal, was undoubt¬
edly better than he could do elsewhere and was at least
secure for there would always be a demand for alcohol and
accommodation. He was not convinced that providing goods
for the tourist market, which was his wife's idea, would
provide any security, particularly as he had no specific
skill.
In both these cases, we have individuals whose
options are severely restricted. The dependence on brew¬
ing and sub-tenancy suggests a point has been reached in
their urban career where the only other real alternative
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is to retire to their rural homes. In neither case do
they find this an attractive proposition. They would
prefer to remain in town, even at the cost of living in
an overcrowded environment and being involved in an
illegal and insecure occupation. Sub-tenancy provides a
background of security, however minimal, against which
they can operate their business.
Plots B2. D4 and E4t In these three cases, the
plot-holder was a woman, though the situations were very
different. B2 was rented by an old woman who had an
elder brother living with her; the holder of E4 was a
young woman of 22 who was separated from her husband; and
the holder of D4 was a young widow. All three plots had
a relatively high population.
B2 was taken over by the present landlady when
another of her brothers returned to the village in 1960.
The brother, who still lived with her, and who was both
old and disabled, made small masks for the tourist market.
Because of his age, however, he was unable to make more
than a few kwacha, which his sister allowed him to keep.
She sold vegetables on a casual basis in and around Malota,
but their basic income came from the rents paid by the
four sub-tenants who lived in three huts. Two of these
sub-tenants had their wives and children with them, the
other two were single men who shared a hut. This was
another plot that was in an appalling condition. The
houses were of poor quality, being little more than mud
huts, and the overcrowding was very apparent. Without the
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income from the sub-tenants, however, the couple would
have had to leave Malota and Livingstone. It was some¬
times difficult to understand why in fact they did remain,
particularly as the old man insisted that "God willing, I
will return to Mongu." They had retained their links
with their rural village where some of their family still
farmed and it would therefore have been a logical step.
The most likely explanation lies in the fact that the
sister was a very active member of the Jehovah's
Witnesses sect, which has a 'church* on the compound, and
has had so for many years. The commitment that this
involved, particularly in view of the controversial role
played by the sect in Zambia, might make her very reluc¬
tant to give it up by leaving the town. Malota was,
unquestionably, the only way she could stay in Livingstone,
for her age and her sex made her employment opportunities
nil, and the only other potential source of economic
support - her brother - was unable to help. Even on
Malota, 3he could not have survived without sub-letting.
Though the young girl on E4 claimed to be the •land¬
lord', her neighbours Insisted that the plot belonged to
an old woman who had * temporarily* returned to her
village, making the girl, in effect, the tenant. Before
the girl had separated from her husband she had lived on
Libuyu compound but when he left she had no alternative -
other than returning home - than to move on to Malota.
She claimed that she had moved onto this particular plot
because the previous owner was *a relative* but was
reluctant to clarify this or to say whether any money had
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been involved. She had subsequently formed a relation¬
ship with a man from Maramba's A section, but she claimed
that he gave her no money and that he 'was just a
visitor'. At the time of this study, there were three
sub-tenants living there. They were all members of the
same family, a man, his wife, three young children, and
two older sons who were aged 19 and 22. All three men
worked as labourers for Burtons, a large construction
firm, but preferred not to live on the squatter compound
set up by Burtons workers to the North of Malota, because
"it is too rough". All three men paid money to the girl
but they only occupied two huts and the total rent was
K10 a month. For a while, the two sons moved on to
Burton's compound which meant that the girl's only
apparent income was K5 a month. During this period,
antagonism sprang up between the girl and some of the
neighbours who accused her of prostitution. They
insisted that, even with sub-tenants, she could not
•i
possibly make a living without resort to prostitution.
The third plot in this group, D4, was occupied by
a widow who ran a small business, selling firewood and
cooking oil. She herself had no children, but one of her
sub-tenants was her brother who had lived on the plot,
with his wife and eight children, since 1966. He worked
as a driver for a firm in the town and paid X10 a month
for two Rimberley brick houses. A fourth house was
For a discussion of the role of prostitution in
urban areas, see Little (1973: 76-101)
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occupied by a young man who worked as a clerk for the
municipal council. The woman had inherited the plot and
th© buildings from her husband who had been an engineering
foreman, and it seemed obvious that, without such an
inheritance, she would have had to leave town altogether
unless she had remarried.
These three cases involved women in dissimilar
situations, but there are certain general points that can
be made. Malota remains the one place where a woman
might live securely. Should she find herself alone, she
is not automatically faced with the normal options of
marriage, living with relatives, or returning home. In
each of the situations discussed here, the woman has lost
an important asset in terms of Zambian urban life - their
husbands. Remarriage was not an option for the old woman,
and increasingly unlikely for the younger widow, who was
about 35 years old. The young girl was not divorced, only
separated and marriage was therefore not, for the time
being, a possible alternative. The oldest and youngest
women had very definite reasons for not wishing to leave
Livingstone: the youngest one because she wished to carry
on a life-style that could not be obtained in rural areas;
the oldest one because of her deep involvement with a
religious organisation. Though she was the effective land¬
lord, the childless widow lived with her brother and was,
through payment of rent, supported by him. Returning
home would provide no extra advantage, and at the same
time would involve the cost of breaking links on Malota
that had been developed over the previous decade.
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Were it not for Malota and its peculiar tenancy
system, all three women would probably have to decide
between remarriage and a return home. Malota allowed
them to remain in town, as they wished. The urban
situations makes certain constraints on women, as we have
already seen, in terms of options available to them.
Independence from a husband or other kin is hard to
obtain, and if it is involuntarily achieved, either
through death or divorce, it is difficult for a woman to
remain in town. Malota is a unique situation in which a
woman can remain independent from the marital state and
in town.
Plots E1. E2 and B3: In the cases I have already
talked about, sub-tenancy has been a valuable additional
source of income the regularity of which was of crucial
significance to the plot-holders. But in a number of
cases on the compound, sub-tenancy involved a much more
flexible idea with a good deal less emphasis on the
financial aspects.
Plot E1, for example, had four adult men living
on it. The landlord ran a successful retail business
selling clothes on a door-to-door basis. In recent years,
he had spent an increasing amount of time away from
Malota and from Livingstone, to the extent that he was
classified as a 'sleeping* landlord by the 1971 Council
survey. The other three men were related to him, two of
them being younger brothers, and the third a younger
brother of his father. One of the brothers works as a
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tailor for a small firm in the town, but had spent a good
deal of time out of work. The uncle worked, at that time,
as a dustman for the municipality. The third brother
claimed to be ♦self-employed* but at no time during this
study did he bring in anything like a constant income,
though he did occassionally earn a few kwacha as a result
of doing odd ;)obs for other businessmen on the compound.
The two employed men had their wives living with them;
the wives of the other two had returned - temporarily it
was claimed - to their home in the Western Province. It
is difficult to regard these three men as sub-tenants in
the formal sense. They claimed to pay rent to the 'land¬
lord', but the payments appear to have been sporadic and,
in the case of the brother who was effectively unemployed,
non-existent. The landlord had become a relatively
successful businessman and could afford, and was expected,
to show generosity to his relatives, particularly if they
were going through a difficult phase. In fact, the
brother who was unemployed eventually left the plot and
returned to his village. This had been inevitable for
nearly two years, and it was only because of his brother
that he had been able to remain in Livingstone that long.
Thus, though the Council, and even the participants them¬
selves, talked of sub-tenancy on this plot there was no
question of a regular and essential income, and certainly
not of exploitation.
Plot E2 was also occupied by four men, The land¬
lord made drums for the tourist trade which were then sold
at the Victoria Falls by one of the other men. The other
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two occupants were employed at that time as labourers on
a building site just outside the town. These two men
paid K2 a month whilst they were working, but in between
jobs they were allowed to stay without payment. The man
who assisted the landlord received rent-free accommodation
and part of the profits in lieu of wages. All four men
were Lozi, and all came from Sesheke, The landlord had
been one of the first men to move onto E section, and the
other three had joined him at various points over the
years. They regarded each other as friends and •brothers*,
and spent a good deal of time in each others' company.
Plot E3 also had three official sub-tenants
according to the Council survey. The plot was actually
occupied by three bachelors who had lived there since
1945 and who were all skilled mechanics. The plot was
officially in the name of one of them, but they appar¬
ently ran some sort of communal system, with all costs
being shared by the three men.
On all three of these plots, relationships have
developed that subordinate the usual economic landlord/
sub-tenant relationship. In one case, kinship is the
most obvious source of this subordination. In the other
two cases it is interesting to note that on each plot the
adult males are all of the same tribe - Lozi on E2 and
Bemba on E3» In each case, financial advantage for the
landlord was not the dominant factor, though not completely
ignored. The landlords regarded other factors as being
more crucial. The landlord of E1, having become success¬
ful, was obliged to help his kin when they found them-
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selves in difficulties. Allowing them to stay on his
plot, where he himself rarely was to be found, discharged
these obligations in kind, rather than in cash, with
minimal cost to himself. The landlord of E2 had
developed close relationships with the other occupants
and, though he demanded some sort of payment normally,
in situations where such payment was difficult - for
example, when the labourers became unemployed - he was
willing to forgo these demands in order that he might
retain the links of friendship. In simple terms, such
links were seen as being worth more than K4 a month. On
E3 the important factor was that the plot provided cheap
and permanent accommodation to three men of similar age,
marital status, occupational status, and tribal origin.
The sorts of situations described on these three
plots were relatively uncommon, but they serve to illus-
trate the great variety of tenancy situations that exist
on the compound. They also show that other factors than
straight financial reward can be involved in the relation¬
ship between a landlord and those people (other than his
immediate family) that are living on the compound. If we
define sub-tenancy purely as an economic relationship,
some of the people Involved could not be classified as
such. It must therefore be remembered that in the urban
situation concepts such as 'reward* and 'payment* can
involve things other than cash.
Plot B3i The last plot in the sample that had
three or more sub-tenants was unique in that it involved
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a 'tenant'. The official landlord had, for many years,
run a food business from the plot, selling a variety of
cheap basic foodstuffs. About 1961 he had closed down the
business on Malota and opened a new one in Mambova. He
had left one of his old employees there, as a tenant, in
order that the old man might have somewhere to live.
This old man, who claimed to be over 75 years old, now
sub-lets the plot to three families and was allowed to
keep the income that accrued. This plot was decidedly
overcrowded with about twenty people living there.
Though there were only three sub-tenants paying rent,
there were at least three other adult males, relatives of
the sub-tenants, living there. As the total rent paid to
the tenant was only K12 a month, it can be hardly called
exploitation, particularly considering the overcrowded
and inconvenient conditions under which the tenant was
himself forced to live. But to the old man it was a very
crucial K12, the difference between remaining in town or
not. Like so many of the other cases I have looked at,
the landlord did not approach the question of sub-tenancy
from the point of view of maximising the financial rewards.
Instead, the number and type of sub-tenants to be taken on
were decided in terms of the minimum amount that was
needed in order to allow the landlord to achieve whatever
goal he was seeking. Thus the criterion was "How many
sub-tenants do I need in order to satisfy my needs?";
rather than "I have three rooms. What is the maximum
number of people paying K4 a month that I can get into
them?" The approach was pragmatic rather than exploitative.
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7;4 Plots with One or Two Sub-Tenants
The remainder of the plots in this sample have
either one or two sub-tenants living there. Such plots
are in the majority on the compound, and as a result it
is very difficult to trace any distinct set of patterns.
The amount of money to be earned from one or two sub¬
tenants is of course limited and can only be a supplement
to the landlord's basic income. It may be for this
reason that there appears to be more sub-tenants who are
related to the landlord in this particular group.
Plot C1: The owner of this plot is a security
guard with a firm of engineers. As such his salary is
only K24 a month and the two sub-tenants living there
bring thi3 up to K32. Without this supplement, he claims
he would have great difficulty in coping because he has
three children at school and they are a great expense to
him. He first moved to Kalota in 1964 after living in
Maramba compound with his uncle for three years. The
plot, which had only one house in it when he bought it,
cost him K30. Both the sub-tenants are also employed and
both earn more than him. One is a foreman for a firm
called Zambia Tiles and the other is 'senior tailor' at a
small, Indian-owned, fashion firm. They both claim to
earn K36 a month and pay the landlord K4 of this for a
single room each. Both have their wives with them, and
the tailor also has a small child. Neither of them like
the situation that they live in, thetailor wanting to buy
his own plot on Kalota and the foreman wishing to move to
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one of the municipal compounds. It is interestiig to note
that, though the sub-tenants earn 50% more than the land¬
lord in terms of wages, by the time the rent has been paid
all three men have the same income - K32.
Plot B1: The Chokwe man who rented this plot sold
tobacco in the nearby Maraaba market. Because he spent a
good deal of his time in the Gwembe valley buying tobacco,
the plot was normally looked after by his widowed sister
who sold fish and vegetables from the plot. There was a
second house on the plot that was rented out. This had
been built by the landlord, at a cost of K90, for this
particular purpose. It was occupied by a labourer for
the municipal council and his wife and two children. All
the people living on this plot, including the sub-tenant,
were members of the Watchtower sect. The landlord had
not returned to his village in 32 years and intended to
stay the rest of his life on Mslota because it allowed
him to be independent. He wished to take on another sub¬
tenant but said that he would only take people who were
members of his 'church*.
Plot C3t This plot was held by an extremely old
Ngoni man who claimed to have been living in Livingstone
before Malota was built. He also claimed to have teen the
first African bricklayer in the town and to have worked on
most of the early major building projects when Livingstone
had been the capital. Two of his sons lived with him on
the plot, but because he refused direct support from them,
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he charged them K5 a month rent. One of the sons was a
teacher with a wife and two children, and the other was
an employed carpenter who was unmarried. They both
claimed that they only lived on the plot because they had
to look after their father. This was probably true for
the teacher*s wife did the cooking for everyone on the
plot and generally looked after the old man who was
virtually blind and rarely moved from the plot. The
carpenter, however, was interested in setting up his own
business, and the plot would have been ideal as a base.
Though he never directly admitted it, there was little
doubt that he hoped eventually to inherit the plot.
Plot C2t This plot was rented from the Council by
an old Lozi man who was now living in a home for old
people that was run by the Council*s Welfare department.
The plot was looked after by the landlord's younger
brother who had a shoe repairing business based on the plot
and who worked, when he could, as a building labourer. He
paid nothing for staying on the plot but was not officially
registered as the tenant. He and his brother had lived on
the compound since 19^3. A room on the plot was let out
to a young Lozi couple both of whom worked as clerks for
the Council. They had only been living on the plot for
two months and hoped that they would be leaving for 'proper
housing' very soon. The landlord did not like having
children on the plot, and he seemed to have a very high
turnover of sub-tenants, few of them apparently staying
more than a few months. This may have been due to the ban
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on children, but was more probably connected to the
clandestine political activity that was based on this
plot. Many people on the compound steered clear of this
plot for fear of coming under suspicion themselves.
Plots D1 and D2: The other two plots in the
sample involved kin who were also sub-tenants. In one
case, D1, it involved the landlord's sister, brother-in-
law, and family and in the other an unmarried brother of
the landlord. Both were sub-tenants in the formal sense,
regularly paying rent to the landlord, but obviously the
relationship was more than purely economic. In both
cases, the sub-tenants were better off financially than
the landlord with whom they were staying and it was there¬
fore felt appropriate that they should pay. This seemed
to be a general rule on Malota, An individual who was
earning regularly, but who could not find accommodation,
was expected to pay rent. If he had no or was earning
very little, then he would be allowed to stay free or at a
reduced cost. A plot was seen as a resource which could
be used to help out kin, if it was needed badly. Other¬
wise, it was seen as a resource which could aid the land¬
lord himself by providing an income from rent. Kin
arriving in Livingstone make great use of Malota, because
the plots are so flexible. A landlord is obliged to help
those of his kin in difficulties; to provide accommodation
while they look for work and housing. In one sense,
living on Malota allows the urban dweller to fulfill his
obligations to his kin more easily than if he lived on one
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of the other compounds. Equally, of course, it Is possible
that he has more demands made of him. However, once the
new arrival is established financially, and particularly
if he has a greater income, then the obligations are
reversed in the sense that he is expected to contribute
something in the form of rent. Otherwise, the severe
shortage of housing would prolong the period of obligation
past what would be regarded as reasonable. Many of these
kin/sub-tenants remain on the plot for over a year with
little prospect of finding alternative housing, yet having
obtained work they are reluctant to move on elsewhere.
They are therefore quite willing to pay their own way.
7:5 Social Composition and Physical Structure
At this point, having discussed some of the major
factors involved, it becomes possible to look at the way
in which the social composition of a plot and its
physical structure are related. We have already seen
how varied both these elements are, but they are not
separated or isolated from each other. Physical flexi¬
bility leads to a large number of possibilities in terms
of social composition? the nature of the social compo¬
sition of a plot at the same time puts certain demands
and constraints on its physical structure. The following
four examples show the different ways in which these
elements can be interconnected. The wide range of vari¬
ations possible are shown in Diagram 7.1.
In example A there are five rooms in a rough
circle, four of which have thatched roofs. The only
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buildings with tin roofs are a work area (one of the
inhabitants is a blacksmith) and a new hut (4) that was
built recently to accommodate the family of the son of
this blacksmith. All of the buildings have walls of
poles and dagga. The occupants of the plot are all
related to the landlord, though each building is a
separate unit and the inhabitants of huts 2, 3 and 4 cook
and eat separately. The two oldest men, the blacksmith
and his father's youngest brother, live in huts 1 and 5 and
have their food cooked for them by two unmarried sisters
of the blacksmith who live in hut 2. No one on the plot
pays any rent to the landlord, and the blacksmith provides
the only source of income. The plot originally consisted
of one small hut that was rebuilt. As new people have
moved onto the plot, new huts have been built to accom¬
modate them. In this way, the plot has been continually
adapted to meet the developing needs of a group of kin,
some of whom could not have otherwise remained in town.
Physically the plot is typical of the type of plot that
gives Malota its rural image.
In dramatic opposition to this is the type of plot
shown in example B. In this case, the house is a large,
single, brick-walled unit which is centred on what the
inhabitants call the 'sitting room'. All the rooms,
apart from one bedroom and the kitchen, have glass win¬
dows. The house accommodates two brothers and their
Immediate families, but the food is provided from a
central kitchen and the two families normally eat
together. Internally, the house resembles a very utili-
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tarian version of British suburbia. The two brothers
are both carpenters, the eldest one working for a firm in
the town, and the younger one producing mainly simple
furniture in a workshop on the plot. Together, they had
an income that was normally over K100 a month, a consid¬
erable income on Malota even with thirteen mouths to feed.
Why, with such an income, they stayed on Malota is a
complex matter outside the scope of this thesis but it
suffices to say in this context that the source of their
commitment was primarily political.
Examples A and B both involve plots where the
inhabitants are all related, but where factors such as
age, income and occupational status have lead to dramati¬
cally different consequences. In both cases, the flexi¬
bility of plot has allowed people other than the landlord
and his nuclear family to move in, though in neither case
are formal sub-tenants Involved. Examples C and D involve
sub-tenants who are also outside of the landlord's family.
Example C, in particular, shows very clearly the way in
which many plots on Malota have developed. The landlord
sells dry fish locally and has developed a successful
business. He bought the house, units 5 and 6 in the
diagram, at the beginning of 1960 for the cost of £25.
This had not been of very good quality and had deterior¬
ated further. He had therefore built two new buildings of
a very good quality, though he continued to use the orig¬
inal units. As his children had grown older and some of
them left the plot, he found himself with units 3 and 4
vacant and he had therefore taken in a sub-tenant. One of
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the two units was left vacant in case of visits from
relatives. In this case, the landlord is not primarily
concerned with profit, but the land and accommodation are
assets and he has no wish to see them wasted.
The landlord of plot D is also self-employed, as
a brick maker. He has done this for many years in
between working as a labourer for local contractors. In
1971 he had not worked for nearly a year, and as he was
approaching 45, he was in the process of accepting that
he was likely to be a fulltime brickmaker for the rest of
his working life. He therefore obtained a loan from his
brother who lives on Libuyu compound and built the extra
house which he hoped he would be able to sub-let to two,
or maybe three, single men thus providing him with a good
stable income as long as he remained in town. When I left
Malota, he had in fact only one sub-tenant staying with
him but he claimed that this was because he was particular
about who he lived with.
The number, size and shape of houses on individual
plots on Mslota depends on what is needed, and can be
altered and adapted as needs change. This is different
from most official accommodation in Zambia, which is fixed
by the authorities and is not subject to change as the
circumstances of the inhabitants alter. The urban situ¬
ation, and the careers of those living in it, is
constantly subject to fluctuations and changes. As towns
grow larger and the shortage of housing becomes more
critical, the demand for the sort of flexibility that
Malota provides inevitably becomes greater. It is in
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this sense that Malota is sometimes seen as desirable,
and even necessary, both from the point of view of the
individuals who are directly concerned, and the authori¬
ties who must cope with the housing problem. This is a
theme that I shall return to at a later point.
We have seen that individuals live on Malota for
a number of reasons and as a consequence of a number of
factors. Having obtained a plot on the compound, there
are a number of options open to them as to what they will
do with it. How many buildings, and of what sort; how
many people live there, and who these people are; how
much Income is derived from the plot and so on. These
are all problems over which the plot-holder has a great
deal of control. As a result, a plot on Malota is an
asset of great potential value, allowing the individual
to adapt to the changing demands of life in the urban
context. For example, the return of many men to their
rural homes as they get older has been an action brought
about frequently by economic necessity rather than per¬
sonal desire or moral obligation. Even now, occupational
security is almost a pre-requisite for stability of
accommodation. A plot on Malota can be an insurance policy
against age, redundancy, market fluctuations, even death.
Inevitably, however, there are also costs; the very low
standards of the facilities provided and the low status
attributed by people in the town to Malotans are parti¬
cularly important factors. Once again, however, the
adaptability of the plot allows some individuals to
balance out these costs by building superior quality
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structures.
The way in which an individual uses his plot
depends, therefore, upon the way in which he assesses
these gains and costs. Such assessment is constantly
subject to review as his situation, and that of those
around him, changes. Events such as the arrival of kin,
the leaving home of children, or a drop in income, cause
a re-evaluation of the landlord's position. A change in
attitudes caused by an increasing fear of the compound's
demolition, or the changing demands of a spouse, might
cause a similar re-evaluation. The major advantage of
Malota is that the individual can more often act on such
re-evaluations without giving up those investments that
have already been made in terms of time, the development
of networks of relationships and so on. Elsewhere, such
action is not generally possible or involves giving up
the investments.
7:6 Slums, Squatters and Marginality
As we saw earlier, Malota is undoubtedly a slum
and is often regarded as a squatter compound. It is not,
by any formal definition, the latter, but it is one of
the large number of what have become known as 'shanty
towns* that surround Africa's large cities. In these
last two chapters I have tried to look at the people who
live on Malota and the particular factors that have
caused them to come and live, and subsequently remain, on
the compound. In doing so I have tried to provide an
"adequate sociological model of the settlement process ...
2J>h
based on the actor* s changing definition of the 'housing
situation' rather than on that of the 'observer'," What
I have been able to conclude is that, in both pre- and
post-independence situations, Malota has been a posi¬
tively attractive proposition to specific categories of
individuals, even when apparently superior alternatives
have been available. It is essential, therefore, that
the observer - whether a planner or a sociologist -
comprehends the full range of criteria employed by the
actors when judging the adequacy of a specific housing
situation.
Inhabitants of Malota choose to move there, or
remain there, when they perceive the benefits as out¬
weighing the costs of living in a situation regarded by
many as totally unacceptable. But what is particularly
apparent is that many of the attractive features of Malota
exist in the present-day squatter areas and were also
present in colonial unauthorised compounds. As a result,
there are, in terms of social composition, many compari¬
sons between Malota and these areas.
In particular I identified the opportunities for
self-employment (and especially for women and older people)
which have always existed there because of the separation
of housing from employment and the physical flexibility
of Malota*s plots. As a result^ I found (both in 1951 and
1971) a comparatively high proportion of self-employed





squatter areas. It was also concluded, as has also been
2
noted in Lusaka, that in 1971 there was a tendency for
the landlords to be older, self-employed men and their
sub-tenants to be younger wage-earners. The illegal
activities such as beer-brewing and sub-letting, such an
essential aspect of squatter areas, can be carried on in
Malota because of the, apparently deliberate, apathy of
the municipal authorities.
The housing on Malota, as in unauthorised areas,
is cheap, can either be owned or rented, and is not tied
to any particular employment situation. This enables a
much higher level of residential stability, irrespective
ox occupational insecurity. Together with the self-employ¬
ment opportunities, this puts individuals on Malota and
elsewhere in a much better position to adapt to the
frequently changing needs of themselves and their families
than if they lived in authorised low-cost housing areas.
These factors are positive advantages to living
in unauthorised and illegal housing areas, as well as
Malota. It is very different from the assumption most
frequently made that the populations of slums and squatter
areas have nowhere else to go. Admittedly, with the
present housing situation, many Malotans have no viable
alternatives within the context of Livingstone, but the
fact remains that they choose to live on Malota rather






which the majority of them came. As we have seen, the
way in which such choices are arrived at depends upon the
inter-relationship between a number of factors such as
age, job* educational experience and marital status; and
the way in which these are perceived by individual actors
within the context of their personal network of social
relationships. Each individual living on Malota must at
least balance the costs and the benefits of living on the
compound.
At the same time as we can see the similarities
between Malota and unauthorised and squatter areas both
in 1951 and 1971, we must also note the very distinct
changes that have occurred in the compound over the last
twenty years. The change in housing regulations brought
about by political independence changed significantly the
way in which individuals were able to manipulate the com¬
pound's resources. As a result, the compound's social
composition changed dramatically, particularly in terms
of the occupational structure. But, despite these
changes, the contrast between Malota and other authorised
urban areas generally remains. This is because, although
Malota has changed, so have the towns of Zambia. Malota's
distinctiveness in 1951 was brought about by the general
structure of colonial employment policy which, through its
inflexibility, made the existence of something like Malota
virtually inevitable. In the same way, the increasingly
acute shortage of official housing, and the inability of
the housing authorities to provide alternative solutions,
has meant that the population itself ha? had to take
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effective action, normally in the form of squatter areas.
Malota is unusual in the sense that though, in its present
form, it has developed from the same factors, and is in
many ways similar to squatter areas, it has taken place
within a situation which does not involve Illegal land
tenure. Thus Malota has changed since 1951 but has
remained, despite its legal status, outside the basic
framework of the country's official housing policies.
It is undoubtedly this that gives Malota its
•squatter' reputation, and which is responsible for the
general idea that slums and squatter areas are in some
way •marginal' to the urban situation. McEwen summarises
the basic idea when she comments;
The term marginality ... tends to combine both
empirical perceptions and theoretical assumptions
that conceive the central problem of shanty-towns
as one of inadequate integration .... Marginality
then is a relational concept which refers, in
different contexts and according to how the concept
of integration is operationalized, to a situation
of tenousness and ambiguityj peripherality, or
superfluity and redundancy.*
Malota is seen by many as marginal to Livingstone. It is
regarded as highly traditional and almost rural, and is
therefore seen as a negation of all that is, or should be,
urban. It is the "village within the town". But from the
evidence presented, it is my contention that it is its
very differences, both physical and demographic, that make
it a vital and essential part of the town. Its presence
and its nature arise from the inability of successive




and reflect the ability of the urban population to
develop and adapt outside of the formal structure. There
can be no doubt that the people of Malota play as impor¬
tant a role in the life of Livingstone as anyone else.
Malota*s value lies in the fact that it allows these
people to stay in the town. Without it, the inadequacies
of the housing authorities over the last twenty years
(and before) would have had a much more drastic effect on
the health of the town.
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CHAPTER 8
POLITICS IN URBAN ZAMBIA
8;1 Introduction
We have seen in previous chapters that political
changes within what is now Zambia have had a significant
influence on the process of urbanization in the country.
But what of specific political activities and institutions?
How do they relate to the development of urban areas, and
to what extent does the housing process, for example, have
any significant effect on the nature of political activity?
More specifically, in what way do the unusual features of
Malota show themselves in the political institutions of
the compound? As in other matters, Malota is regarded
within Livingstone as being politically isolated and
marginal. It is the 'village in the town', attached to,
but not part of, Livingstone. As a result, the activities
of the people living there are thought to be based on rural
rather than urban values and the compound is thought by
many to be a bulwark of traditionalism and opposition.
Its population is seen as conservative and resistant to
the changes that have been brought about by independence.
In the following chapters I hope to show how inaccurate
this view is, and that what is happening on Malota is
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very much a reflection of what is going on in the wider
society.
It is inevitable that 1964, the year of indepen¬
dence, provides the focal point for any discussion of
political change within Zambia. Taking a broader per¬
spective, however, independence might well be seen as just
one point, albeit an important one, in Zambia's movement
from a colonial protectorate to the 'one-party partici¬
patory democracy' that it is today. We must take care
not to overstress the significance of 1964 by providing it
with some sort of barrier-like quality that separates off
'what is' from 'what used to be'. Independence was not
achieved overnight, nor did its achievement rid Zambia of
the effects of colonialism. When Zambia's new leaders
took over it was only the first step for, as Fettman
points out, "the nation had yet to be created and its
interests had yet to be articulated." The political
structure inherited was to prove inadequate and a new one
would have to be developed. Even now, Zambia is still
"in the initial stage of emerging from her colonial
2
past." Independence was a historical process that
neither ended nor began on October 24th. 1964; at the
beginning of the 1970s many problems remained unsolved
and the prospect seemed to be one of growing instability.
The blame for the problems that Zambia has




Molteno & Tordoff (1974:399)
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merit of cleavages within the state. One of the major
themes of the nationalist movement was the need for the
complete unity of the African population but it has
become quite apparent that "conflict on sectional lines
A
has increased sharply in the years since 1964." In
particular, it is believed that tribal loyalties and
groupings have emerged to form a "major barrier against
integration of the people into a nation-wide political
2
unit." This aspect of Zambian political activity was
very prominent during the period of my fieldwork. By
early 1971, accusations of 'tribalism1 amongst political
leaders were rampant, and the deep conflicts both within
and between political parties were normally attributed to
tribal divisions. The fight for independence, with its
unified opposition to the colonial regime, subsumed
internal differences. But after 1964 what "little uni¬
fication ... had been achieved in the independence
3
struggle soon dissolved."
8:2 Tribalism and Ethnicity
This turn of events in Zambia follows a common
trend throughout Africa over the last 25 years as various
states have become independent. The fear of the conse¬
quences of cleavages within the continent's new, emergent,






by political leaders who, meeting at the first 'All
African Peoples1 Congress1 in Accra, called tribalism an
'evil practice* and a 'serious obstacle to the unity,
political evolution, and rapid liberation of Africa'. At
the same time they were only too aware of the possible
contradiction that such views involved. Politicians saw
the need for large independent political units which
would be powerful enough to have some say in their external
relations with the rest of the world; yet they were faced
with internal cleavages which, though often dividing
countries, frequently provided the source of their own
power.
The word 'tribalism' in this sense became associ¬
ated with division end conflict; it became a 'problem'.
This provided a basic framework of confusion against
which social scientists have tried to understand the role
of the tribe in rapidly changing and urbanizing societies.
Their difficulties in clarifying what exactly is meant by
•tribalism*, or its more recent (and less perforative)
equivalent 'ethnicity*, have been compounded by a number
of other factors well summarised in the following passage:
Our main argument is that in rural areas membership
of a tribe involves participation in a working
political system, and sharing domestic life with
kinsfolk; and that this continued participation is
based on present social and economic needs, and not
merely on conservatism. On the other hand, tribalism
in towns is a different phenomenon entirely. It is
primarily a means of classifying the multitude of
Africans of heterogeneous origins who live together
in the towns, and this classification is the basis on
which a number of new groupings, such as burial and





In this passage Gluckman introduces a number of variables
that confuse our understanding of the concept of
*tribalism•• Primarily he is concerned with the urban-
rural dichotomy and the tremendous effect that he sees
this having on the form and function of the ethnic group.
The increasing consideration of the role of tribalism in
towns meant that the focus of interest shifted from "the
isolated ethnic group defined by its cultural content to
the ethnic unit as a social category, a form of structure,
embedded within a larger system."^ Anthropologists
working in sometimes extremely isolated rural areas had
developed a theoretical framework that emphasised the
harmony, equilibrium and integration of the tribe. The
analysis of urban life brought them face-to-face with the
changes that had taken, and were taking, place, and it
quickly became evident that adding theories of accultur¬




8s 3 Ethnicity in Towns




The •culture contact* school of thought, though
primarily concerned with rural areas (Hunter 1961; Mair
1934; Fortes 1945; 1949), provided the initial framework
for the study of changing situations with heterogeneous
populations (International African Institute 1938). The
most notable example of an urban study was Bellman's
investigation of a Johannesburg slum yard (1948).
x
This section can only be brief and selective.
A comprehensive statement of the myriad problems, ambi¬
guities and solutions surrounding the subject of urban
ethnicity can best be obtained from the book of that
title (Cohen 1974)
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particular the work of Mitchell and Epstein, was an
attempt to develop a new framework. These writers viewed
the tribal origins of the population, in the sense of
tribal modes of behaviour, as being of secondary impor¬
tance. The migrant in town was to be seen both as towns¬
man and tribesman depending on the features of the
situation under consideration. In this sense, tribalism
was not the basis of the organisation of tribal groups
but "essentially a category of interaction in casual
■y
social intercourse." This argument emphasised the
position of the individual migrant in town and the way in
which he conceived of, and categorised, ethnic divisions.
The urban African came to be seen as living within dif¬
ferent 'fields* of activity - work, politics, recreation
and so on. In any particular situation the actors were
seen to choose certain relevant factors. Epstein, for
example, saw 'tribe* as being the most pertinent factor
in domestic and interpersonal relationships, but less
2
important in work and political situations. The basic
assumption behind this analytic framework seems to be
that:
Ethnicity was not a live economic or political issue,
but essentially an epistemological device developed
by the Africans so that they could comprehend, or make
sense oft the bewildering complexity and heterogenity
of urban society. They did this by classifying other







Thus, in towns, the cognitive aspect of tribalism is seen
to be dominant. As a result of such work, tribalism came
to be seen increasingly in terms of its urban context as
an element of urban life subject to manipulation by the
individual actors involved. Ethnic divisions were seen
as existing, but their significance and their impact on
social life were dependent upon the extent to which they
were brought into play by the actors in specific situ¬
ations. This idea has been further developed by Earth who
has argued that ethnic categories provide an
organizational vessel that may be given varying
amounts and forms of content In different socio-
cultural systems. They may be of great relevance
to behaviour, but they need not be; they may
pervade all social life, or they may be relevant
only in limited sectors of activity.1
Such arguments have, more recently, come in for a good
deal of criticism as being, amongst other things, tauto-
logous and static. Cohen argues that it is not sufficient
to reduce ethnicity to the level of strategic manipulation
by individuals. This, he claims, is a one-sided argument
that does not account "for the potency of the normative
2
symbols which the individual manipulates". Ethnicity,
he continues, has to be understood in terms of its
relationship to a number of economic and political
variables which "for brevity" he subsumes, reluctantly
perhaps, under the all-embracing banner of 'political'.







specialization of social anthropology is this very
political interpretation of what are essentially
non-political formations and activities •••• The
cultures of ethnic groups are universes of such
formally non-political formations and activities
that are politicized in the course of social action.'
Using such a framework, Cohen attempts to cut across the
analytic subsystems of urban life used by other researchers
which, as Hanna points out, "are not likely to display the
2
same degree of ethnicity". Thus he tries to bring to¬
gether the separate arenas of urban life by attempting to
show how the ongoing competition for available resources,
that is the political element of urban life, is carried
out (or at least expressed) through the cultural symbols
of ethnic divisiveness. In one sense Cohen's views bring
us back to the point from which we started, for he is
emphasising the strife that exists between different
ethnic groups. Thus, though the term 'ethnicity* as
used by Cohen does not have the connotations of the term
l±
•tribalism' so frequently used by politicians, it is
firmly set within the context of conflict and competition
and it is decidedly political. Needless to say, Cohen






This is not to say that the term 'ethnicity'
has no implications. Indeed, Cohen himself believes that
the term will eventually have to be replaced because the
word 'ethnic* suggests the idea of minority, inferiority,
subordinacy and so on, when in fact an ethnic group need
be none of these things.
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an approach to these areas in the field of ethnicity,
particularly evident in the urban situation, that the
•political approach* neither encompasses nor adequately
-i
conceptualizes". But there is no doubt that much of the
recent work on ethnicity in towns is very solidly based
on Cohen's framework.
8: Ethnicity and Politics in Urban Zambia
It is abundantly clear that, as an analytic
concept, the term tribalism (or ethnicity) is far from
clear. The continuing search for clarification is much
hampered by the way in which the term is also used by
non-academics and particularly the media and the politi¬
cians. All too frequently (and freely) it is associated
2
with corruption and conservatism, and regarded as a
social and political problem rather than a sociological
phenomenon. This usage (or misueage) of the term is, of
course, part of the very phenomenon that we are trying to
study and provides the basis of the idea of the tribe as
3
a •blame-pinning device*.
It has been a basic theme of Zambian domestic
policy to rid itself of tribalism. In his first speech




This is clearly demonstrated, for example, by
the Commission of Inquiry set up by President Kaunda in
1971 "to probe charges of tribalism and rampant corrup¬





We, as a Government, are committed to the building up
here of a truly non-racial and non-^tribal society,
and I would like to declare here and nov/ that just as
I say that do not let what happened in the past make
you racially or tribally bitter.'
Later that year, however, he felt bound to admit that a
man's tribal background could be of positive value when
he argued that people should try to remember the tradi¬
tional ways of life - what he termed the 'good aspect of
tribalism* - and at the same time reject the divisions,
jealousies, and conflicts that are thought to be the
basis of modern tribalism. It is very apparent that he
and his government have been unable to achieve their
goals in this line. Seven years after independence, one
of Zambia's national newspapers was able to conclude in
editorial comment:
About the most tired subject in Zambia today is that
of tribalism. It is a favourite after-dinner subject
in the households of some of our most erudite politi¬
cians, It is the subject of the day - everywhere -
and what a pity this is so .... For centuries there
have existed in Zambia about the same number of
tribes as there are now. During those dark days,
internecine wars were common, with the victors
pillaging the houses of the vanquished and raping
their women or abducting them •••• Happily these days
are gone and forgotten. Or are they? We ask this
question because the present concern over tribalism
is about as ruinous to unity in Zambia as were the
tribal wars of yore.2
In 1971, at the time of this study, tribalism was undoubt¬
edly regarded as the primary force in Zambian politics.
As has already been noted, the divisions within the




Sundays Times of Zambia, 25/4/1971
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Much of the conflict that arose has been focused on the
urban areas which "reflect serious and growing divisions
... which make a mockery of the motto 'One Zambia, One
Nation*n. Eecause of its dominant position within the
political structure, the effect of these divisions was
particularly evident in the ruling party UNIP which had
become, at independence, the agency of representation and
the source of government. Since independence UNIP has
maintained, indeed increased, its strength over political
opposition, until in 1971 all other parties were declared
illegal. Essentially UNIP had been put forward ©s the
agency of a new, modern, independent Zambia. Loyalty to
the party was loyalty to Zembia; opposition to UNIP was
opposition to the State. Such a viewpoint is implicitly
contained within the emergence of the cne-party state that
is now Zambia. But at the same time UNIP itself has been
continually plagued by deep conflicts within its own
organisation to the extent that in 1969 President Kaunda
was forced to dissolve the Central Committee of the party
p
in order to "reunify it in the face of tribal violence".
Superficially at least, the formal political
structure of Zambia is seen to be centred around a
variety of sectional interests which appear to be coinci¬
dent with ethnic cleavages. Cohen has suggested that
♦political ethnicity*, though universal, has been parti¬






World. This has come about largely
because under colonial rule some ethnic groups
succeeded in gaining a great deal of power while
others became under-privileged.
With independence, the under-privileged
closed their ranks to redress the balance whilst
the privileged had to close their ranks to retain
their privileges.1
Ethnicity, by definition, involves interactions between
members of different ethnic groups. Obviously these
interactions are likely to be most intense and concen¬
trated within urban areas. But it is by no means an
urban phenomenon as such. Similarly, political activity
within new emergent states is often focused around cities,
and particularly the capitals. Yet the politics of an
African state involves a much wider environment. We
cannot then start from the assumption that, by studying
ethnicity and politics, or rather the relationship between
them, we are studying urban phenomena. What we are trying
to find out is the way in which particular urban situ¬




POLITICAL CHANGE IN ZAMBIA: 1951-1971
9:1 Introduetlon
Zambia's political structure, even after indepen¬
dence, has been heavily affected by the process of
colonialism. Northern Rhodesia had protectorate status,
its white settlers never gaining full political control,
and sixty years of British rule "created a structure of
dependence on southern Africa, and of division at home".
In one sense of course, Zambia would never have existed
as an entity without colonialism, and it was through the
need to attack British dominance that a nationalist move¬
ment was first created. But the formal structure of
Northern Rhodesia was designed to block any political
advancement for the African population, retard any growth
of national consciousness, and restrict the development
of a political culture. However, as we shall see, it was
impossible to repress all resistance even as early as the
1920s. Eventually, a nationalist movement was to emerge
because the 'external political enemy*, i.e. the British,




political irrelevance of linguistic and provincial
•i
differences". The drive for Federation with Southern
Rhodesia and Nyasaland sharply increased African opposi¬
tion during the early 1950s and its achievement led to a
decline in British credibility and further demands for a
universal franchise. As a result the movement to inde¬
pendence accelerated rapidly and there was a "fairly
peaceful and evolutionary, albeit hasty, transition to
2
political independence". It is within this framework
that the political institutions of pre-independence
Northern Rhodesia must be understood.
9i2 The Colonial Framework
At the beginning of the 1950s political activity
took place within a formal structure that gave little more
than token representation to the African population, even
though they were in the majority by over 60 to 1. This
structure was centered on a hierachy of Councils overseen
by the Governor who headed the executive branch of govern¬
ment and who presided over the two top bodies, the
Executive Council (EXCO) and the Legislative Council
(LEGCO). The higher levels were virtually totally domin¬
ated by Europeans and it was not until 194-8 that any
Africans were allowed to sit on the Legislative Council.
It was this body that voted supplies and was responsible
for local laws (including the many ordinances we noted in
1
Molteno (1974s65)
2 Tordoff and Molteno (1974:11)
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previous chapters). In 1951 it was made up of 22 members
and the impact of the two African members must have been
minimal.
Five years earlier, the administration had set up
the African Representative Council made up entirely of
Africans from all over the country. However, it had no
legislative power, could not impose its values on the
administration and, though it did provide a focus for
nation-wide discussion amongst Africans, they "had few
1
illusions about its power to change the course of events".
Representatives to this Council were nominated from below
by a series of regional (later *provincial1) councils,
also instituted during the 1940s, which contained
representatives from both rural and urban areas. Hall
contends that these provincial councils had a considerable
impact and comments that "under the benevolent chairman¬
ship of provincial administration officials, members could
list their grievances about racial discrimination, the
lack of educational opportunities, housing conditions, and
(most important of all) the intentions of the white
2
politicians in the Legislative Council." But, once again,
they had no effective power and were little more than
sounding boards whose members were drawn from a restricted
sector of the population and over whom colonial officials
were able to maintain a good deal of control. It seems





this stage was an attempt to contain African opinion and
potential opposition, but it can also be argued that they
brought together Africans from various parts of the country
from both rural and urban areas and, as such, hastened the
process of political conciousness, national identity, and
ultimately independence.
The base of this •political* pyramid that was
being created was centred, in the urban areas, on the
A
Urban Advisory Councils (UAC). Such Councils acted as a
link between the local urban population and the regional
and national levels by nominating two members to the
appropriate provincial council (See Diagram 9.1).
Though they varied greatly from town to town, they were
all intended to represent the overall urban population,
and their members were chosen from a variety of groups
within the town. Thus in Livingstone delegates were
brought in from the local native welfare association, the
Railways and Sawmills compounds, and two others were
nominated by the District Commissioner to represent
workers in various minor industries and also domestic
servants. All but the latter two were elected at polls
2
"democratically conducted at public meetings". The first
UACs had been formed on the Copperbelt around 1938,
Sometimes known at the beginning as •native
advisory councils* or 'urban advisory committee*.
2
Native Affairs 1949,p71. In contrast, Kitwe
UAC was made up of mine tribal representatives, members
of the Kitwe African Society, delegates from the War Fund
Committee and others nominated by the District Commis¬
sioner; See Clay (1948;38)
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DIAGRAM 9.1
THE PLACE OF LIVINGSTONE WITHIN THE FORMAL
POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 1
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
Two members appointed by the government and elected by the
AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL
whose members are elected by and from members of the
AFRICAN PROVINCIAL COUNCIL
whose members are elected by and from members of
1
Based on Clay (1949:38)
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apparently as a reaction to a developing feeling amongst
some senior colonial administrators that a certain degree
of controlled political activity amongst Africans would
1 >
be a healthy thing. The objectives of the UAC were to
keep the District Commissioner in touch with African
opinion; to act as a mouthpiece of government; and to
advise the District Commissioner on African welfare. In
more general terms they were to act as a "controlled
liaison between the administration and 'Africans working
2
in the towns*w.
The success and development of these UACs was
very uneven. The Livingstone UAC, for example, was
defunct for a period during the mid-1940s, and only re-
emerged in 1949 when it commenced to meet monthly and
took on the primary function of advising the municipal
council on African matters. On the whole, the councils
appear to have suffered a lack of credibility. Gann
claims that the "vast majority of Africans ... displayed
little interest in these bodies which remained the pre¬
rogative of a small elite which thereby gained convenient
*
access to the *D.C.*s* office.""^ Certainly they gained
little respect from the colonial administrators who
-i
Most notably Lord Halley who said in 1938 that
African politics needed to be handled 'sympathetically'.
2
Hall (1965:120)
^ Gann (1964:349-50), Very few of Malota's older
inhabitants had even heard of the UAC, never mind the
higher councils. Many of them believed that, before the
existence of political parties, the compound manager had
been their official representative.
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persistently complained that the councils were used to
further the political ambitions of individual Africans.
Thus in its first year of reconstitution the District
Commissioner commented of the Livingstone UAC that the
"Council is overweighted by the Barotse element, which is
unfortunate as the Lozi peoples are not a majority in
Livingstone, but inevitable as they provide nearly all
the 'politicians' in the town". This complaint was
reiterated annually and in 1951 the District Commissioner
elaborated when he said:
Generally their work has been disappointing. They
are an unbalanced body dominated by the six repre¬
sentatives of the Livingstone Welfare Society who
are primarily a political society and the balance
of numbers drawn from the railways, sawmills, and
contractor's compounds do not play a very enter¬
prising part. The Council needs a more democratic
basis and election by wards will no doubt be the
solution; meanwhile it provides a safety valve and
a means of taking African opinion, and in the early
stages one should not expect too much.2
Though the very wording of this statement gives us a good
deal of insight into how colonial administrators really
viewed the 'political' role of Africans, he is undoubtedly
correct in his belief that, in terms of social and
economic composition, the Livingstone UAC was not repre¬
sentative. Not only was it tribally unbalanced, but the
majority of members were from the better educated, better
paid sector of the population. This was virtually inevi¬
table because of the way in which the administrators
decided to select its members: half from the Livingstone
Welfare Society, accepted as being "for the better
1
Native Affairs 19^9, p.71
2 Native Affairs 1951, p.68
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■J
educated class of natives", and the other half wage-
employees from specific sectors of industry. Equally, it
was inevitable that the UACs would attract the politi¬
cally ambitious as higher office could only be obtained
by climbing through the formal structure of councils
that had been built up, and which only recruited for a
2
particular level from the level below.
We can see then that, in terms of the formal
structure of Northern Rhodesian politics, the 1940s
brought in a number of changes that seemed by 1951 to
have effectively developed the political role of the
African. It appears from this, on the surface at least,
that political consciousness and self-assertion were
phenomena that emerged in the period immediately after
the Second World War. But I would argue that these were
changes that only reflected the delayed reaction of the
colonial administrators to movements that had been taking
place, and building up over a much longer period of time.
In this sense, the development of these institutions was
an attempt on the part of the administration to bring under
their control political activity that was going on outside
of the formal structure. By giving the Africans limited
concessions, they hoped to avoid the development of other




It is interesting to note, for example, that
one of the first two Africans to sit on the highest body,
the Legislative Council, was Nelson Nalumango, a Lozi who
had started his political career in 1930 as one of the
founder members of the Livingstone Welfare Society.
259
of political parties.
We have only to look at the role of the Welfare
Societies and Associations to realise that this sort of
activity had been going on for a considerable period of
time. By 1951 they had been in existence for over 25
years and, although the Administration had hoped they
<1
would develop into "debating societies and social clubs",
they had always had some sort of political content though
they were careful at first not to be seen as critical of
the government. Indeed the constitution of the first one,
set up at Mwenzo in 1923# stated specifically that;
The aid of the association is neither directly nor
indirectly to subvert the authority of the government
or of any lawful establishment, nor to induce the
community to do so. It is rather one of the helpful
means of developing the country in the hands of the
two necessary connecting links - the government and
the governed.2
This 'positive' aspect was usually stressed in formal
constitutions with the result that Gann was able to speak
of members as being "'loyalists* rather than critics of
■5
Government". This was not always the view of admini¬
strators, however, and in its first year of existence the




Hall (1965:113). MacPherson (1974:39) contends
that, though the formal constitution of the Nwenzo Welfare
Society was set up in 1923# the group had been formed
before the First World War and that "Nineteen-twelve is
thus a more probable date for the formal establishment of
the Association, which can be regarded as the first
organised body of African political expression in
Northern Rhodesia in the context of colonial rule."
3 Gann (1964:270)
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because of its tendency to "indulge in a good deal of
1
irrelevant and rather wild, talk on extraneous matters".
Ey 1930 the Nwenzo association had died out, but
there were major associations at Mazabuka, Broken Hill,
Ndola, and Livingstone. Livingstone had the biggest and
most active group, one of its first meetings being
2
attended by over 350 people. It was relatively short¬
lived, partly because of pressure from the authorities,
and after 1935 was dormant until there was a national
resurgence of Welfare Society activity at the beginning
of the 1940s. In 1946 there was a major breakthrough at
the national level when the Northern Rhodesian Federation
of Welfare Societies was formed but, ironically, this was
the beginning of the end of the Welfare Societies as such
for there were a number of forces at work that would soon
make them redundant. But during the 1940s they were the
focus of a number of changes that were taking place in
3
Northern Rhodesia. The leaders of the societies that
grew up in most of the major towns tended to be men who
were better educated, better paid, and essentially urban
dwellers. Though many were still recent migrants to the
towns, their commitment was to the urban situation which
1
Native Affairs 1930, p.9. This 'wild talk'
was frequently centred on the subject of racial discrim¬
ination and in particular the large numbers of arrests
made that year of Africans who had walked on the pave¬




For a discussion of the changing role of one
particular welfare society during this period, see
Epstein (1958:66-72).
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provided the focus for their ideas, expectations, and
ambitions. As a result they sought a political framework
that was specifically relevant to their urban situation.
This the Welfare Societies were able to provide, unlike
the formal hierachy of the councils which "deliberately
looked back to the tribal areas". They were attractive
for a number of reasons. They were specifically urban,
African and 'modern*. They were not *official* in the
way that the various councils were, and consequently they
had a certain independence from government both in terms of
membership and action. The result was that they had a
vitality that the other political institutions did not.
Inevitably, they came into conflict with these
other institutions. Though there was a good deal of over¬
lap with the formal structure - for example, the dominance
of the Livingstone UAC by the Livingstone Welfare Society-
increasingly the societies seemed to be taking over the
functions of the UACs. In Luanshya the influence of the
Welfare Society became so great that the UAC had become
virtually 'moribund* by 194-6. It was only with the
astute Introduction of the Provincial Councils, which
made higher political office a more easily attainable
goal, that the UACs regained any of their earlier strength.
Epstein has vividly shown how the threat of the Welfare
Societies forced major changes in the political structure






takeover of the UACs by the younger, more urbanized,
element.
The political institutions developed by the
colonial administration reflected, of course, their atti¬
tude towards urban dwellers generally at this time. As we
have seen in earlier chapters, the migrant in town was
regarded essentially as a temporary inhabitant who would
never really lose his rural origins. The hierachy of
advisory bodies that was set up was based to a certain
extent on this assumption. But it was even more explicitly
demonstrated in the other major institution of this era,
the Tribal Representative or Elder. Elders existed in all
urban areas, in one form or another, throughout the 19^0s
and early 1950s. They were originally introduced on the
Copperbelt as early as 1931» and were initially used by
the Mine Compound Managers as a primary link between the
mining companies and the African population. Their role
extended to almost every aspect of life on the mine com¬
pounds although they had no actual legal power and were
very much dependent upon the voluntary submission of the
population to their authority. They were men of consid¬
erable prestige and regarded themselves as * fathers of the
<1
location'. Originally they formed the basis of the
7
administrative structure. Though the system was origin¬
ally confined to the mine compounds, its apparent success
A
Epstein's study (1958) includes a detailed dis¬
cussion of the role of the Elders. See particularly
pp. 37-65.
2
For example, Luanshya's original UAC was mainly
made up of Elders.
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caused it to be extended to a number of municipal loca¬
tions. But their role was never to be as comprehensive.
The mine Elders were specifically involved in the relation¬
ship between employer and employee. They played an impor¬
tant part in the solution of problems relating to wages
and working conditions as well as the settlement of local,
frequently domestic, disputes that formed the core of the
role of the Elders on municipal locations, where the popu¬
lation was normally heterogeneous in terms of employment.
As the role of the Elders developed on the mines, they
came to be seen increasingly as a 'labour body', or as
Epstein put it, "an embryonic organisation for collective
<1
bargaining".
However, the two groups of Elders did have certain
things in common. Their essential function was, as
Epstein saw it, to uphold the established order of societyj
to be the guardians of law and morals; and to reaffirm the
moral values of society. In this sense they were seen to
express the deepest values of tribal, i.e. rural, society.
It is hardly surprising therefore that the Elders would
eventually come into conflict with certain sectors of the
urban African population who believed that things were
changing and that a new order was emerging which made
rural values, and those people who symbolised them,redun¬
dant. As early as 1935, these conflicts were apparent,
particularly when it was felt that the Elders acted as an




sentatives of the African population. Their situation
was particularly fraught when involving industrial dis¬
putes for which their framework of customary law could
not possibly have any precedents.
In the late 19^0s, the political structure of
Northern Rhodesia (as far as the African population was
concerned) was centred on three main pointss
(i) The hierachy of •representative* councils with
the urban Advisory Councils at the base and
the Legislative Council at the top.
(ii) The Tribal Elders and Representatives
(iii) The increasingly important local Welfare
Societies.
These three groups of institutions were very different in
nature, though in terms of membership there was a good
deal of overlap between them. Over the decade the balance
between them altered considerably with the Elders losing
a good deal of support and influence as younger men, more
committed to urban life than their predecessors, began to
emerge as leaders of the urban community. The UACs also
lost some of their strength because of the intercalary
role that they were forced to play but, at the same time,
they were tne primary vehicle to political office and
could not be totally ignored by those who had political
ambitions. This was particularly the case when the Pro¬
vincial Councils and the African Representative Council
were introduced, for they considerably broadened the
scope for those who were looking for office. It is in
this sense that I believe that these bodies were intro¬
duced by the colonial administration, not simply to improve
the representation of the Africans, but rather to control
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the political activity of the emerging generation which
was then based on the Welfare Societies. The societies
could only be effective through the formal hierachy,
without which they could do little to achieve the changes
on which so much of their thinking and talking was centred.
The elaboration of the African representative structure
was an attempt to divert political vigour from •unofficial*
into official channels rather than allow the dynamism of
the Welfare Societies to get out of control, perhaps with
the formation of political parties resulting.
But though these changes did result in, for
example, the revitalisation of some of the UACs, the
councils were to prove inadequate for the political needs
of their African members and could not prevent the develop¬
ment of what was by that stage virtually inevitable, the
formation of new African-run political institutions out¬
side the formal framework. These eventually emerged in
1947 and 1948 in the form of Trade Unions and the first
political party. Both had been the focus of much discus-
A
sion for several years , and in 1948 the two-year old
Federation of Welfare Societies was disbanded and recon¬
stituted as the Northern Rhodesian Congress, to become
the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress three
years later. The relationship between the Welfare
Societies and 'Congress* remained close for a number of
i
An African Congress had been set up, very
briefly, as early as 1937 and the idea was mooted several
times during the early 1940s but with no success. [See
Hall (1965:119-23)j. A shop assistant's Trade Union was
set up in 1947.
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years with some of the societies becoming Congress
branches and others affiliating, and acting as a base
for, the party. 1948 also saw the formation of the
African Mineworkers Union which was quickly to become
the biggest, best organised and most powerful union in
Northern Rhodesia.
By 1951t therefore, the political structure of
Northern Rhodesia was becoming increasingly diversified
and was in a considerable state of flux. Certain bodies
were waning in strength and would soon disappear; others
were emerging which, though they would suffer setbacks,
would provide the basis for a new political structure.
But, specific institutions apart, a definite trend was
obvious. There was a movement from a structure set up
and controlled by the colonial administration and highly
dependent upon rural-based values, to a series of insti¬
tutions derived from the urban situation which were
explicitly run bjr Africans for Africans.
9:3 Folitics in Livingstone - 1951
The Copperbelt was the focal point of many of the
changes that were going on in Northern Rhodesia, primarily
because of its large and relatively long established
industrial labour force. Livingstone, though the oldest
settlement, was still a comparatively small town and was,
in many ways, cut off from the main flow of events in the
country. It was also, as the administration constantly
pointed out, heavily dominated (both statistically and
politically) by migrants from Barotseland, and, in parti-
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cular, members of the Lozi tribe. The political structure
of the town was based on the framework that I have just
presented, but with a number of peculiar features which
were dependent upon local factors.
One of the major differences between Livingstone
and the towns of the Copperbelt is the obvious one that
the town has no mines and therefore no mining compounds.
As such the system of Elders that existed in the town in
1951 was subject to the distinctive nature of municipal
location elders that I have already mentioned. The system
had originally been introduced in Livingstone in 1936 when,
ironically enough, it was considered that the Welfare
Societies would "gradually develop into debating societies
and social clubs ... and their places will be taken by
councils of natives, chosen from tribal status rather than
educational attainment such as are being established by
y
the Local Authorities at Mazabuka and Livingstone". The
Welfare Association in Livingstone had been very strong
having started as a 'reading circle* in 1926, but by 1935
had virtually become defunct, partly because of a campaign
of ridicule on the part of the administration who, from
the very beginning, suspected the goals of the society and
were unhappy about the considerable support that it had
initially gained. The relatively early formation of a
system of Elders was probably a reaction to this, parti¬
cularly as it was being claimed on the Copperbelt that the




introduced by the municipal authorities, the system was
necessarily centred on the main municipal compound which,
at that time, was Malota. By 1951 the administrative
area known as 'The Municipal Compound' had beer; substan¬
tially expanded to include what are now known as Maramba
and Libuyu, but Malota had continued to provide the focus
for the elders. These elders seem to have performed very
similar functions to those of the Elders that Epstein
studied on the municipal location at Luanshya, An Ngoni
man who had lived on Malota since 1928, end who had been
the Elder for his tribe from 1937 until 1942, defined his
job in the following Euanner:
When the population in Malota got larger, tribal
elders were needed but before this all civil cases
were heard at Chief Mukuni's headquarters some few
kilometres east of Livingstone .Tribal Elders
were used many times for different things. We were
sometimes called to the Court to help the judges.
We administered African customary law subject to
direction from the Courts. The Elders had to decide
civil cases up to a total of £100 (more in the case
of inheritance or matrimonial cases); we could impose
prison up to one year, beatings for males up to 12
strokes ... but as the Elders provided many services,
so the rights were enjoyed by the residents only in
so far as they recognised and respected the Elders
and carried out their civil duties.
Apart from the general benefits of protection
and an opportunity for a fuller life which all Malotan
residents had, there were immediate advantages,
(i) safety and security (ii) educational grants for
orphans and help for destitutes.
The Elders, claimed this man, had sufficient authority "for
even the District Commissioner to show respect". It is not
clear exactly how many Elders there were on Malota. Luan¬
shya had, on its municipal location, 23 Elders representing
20 tribes. It is known that there were over o dozen on
Malota, and there were certainly representatives of the
Bemba, Lozi, Ngoni, Luvale and what used to be known as the
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*Nyasas', those migrants from what is now known as Malawi.
Livingstone*s system of Elders became more elabo¬
rate in 1943 when, after a strike of Lozi workers at the
Zambezi Saw Mills over the question of rations, a system
of Tribal Representatives was set up on the Saw Mills
Compound. These Representatives were very much in the
mould of the Copperbelt mine compound elders, acting
principally as mediators in the relationship between
employer and employee. In the absence of trade unions,
unrest amongst African workers over conditions was a
constant source of tension which needed some sort of
channelling if it was not to get out of hand. However,
workers were never very happy with this system, though it
did provide some sort of representation, and Elders tended
to become identified with the interests of management
rather than workers. Their lack of credibility was
intensified once the Trade Union movement got under way
and the African Mineworkers Union made it a priority to
seek the abolition of the system. In 1953 a referendum
on all the mines was held, and 97% of those who voted
were in favour of the abolition of Tribal Representatives
O
(82% of the total workforce). The Saw Mills Representa¬
tives had not lasted even that long, rapidly becoming
redundant as the highly politicised Barotse workers (who
2







became involved in the new emergent political institutions.
On Malota, however, where their role was mainly concerned
with the settlement of domestic disputes, the Elders
appear to have retained formal, i.e. administration-backed,
authority until the later part of the 1950s.
In 1951, therefore, there were in Livingstone all
the political Institutions mentioned in the previous
section. Geographically, ethnically, and occupationally,
however, they were distributed unevenly throughout the
town. Both the UAC and the Welfare Society, overlapping
as they were, were dominated by the Lozi. They were also
dominated by white-collar workers, the majority of whom
lived on the Maramba Compound. The Elders were effect¬
ively restricted to Malota, the power of the Representa¬
tives on the Sawmills compound having declined substan¬
tially. Writing ten years later, Reynolds argued that
Malota had always been the centre for Elders, and had
remained so even after the Copperbelt referendum because
the population of the compound were "exceedingly law¬
's
abiding, perhaps as a result of their settled residence.""
Epstein found that, in Luanshya, an important attribute
of the Elders on the municipal location was their length
of residence in the town, and also the fact that they were
normally men who had been around long enough to have had
the opportunity to become widely known throughout the
3







that plot-holders on Malota tended to be older men who
had spent a good deal of time in town. This fact, to¬
gether with the fact that Malota was by far the oldest
remaining compound, was the original base for the Elders
when they were instituted in 1936, and was geographically
the centre of the large housing complex known as 'The
Municipal Compound* (containing almost 50% of the town's
total population) provides the most reasonable explanation
for the dominance by the compound of the town's Elder
system.
But even on Malota the Elders were declining.
•Congress' and the Trade Unions were moving to the fore¬
front. However, the situation was complicated by the role
of the Lozi elite within the town. McCulloch contended
that the Lozi "never seem to have been particularly
interested in political or Trade Union activity". This
is of course in direct contradition to the views of the
colonial administrators that we noted earlier, and seems
to arise from McCulloch*s narrow definition of politics.
She herself talks at a later stage of a "struggle for
leadership in the town between the elite among the Lozi
and a number of 'foreigners* who are selected individuals
2
in terms of wealth, education and occupation". What seems
to have arisen was a competition for power centred on two
factions, one based on the UAC and the Welfare Society,






there were at least four at the time). The former group
was heavily dominated by the Lozi, and the latter, though
quite broad based, had a majority of its most active
participants from the Northern and Eastern regions. This
meant that •outsiders' had control of those institutions
which within a couple of years would become more attrac¬
tive to the Lozi when the UAC was disbanded and the
Welfare Society began to lose its significance in the
town. Inevitably, this was to have an important impact
on the development of politics within the town.
It has to be remembered that, at this point in
time, politics in urban areas was very much the politics
of the elite. Even amongst the Elders, tribal status,
preferably a •royal1 connection, was an important pre¬
requisite. It was inevitable that the emerging political
institutions were dominated by the better paid and better
educated. As a result, the political arena was controlled
by certain ethnic groups which, for a variety of histori¬
cal reasons, had access to superior educational facilities
or were more likely to have acquired marketable skills,
and as a result were very much over-represented amongst
the elite of the town. As can be seen from Table 9.1» the
Lozi, Northern, and Eastern groups, which were the three
smallest, were significantly over-represented in terms of
skilled workers, white-collar workers, high earnings and
(with one exception) high levels of education. The
^ The comparatively low educational achievement
of the Eastern Province men was probably due, according
to McCulloch, to the fact that the major tribe within







































































Northern and Eastern groups appear to have been particu¬
larly dominant in •Congress* and the Trade Unions because
most of them had some prior links with the Copperbelt
where much of this activity had originated. The Lozi, on
the other hand, had many years of experience of (and
domination of) both the UAC and the Welfare Society. The
division between these two factions is, therefore, a
reflection of a competition within the elite for available
political resources in which a local factor - the domin¬
ation of the town by Lozi - became predominant.
In 1951 the future trends were becoming increas¬
ingly obvious. The seeds of a nationalist movement had
been sown many years before, but were now beginning to
sprout. The political party and the Trade Union looked
likely to become the mechanisms through which Africans
would seek political power. The institutions set up by
the colonial administration were having to strive for
survival and were surely on their way out. The next
decade was to see an acceleration of these trends that
took even the most ardent nationalists by surprise.
9:4 1951 - 1971: From Colonial Protectorate to Federal
ITepubllc : ;
However, though independence was in sight by the
end of the 1950s, political activity during that decade
was not a straight and uninterrupted line on the path of
nationalism. Some of the older institutions showed a
reluctance to disappear, and the new forms of activity
were to receive considerable setbacks.
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From 1952 onwards, the representatives of Living-
stone's UAC were elected by ward and this virtually ended
the power of the town's Welfare Society which had pre¬
viously been guaranteed 50% of the Council places, and
which therefore provided a direct channel for the ambi¬
tions of the Lozi elite. The major consequence of this
seems to have been that, as Mulford points out, the
"younger educated Lozi, who lived on the Copperbelt or
along the 'line of rail', shared in the general political
2
awakening of the 1950*sM. Increasingly, their support
was focused on the ANC who gained rapid support in the
early years of the decade. In doing so, they came into
conflict with the Barotseland traditional hierachy who
showed a determined resistance towards any involvement in
3
nationalist politics. This conflict was particularly
centred on the question of Northern Rhodesia's Federation
with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The ANC had become
associated in many people's minds with the fight against
'Federation'. The Lozi traditional leaders provided
implicit support for Federation when an "official was sent
from the capital of the Lozi Paramount Chief, to advise
the Barotseland men in Livingstone not to oppose Feder-
4
ation actively." This caused a good deal of conflict in
the town, both between the Lozi and other tribes, and also
1
The UAC was subsequently made up of 5 represen¬
tatives from Maramba/Libuyu, 2 from Sawmills, and one each
from the Railways, Airport, Industrial and Malota Compounds.
2 Mulford (1967:213)
For a detailed analysis of Barotseland at this




between the younger and the older elements within the
Lozi. According to McCulloch "this action led to a
rapid increase in power of the National Congress, at the
expense of the Lozi-dominated Welfare Society."1
Certainly, by taking away the youngest and most active
Welfare Society members it probably dealt a final death
blow to that organisation. It was ironic then that, when
Federation was declared on 3rd September 1953, the fact
that Congress had fought against it and failed sent it
into rapid decline such that, by 1954, many people had
begun to think that the ANC was finished.
For the ANC leaders, the next two years were spent
in trying to build up party organisation. Up to this
stage, as Epstein points out, "Congress organisation was
built up through a large number of small nuclei or commit¬
tees, each designed to organise the community as a whole
2
on some specific issue, or for some specific purpose,"
At the same time as they were building up this party
organisation, a number of the younger leaders were becom¬
ing noticeably "more militant and more consciously
x
nationalist" than the then leader Harry Nkumbula. In
1958, the colonial administration's proposals for a new
constitution precipitated a split at the top of the party
hierachy and the General Secretary, Kenneth Kaunda, and







they saw as an increasingly moderate line - broke away to
form a rival party, the Zambia African National Congress.
After this the ANC steadily declined. Africans became
suspicious when •Zambia', but not ANC, was banned in
1959. Four months after this ban, the United National
Independence Party (UNIP) was formed, drawing its greatest
support from Luapula, Northern and parts of the Copperbelt
Provinces. With its leaders in detention, UNIP was not
able to organise effectively until 1960, and both parties
remained regional in nature. UNIP's main strength was in
•i
the large Bemba-speaking area in the North. In Lusaka
and Broken Hill, both parties had large followings, but
the small towns southwards along the line-of-rail from
Lusaka to Livingstone were in the heart of ANC country.
Mulford, however, did note that UNIP gained "limited
interest in several railway towns, particularly in Living-
2
stone.M
From the very beginning, UNIP placed great
emphasis on effective party organisation. Kaunda, for
example, always stressed the need to build a structure
that would not only achieve independence, but would be
able to govern the country after the immediate objectives
had been achieved. The party followed the pattern of
nationalist parties in other African territories by iden¬
tifying itself with the vision of a new nation - Zambia.
This gave UNIP a great advantage on the Copper-




Individuals, irrespective of race, who were willing to
acknowledge the legitimacy of the new state were to show
direct allegiance to its political expression - UNIP.
Such a commitment should supercede tribal loyalties,
regional and economic interests, linguistic preferences,
allegiance to tribal rules, and religious affiliations.
The party structure was designed to help, and, if
necessary, force individuals to achieve this commitment,
to become good Zambians. This has remained over the
years a central part of government and party policy.
Similarly, Kaunda also took care from the start
to ensure that the party*s Central Committee was represen¬
tative of the countryfs various major linguistic and tri¬
bal groups, hoping to avoid claims of dominance by, or
favouritism towards, any one section of the population.
Before long, UNIP clearly dominated most urban areas in
the country. But this does not mean to say that divisions
did not exist, Legum commented that:
During Zambia's independence struggle an internal
eontest for power developed within the UNIP by the
elites of the Lozis and the Bembas. Notwithstanding
the fact that the Lozi traditional system was antago¬
nistic to UNIP, and separatist rather than national¬
ist, this conflict was seen as a contest for power
within UNIP between the Lozis and the Bembas.'
Indeed during 1961 it was felt that the Lozi elite, who
had the support of a large number of Lozi migrant workers,
were trying to overthrow Kaunda. At the same time, it was
becoming very clear that the ANC was essentially a tri-




the Tonga-speaking groups in the Central and Southern
Frovinces. Thus, although unity was the constant theme
of both parties and independence the common purpose behind
the political activity of the majority of Africans, a
number of divisive forces were at work.
In the period immediately after the split between
the parties, AHC policy did not substantially alter for
it remained committed to the break-up of the Federation
and to the achievement of self-government. ANC's leaders
claimed that the split with 'Zambia' had been purely a
matter of personalities and that ZANC, and subsequently
UNIP, policy was no different from that of the ANC.
Europeans, however, believed that it was a combination of
tribal and personal differences that brought about the
split. Retrospectively, it seems to me that it was
approach and attitude, rather than overall policy or
tribal background, that was the cause of the initial split.
Regional differences may have subsequently become signifi¬
cant but they have been brought about, to a very great
extent, by the different organisational structures and
methods adopted by the parties. As a leader, ANC's
Nkumbula was little concerned with the details of party
organisation. Outside Lusaka there was little organised
activity; party rallies and meetings were poorly organised
and attended; and there was little evidence of the highly
organised women's and youth brigades run by UNIP,
Consequently, there was never very much doubt about
the outcome of the country's pre-independence election.
The introduction of universal adult suffrage was bound to
281
benefit the party with the most effective and extensive
territorial organisation. As a result, in the 1964
election, UNIP achieved its predicted victory obtaining,
on the main electoral roll, 55 of the 65 seats. The
popular roll gave UNIP 69*6% of the votes cast and ANC
30.5$. Even in Livingstone, in the very heart of ANC
country, UNIP managed to secure its only seat in the
Southern Province, though by a majority of only 489 votes.
The emergence and development of ANC, ZANC, and
UNIP brought about, in a very short time, representation
by vote for the African population. As late as 1958,
only eleven Africans were registered as voters. A*t the
time of independence, only six years later, this figure
exceeded one million.
Independence, on October 24th 1964, inevitably
brought with it high expectations of change with the
colonial framework rapidly disappearing and new institu¬
tions developing that would reflect the ideals and ideology
of the new Zambian Republic. But, as Ross points out, many
African nations have found out that "organising a nation¬
alist movement capable of attaining political independence
from a somewhat weary colonial power was far easier than
the task of producing economic development and ordered
2
social change". Zambia is no exception and, even ten
•j
The sequence of events, and the various elec¬
toral and constitutional changes, that led up to indepen¬
dence are very complex and outside the scope of this
thesis. Mulford's work, Zambia; the politics of indepen¬




years later, the country had only taxen the first steps in
solving its major problems, that is "diversifying and
restructuring the economy, re-ordering social relations
between classes and colour groups, and establishing
A
autochtonous political and governmental institutions."
As we shall see in the following chapter, Zambia has not
become the egalitarian and 'non-tribal* society that was
so much sought for, and promised by, those who fought for
its independence.
915 Conclusion
Political development in the pre-independence era
in Northern Rhodesia was consequent, in the most general
terms, upon the relationship between what can best be
described as the 'official* (administration-based) and
•unofficial* (African-based) levels of activity. Reviewing
the development of the various institutions discussed in
this chapter, we have seen how activity at one level even¬
tually led to a reaction at the other. I have argued that,
in the first half-century, the administration did not
independently or positively promote the political interests
of the African population, but rather sought to control
informal activity by introducing institutions that were
little more than concessions, and which were undoubtedly
based on the assumptions of the administrators rather than
the Africans. Thus, the emergence of Welfare Societies in
the 1920s and early 1930s stimulated the colonial admini-
1
Nolteno and Tordoff (197^:399)
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stration to introduce Tribal Elders. It was the inade¬
quacies of this latter institution that was a primary
force behind the re-emergence of the Welfare Societies
and, in turn, it was the rapid success cf these that
pressurised the administration into introducing the Urban
Advisory Councils, Provincial Council, and the African
Representative Council of the 1940s. In one sense, such
reactions on the part of the colonial administrators when
trying to resist the development of African political
activity were more likely to further stimulate it. One
of the principal reasons for this seems to arise from the
set of assumptions underlying the actions of the colonial
administration. In particular, there was the continuing
belief, so dominant an influence on housing policy, that
Africans in towns were not (and should not be) 'urbanized*.
Thus they tried to impose an institutional framework that
was essentially rural-based. For example, the introduc¬
tion of Tribal Elders as a reaction to the Welfare
Societies could not possibly satisfy all the needs of the
urban population and, in particular, the emerging urban
elite of younger, better paid, and better educated workers.
They sought a specifically urban institution to represent
their political development. We can see then that, in the
broadest terms, political development has been very much
structured by both the colonial situation and the process
of urbanization.
But another important factor came from within the
African population itself. The political activists of the
pre-independence era were almost invariably members of the
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African elite. Though we cannot obviously disregard the
role of the 'masses', either urban or rural, the nature
and structure of the emerging political institutions were
very much dependent upon the urban elite. This elite was
not, of course, a unified body, status being derived from
a number of possible sources. What was apparent, however,
was that over a period of time education and income
increasingly took over from factors such as tribal status
and age as the basis for leadership in towns. The inevi¬
table result was that a new group of leaders, and a
correspondingly new group of institutions, began to emerge.
The third important factor was what can best be
described as the 'local' variable, that is the effect on
political development of certain situational peculiarities.
This was investigated with particular reference to Living¬
stone. We saw how the dominance of the town - economi¬
cally, politically, and historically - by the Lozi tribe
produced a factional struggle for control of political
institutions within the 'unofficial' sector. We also saw
how the attitude of the traditional Lozi elite led to a
division within the Lozi, the exaggeration of the gap
between young and old Lozi, and the consequent acceler¬
ation of ANC activity and rapid demise of the Welfare
Society, This was a vivid example of how, as was stated
earlier, other factors - in this case age - could subsume
ethnic differences in the struggle for independence.
-1
See. for example, Rasmussen (1974)} Bates
(1976): Ross (1975).
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Political change is a complex phenomenon. In
this chapter I have tried to analyse briefly the histori¬
cal development of political institutions in the period
up to independence and to abstract a number of factors
which contributed to the form that this development took.
But, as I have already said, independence is not an
impermeable barrier. Political activity after indepen¬
dence is still very much subject to what preceded it,
and I now wish to look more closely at this relationship
by studying in some detail certain aspects of post-
independence politics on Malota.
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CHAPTER 10
POST-INDEFBNDENCE POLITICS ON MALOTA
10:1 Introduction
Malota was thought to be 'a village within the
town* and consequently it was believed that much of the
political activity that took place on the compound was
appropriate to rural, rather than urban, areas. Thus it
was frequently stated that politics was ruled by
•tribalism* on Malota. But what substantive differences
were there between Malota and the other housing areas in
political terms?
The town was undergoing a number of dramatic
changes at that time. On February 12th 1970 the African
National Congress, whose strength was mainly derived from
the surrounding Southern and Western Provinces, was
declared an illegal organisation in Livingstone and some
■j
of its officials were placed in detention. The ban was
necessary, the government declared, "because these people
threaten the security and safety of the State", and because
of "serious acts of lawlessness including many political
The party had previously only been banned in
Mumbwa.
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murders committed in the past and particularly in the
preceding three weeks". Violent conflict was not uncom¬
mon between political opponents et this time and several
of my informants on Malota had been beaten or had their
houses stoned for being suspected 'Congress' members.
•Though this conflict was only a prelude to what
was to become a national movement, it reflects Living¬
stone's peculiar political status within Zambia. The
relatively strong influence of the ANC in the town is an
added factor in the system of political rivalries that has
developed in the post-independence era and which tends to
have centred on two main tribal groups, the Lozi and the
Northern Bemba. We saw in the previous chapter how this
Lozi/Northern competition grew up earlier at a local level,
and similar divisions have arisen in other urban areas to
the extent that it has become a national force. Increas¬
ingly the rivalries have widened into 'alliances of
region', conglomerations of tribal groups affiliated on
the basis of region. Contrary to popular opinion amongst
many younger Zambians, there is no great traditional
rivalry or enmity between the Lozis and the Bembas,
Although both have a vigorous history of migration, both
have retained strong ethnocentric tendencies and there is
still a very active secessionist movement within Barotse-
land. The rivalry between the two groups is comparatively
recent and began to emerge partly as a result of the
resistance to Federation during the 1950s when the Lozi,
1
Times of Zambia, 13/2/1970.
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unlike the Bemba, developed strong separatist tendencies.
During the formative period of the nationalist movement
the Lozis, who had arrived in the capital Lusaka before
the Bembas, were strongly defensive in their reactions to
the more numerous, but often less sophisticated, Northern¬
ers whom they suspected of wishing to dominate UNIP. Thus
the modern nationalist movement was virtually born with
an inner tension. This surfaced in the late 1960s when
Bemba leaders successfully challenged the non-Bemba
holders of some of UNIP's top posts with a resulting damage
to the party's unity. This position is summarised by
Pettman who comments:
Much of the political conflict and opposition within
Zambia since 1964, and especially since 1967, has
been within UNIP itself. Many of Zambia's deep
divisions, tribal, religious, age and class, are
well illustrated and represented within UNIP ....
Much of UNIP's early pre-independence strength drew
on the Copperbelt and Northern Province, and it has
always suffered from the reputation of being a
Bernba-dominated party. With the hope of overcoming
these fears, Kaunda carefully balanced the various
factions represented, and as a result the Bemba were
underrepresented in terms of their numerical and
party support, and economic significance.1
By 1970, Kaunda*s problems in maintaining the credibility
of his impartial role between the conflicting regional and
ethnic groups became increasingly obvious.
Bemba dominance of UNIP in 1967 led to the forma¬
tion of the United Party (UP) which drew its support "from
discontent over Barotse Province's share in development
p






the UP the following year inevitably strengthened ANC in
the region and brought the Lozl into some sort of tenta¬
tive alliance with the Southern Province Tonga thus intro¬
ducing the source of the conflict that was to lead to the
banning of the party in the town.
These national level factors provided a broad
framework for political activity in Livingstone when I
arrived there in late 1970. A few months later these
conflicts began to come to a head at a national level when
the President was forced to suspend his Minister for Trade
and Industry after the latter had made unspecified charges
of tribal bias and corruption within the party. It was
his claim that the Bemba were being victimised, and that
they were intending to mobilise to fight the many injus¬
tices against them. The controversy caused by this
episode quickly escalated, and the intra-party tensions
that Kaunda had been battling to contain rapidly became
public knowledge. In April of the same year he was
forced to ban two ♦tribal* groups that had been formed
earlier and which were now described by the President as
1
"dirty and cheap tribal mafias". It is hardly surprising
that within Livingstone itself the Bemba (or for that
matter any Northerners) were, during 1971, regarded with
great suspicion by many people. At a Maramba branch
meeting of UNIP's Youth Brigade, a speaker accused the
suspended minister of having said: "There will not be a
non-tribalistic country until everyone realises that the
'
Times of Zambia, 19/4/1971
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Bemba are the majority tribe and therefore entitled to
the majority of jobs". A similar meeting in the nearby
Linda compound reached the conclusion that party members
should keep a constant lookout to ensure that there was
no discrimination in favour of the Bemba when houses or
jobs were applied for. Many 'facts* began to emerge about
the role of the Bemba in the town. For example, a senior
member of the Town Clerk's department was adament, though
with no justification, that the majority of the better
jobs with the Municipal Council were taken up by Bemba.
Such reactions reflected a general feeling within the
town that the Bemba were, in some way, 'taking over'.
The politics of Livingstone in 1971 were therefore,
in general terms, centred on three main factors. Firstly,
the official monopoly of the town's political structure
by UNIPj secondly, the necessarily 'underground* nature
of opposition to UNIP; thirdly, the effect of tribal and
regional rivalries, so predominant at the national level,
on local political activity. It is within this general
urban framework that political activity on Malota must be
understood.
The compound has a number of unusual features
which have given it a reputation for being in some way
different from the rest of the town in terms of its
politics. This is partly due to the fact that, as in many
other matters, Malota is seen as marginal; as being out¬
side the normal pattern of the town. This belief is
exaggerated in political terms by three other factors:
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1) The headquarters of the Jehovah's Witness sect
axe based on Malota. The ideology of this church
excludes its followers from any political activity
including, for example, acknowledgement of
national anthems and flags. For many years, even
before independence, followers of the church have
been in conflict (often violent) with nationalists.
2) The practice of ritual circumcision that was re¬
introduced into the town by the 'Wiko' group of
tribes in 1964 has particularly flourished on
Malota. The practice was regarded as a recourse
to 'traditionalism* or •tribalism'.1
3) It was widely believed that Tribal Elders still
existed on the compound and nowhere else in the
town. This implicit acceptance of colonial
values was seen as inconsistent with the needs of
a new and modern Zambia.
All three of these factors are, of course, a direct contra¬
diction of the stated goals of UNIP and as such contribute
to the belief that Malota is a centre of opposition in the
town. In the rest of this chapter, I wish to consider the
validity of this belief by looking at two particular
aspects of political behaviour on the compound. Firstly,
I want to examine briefly the nature of UNIP organisation
on Malota; and secondly I want to look, in some detail, at
2
the belief that Tribal Elders exist.
1 The emergence of these rituals, known as
'Mukanda', within the town has been analysed in Mubitana
(1969).
2 The concentration on Tribal Elders came about for
a number of reasons. Their existence, assuming they still
do exist, covers a very great section of the historical
period with which this thesis has been involved; they were
an important institution on Malota for many years; and
inevitably they focus on the question of the role of eth¬
nicity in political activity. There were also a number
of practical reasons. A study of ANC activity was, for
political reasons, virtually impossible. There was already
in existence Mubitana's excellent study of Wiko circum¬
cision. And a study of the Jehovah's Witness sect seemed
to me to be a major project outside the scope or goal of
this thesis.
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10;2 UNIP Activity on Malota Compound
Party organisation has always been a strong point
in the development of UNIP and the party structure is, in
theory at least, an attempt to get a high level of involve¬
ment right down to the grass-roots. Urban areas are
divided into branches which are in turn broken down into
smaller sections. UNIP activity on Malota is contained
within the Maramba branch of the party, the offices of
which are situated just off Malota. The compound is
broken down into ten sub-sections, two to each of the
administrative sections. This sub-section is the lowest
level of party organisation. In his study of Luanshya
UNIP organisation, Harries-Jones noted that section
officials thought of themselves as the "eyes and ears of
2
the party", and there was no doubt that officials on
Malota felt that they had a supremely important role to
play within the party. Organisation at this level varies
from one sub-section to another. Official UNIP organi¬
sation at all levels tends to be centred on the 'eight-
man cabinet' but, on Malota at least, this did not seem
to be a strong feature. Though there were other junior
officials, the sub-section organisation was very much
focused on the chairman and the secretary or the vice-
chairman. It is the job of these officials to arrange
regular meetings on at least a weekly basis which any
party member within the sub-section is allowed to attend.
To avoid confusion with the administrative
units A,B,C,D, and E, the party-based unit will be called




At these meetings individuals are allowed to brlr^ up any
problems or complaints that they might have. It is the
job of the sub-section officials to help their members.
It was a notable feature of these meetings that the
majority of discussions centred on specific personal
matters such as employment and housing (or the lack of
them) rather than on more general political questions.
The role of UNIP in Zambia is so pervasive that it is seen
as both provider and protector. Harries-Jones noted how,
in the months prior to independence:
The mutual protection aspect of section organisation
began to die away and sections began to adopt the
function of a 'friendly society* .... Active member¬
ship of the section became an option to be weighed
for its advantages and disadvantages.'1
Though there is a very definite element of truth to this
view, it rather simplifies the position for, on Malota in
1971, there were a number of distinctive political aspects
to sub-section organisation. Firstly, to those indivi¬
duals who desired political office, the official party
posts (prestigious in themselves) were the first step in
the political hierachy and the source from which the local
party, especially the branch level, must initially recruit
its potential leaders. Secondly, it is at this level that
the objectives and policies of UNIP and the government can
best be directed at the individual citizen, particularly
in view of the comparatively low level of literacy and the
lack of development of the various media. The sub-sections
1Harries-Jones (1969:310-311), For a more detailed
analysis of UNIP section organisation, see Harries-Jones
(1975:120-123).
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allow both party and government to gain some control over
individuals and to minimise the effects of opposition.
Each of Malota's sub-sections has, on average, a
population of Just over four hundred, of which less than
150 will normally be adult males. This makes it a com¬
paratively simple task for the sub-section officials to be
aware of the activities of most of their potential members.
Sub-section residents are only too conscious of this as
well as the possibility of being tagged as 'Congress*
members if their behaviour is not acceptable to the
officials, who may well also be their next-door neighbour.
Such a small unit (in political terms) means that a direct
check can be kept on any active opposition, and also that
officials can better mobilise and organise potential
support. Attendance at routine sub-section meetings
averaged between ten and fifteen, but thi3 did not mean
that there were not many more UNIP members who only became
active when they themselves had welfare problems, or when
they were needed by the party for some specific purpose.
There were few people who did not know their chairman,
and many of the chairmen had signboards outside their
plots announcing their status. The party was always, as
one man put it, "around us and behind us".
A good example of the truth of this was in the
organisation of large political meetings. If needed,
sub-section officials could quickly be drafted in -
together with the party's Youth Brigade - to apply pres¬
sure, occasionally of a physical nature, in order to
ensure attendance at important meetings. This happened
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in the case of Livingstone*s 1971 Labour Day rally, an
annual event of some significance in the political calen¬
dar. The rally was supposed to take place in Marainba's
football stadium, but bad weather and poor organisation
meant that there was a very small attendance. Using
weather as an excuse, the rally was postponed for two
days with a new venue in the centre of the town. The
reorganised rally was an impressive success with, it was
claimed by senior UNIP officials, an estimated 10-15,000
people present. However, this did not come about without
a great deal of work on the part of UNIP officials.
Government and Municipal offices were closed during the
rally. Local businessmen claimed that they had received
'informal directives* that supervisors should ensure that
their workers turned up for the rally. The day after the
original rally, all of Malota's sub-section chairmen were
visited by branch officials and told to make certain that
as many people as possible turned out. Their job was two¬
fold. Firstly, they had to see to it that everyone on
their sub-section knew the revised time and place of the
rally, and how seriously it was regarded by the authori¬
ties. Secondly, it was their job to exert pressure on
those known to be indifferent or opposed to UNIP. The
party had lost a great deal of prestige and was determined
to get everybody, irrespective of their political persua¬
sion, to attend. Over a period of twenty-four hours, a
large proportion of Malota's plots were visited by the
sub-section officials and it quickly became apparent to
the general population that UNIP was taking the matter very
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seriously. This, in itself, was a sufficient stimulus to
most people and there was no need for physical violence.
Occasional threats were made. Thus one man, a known ANC
supporter, was told that his house looked very unstable
and *might fall down during the next rain1, and another
man who was unemployed but who had been promised a ^ob by
his section chairman was * advised* to make sure that his
brother, who did not have a UNIP card, attended the meet¬
ing. On the afternoon of the rally, the compound was
virtually deserted.
In this sort of situation the sub-section is a
valuable political device, providing an effective downward
link between the formal political institutions and the
mass of the population. In many cases, the officials had
no problem in persuading people to attend the rally. A
man may not attend sub-section meetings regularly, but at
some future date he, or one of his family, may need the
help of the party officials. More importantly, refusal
to attend the meeting would be taken to mean that the
individual was sympathetic to ANC and therefore suspect.
To be labelled such was extremely harmful, socially,
economically and even physically.
10:3 UNIP Officials on Malota Compound
The election of UNIP officials on Malota's sub¬
sections was, in many cases, a relatively informal matter
and was not organised directly by any of the higher levels
of the party structure though, as in most matters, the
branch officials kept a very strict eye on what was
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happening. More often, elections seemed to be based on
the decisions of relatively small groups of individuals
who were active participants within the sub-section. Thus,
the chairman of Angola sub-section said that he had been
elected by what he called his 'house committee', that is
those people on the sub-section who held some sort of
official position. On Sipalo the chairman claimed to
have come to office "after discussions with some of my
friends". Such decisions must be validated by the general
party membership at a sub-section meeting, but it is
obvious that, very often, the decision are made by a
restricted group of individuals.
The relationships between the individual officials
within a sub-section are normally intense, exaggerated as
they are by spatial proximity. The main participants are
likely to meet frequently, drinking and talking together
on a day-to-day basis. It is at this level that the
specifically political discussions seem to take place,
with arguments over national and local problems being a
central theme. It is at these informal meetings that the
business of 'running the party* is carried on. Involvement
in sub-section political activity normally necessitates
membership of a close-knit network that is based, initi¬
ally at least, on the physically defined neighbourhood
that is taken to make up the sub-section. However, other
factors are involved and it is these that give to sub-
Each sub-section has an official name,
frequently that of a famous nationalist politician. The
names are given in Diagram 10.1.
299
section organisation on the compound its highly varied
nature,
Angola sub-section, for example, was run by two
brothers and was locally known by their name - Shaabah,
The elder brother was the chairman and had also been
elected in 1971 to the Maramba Ward Development Commit¬
tee. Both men had lived on Malota since they were children
and though they were Ngoni, from Eastern Province, neither
had been home for over 15 years. They had both come to
office in early 1970 after the death of the previous
chairman. They appear to have been continually active
in the years after independence, and their takeover seems
to have come as no real surprise, though it involved a
relatively major changeover of personnel with the previous
publicity secretary and the •trustee* being dropped. The
Shaabah brothers were adamant that this would have hap¬
pened in any case because "we change our people when
things do not get done". The plot on which the two men
lived was a hive of political activity, particularly as
the younger brother ran a carpentry business which kept
him on the plot most of the day. Meetings were invariably
held there and there was a constant flow of people enter¬
ing and leaving the plot. As such it was virtually impos¬
sible to distinguish between friends and political
colleagues. To be one virtually implied being the other.
Kenyatta sub-sectipn was also run from one plot
where two Bemba bachelors living together were the chair¬
man and secretary. They had arrived in Livingstone
together in 1955 after working on the Copperbelt and had
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moved to Malota in 1960. They both worked as mechanics
in the town. They spent very little of their spare time
on the compound and were mostly to be found with other
Bemba in various bars around the town. Despite their
long period on Malota, they were still treated as •out¬
siders* by their neighbours who became increasingly
suspicious of their activities during 1971. Attendance
at sub-section meetings seemed to be virtually restricted
to a few officials and involvement on the part of the rest
of the sub-section residents was almost nil, with very
little of the welfare activity that I noted earlier.
Occasionally, the neighbourhood factor becomes
less important. A sub-section cannot be isolated from the
rest of the compound or the rest of the town. The resi¬
dents must necessarily have links, through work, recre¬
ation or family, with people outside the sub-section.
Politically, all the sub-sections are linked through the
branch. Thus the chairman of Mulenga Sepelina, who was
also very active at the branch level, had very strong
links with the officials from Ngoma and Mainza Choma sub¬
sections and they met frequently at each others* plots
and in a bar to the North of Malota. They had all known
each other for several years and, although their conver¬
sations were very much dominated by political controversy,
when they met * socially* their activity within the sub¬
section was concentrated on the welfare and control
functions. For this group of men, political activity was
carried out at two distinct levels. One was within a
group of politically involved, ethnically homogeneous,
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friends and crossed over the boundaries between sub-
sectional units. The other related to the carrying oiAof
specific functions attached to political office within a
restricted neighbourhood.
Sub-section politics do not, however, always
rotate around such highly involved, close-knit cliques.
Room is left for the politically ambitious individual who
sees UNIP as the source of power and status. Thus the
Mbundan chairman of Changufu was seen by others as an
individual on his way up rather than as the core of some
group within the sub-section. He had lived on Malota for
13 years and was well known as a young man who, by working
hard, had made his way up and was highly respected. His
political activity was thought to be, in combination with
his attendance at night school, part of a general personal
plan that would soon take him away from Malota. This
highly individualistic impression was probably exaggerated
by the fact that, for a period of six months, there was
neither publicity secretary nor trustee on the sub-section
after the two previous incumbents left the compound.
As we can see from these brief cases, sub-section
organisation within the branch is both variable and flex¬
ible. Though the party provided a framework that constrains
individuals, how the sub-section is organised depends to a
very great extent on who exactly is in charge, how they
achieved the position, and what specific goals lay behind
their seeking the position. They are obviously also
influenced by the nature of the support they have had in
order to acquire and maintain their position. The combin-
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ation of these factors gives each sub-section a unique
aspect* But there are a number of factors common to the
sub-section officials. They tend to be relatively young,
mostly in the 25-45 age category. The majority of them
were skilled, employed workers. Though I do not have the
appropriate statistical data, they seemed to be signifi¬
cantly better educated than the general population of
Malota and, of the officials with whom I had personal
contact, only one did not speak English, Their life-styles
were, by Kalotan standards, highly Westernised and econo¬
mically, as well as politically, they were undoubtedly part
of the compound's elite.
10:4 Ethnicity and Political Office on Malota Compound
However, the most striking feature of the sub¬
section officials on Malota is their dominance by two
ethnic groups. Diagram 10.1 shows the ethnic origins of
the two top officials of all the compound's sub-sections.
In view of what has recently been said about ethnic
rivalry within UNIP, this distribution is very significant
for there are no Lozi and a very high proportion of the
officials, almost 75%, come from either the Northern or
Eastern regions. There were nine Bemba and six Ngoni
holding such positions, with a single representative from
1
four other tribes. This domination by two groups that
were very distinct minorities within both the town and the
compound was unexpected and was, in terms of the Bemba at
The Lenje and Tonga are from the Southern





















Notes I strongly suspect that two of the Remba were
actually from small tribes affiliated to the Bemba,
but they insisted that they were Bemba. Changufu
did not have a publicity secretary at this point
in time.
least, additional •proof* to the local population that
the Bemba were taking over. Latent suspicions of the
Bemba began to turn into open hostility and a number of
wild rumours spread.
I was told on Malota, for example, of an attempt
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to revive the Lumpa religious sect. This is a fanatical
religious group, set up in the 1950s, whose leader Alice
Lenshina claims to have been resurrected. In 1964 the
sect was a major 'non-political* force which refused
either to support, or oppose, the government. After a
series of clashes between members of the sect and UNIP
campaigners, the Lumpas rebelled and set up stockaded
fortresses, mainly in the Northern and Eastern regions,
and severe fighting broke out. Nearly 800 of Lenshina's
followers were killed, the sect was outlawed, and she
eventually gave herself up to the authorities. However,
even in 1971, the sect was still in existence with 15-
20,000 followers reputed to be encamped over the border
in neighbouring Zaire. The sect*s headquarters at the
time of the uprising was the village of Sione (Zion)
which is in the heart of Bemba country, and the church is
regarded throughout Zambia as essentially *a church of
the North* and particularly of the Bemba. The rumour
that the sect had had a revival meeting on Malota swept
the compound. But further investigation showed that the
meeting had been held at the plot of the UNIP chairman on
Mulenga Sepelina, a sub-section run by Bemba officials,
and that the attendants at the meeting had primarily been
2
UNIP officials from other plots on the compound. It
A
For further details, see Rotberg (1961);
Roberts (1970).
2
We saw earlier that this chairman was highly
involved with UNIP officials from other sub-sections and
that much of his specifically political activity was
centred outside of the sub-section.
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seems likely that the ethnic homogeneity (against all
UNIPs stated principles) of this meeting had been
regarded by outsiders as essentially illegal and against
the best interests of the party. The development of the
belief that this was a 'Lurapa* meeting, which would very
definitely have been illegal, was not particularly sur¬
prising in view of the political climate at the time.
Such a story served to reflect and exaggerate the general
belief that the Bemba trice were turning against UNIP,
and therefore the government, and represented a serious
threat to unity. The extent to which the subsequent
breakaway from UN IP, in late 1971, of the leading Bemba
politician Simon Kapepwe; the formation of a Bemba-based
opposition party, the United Progressive Party (UPP)j and
ultimately the setting up of a one-party state in 1972
can be seen as verifying this fear, or conversely as a
consequence of anti-Bemba sentiment, is difficult to say.
The truth probably lies in a complex interaction between
the two factors. For the purpose of this study, it is
sufficient to know that the fears did exist, as did the
domination of UNIP posts on Malota by outsiders, and
particularly Bemba.
In statistical terms, the Bemba, Ngoni and their
associated tribes from the Northern and Eastern Provinces
are very much a minority in Livingstone. We have already
seen how, in terms of socio-economic factors such as
occupation, education, and earnings, the migrants from
these two regions have figured prominently in Livingstone,
with only the Lozi achieving some parity. This dominance
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was further dramatised on Malota where Western Province
men, who make up the majority of the traders in the town,
tend to be concentrated. It is within this context, of
certain statistically minor tribes having superior access
to various economic and social resources, that the
national framework must be understood. The arrival of
independence radically altered the system by which the
ordinary individual was formally represented in the
political structure. Right until the late 1950s many
Malotans had remained dependent upon the elders for this
sort of representation. Even after the formal abolition,
certain elders appear to have retained a good deal of
respect amongst some sectors of the population and,
although their formal authority disappeared, they were
still the people who could sort out a number of the dome¬
stic problems that arose on the compound. The institution
of Tribal Elders was contradictory in one sense in that it
ensured that all tribal groups of any standing were guar¬
anteed some sort of representation and authority. Because
each group had one Elder, they were all in a relatively
equal relationship to the colonial authorities. Having an
elder guaranteed an individual certain rights irrespective
of his tribe. There were of course inequalities, for the
colonial administrators were only too well aware of the
relative status of the different groups. However, to a
certain extent, the system of Tribal Elders minimised the
effect of tribal differences.
Political parties, on the other hand, provided a
number of positions open to competition without, theoreti-
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cally, any major constraints on who exactly should be
elected. As such, no ethnic group is automatically
guaranteed representation at this level. The nature of
the selection process at the sub-section level means that
8 relatively small number of individuals can obtain power,
and that minority groups with the appropriate resources
can gain control of the UNIP structure at this level.
Under the colonial system of Elders, competition for
office took place within tribal groupings. With indepen¬
dence, however, the field of competition has changed from
one with ethnic boundaries to one with residential boun¬
daries. This means that competition is, potentially at
least, between members of different tribes. This does not
mean to say, however, that members of a particular tribal
group will consciously organise themselves in order to
gain a monopoly of political offices. At the sub-section
level particularly, it is the individual who initially
seeks office and, if monopolistic tendencies occur as on
Falota, we must try to understand why it is that indivi¬
duals from certain tribal groupings find selection to UNIP
office both attractive and feasible. The Bemba officials
on Malota, for example, were not involved in any sort of
concentrated and co-ordinated effort to control the com¬
pound, nor was there any centralised agency supporting the
efforts of the various individuals.
The Bemba have been highly involved in national
political activity since the emergence of political parties
over twenty years ago. It has been argued that this high
level of involvement can be related to the traditional
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political structure of Bemba society. Both UNIP and also
the Lumpa sect demand a high level of commitment and
Roberts has suggested that:
(this) total commitment to the cause of the United
National Independence Party found a ready, if perhaps
temporary response among the peoples of the Northern
Province • ••• Just as the traditional character of
Bemba chieftainship uniting political and religious
authority in a hierachy headed by a *divine king* may
have served as a model for the Lumpa church, so too
may it have predisposed the Bemba to accept a new
political authority.1
This ♦predisposition* may well have been exaggerated by
the fact that the majority of the Bemba who move into the
urban areas spend the early part of their migratory
careers on the Copperbelt, regarded generally as "the
2
political powerhouse of Zambia", and it is here - in an
urban, industrial milieu - that they have gained their
reputation as an aggressive and dangerous political force.
Berrba migrants arriving on Malota must, almost inevitably,
have derived their basic perceptions of what constitutes
relevant political activity from an arena that has a
national, rather than a local base. However, this does
not explain why the Bemba have been able to (or allowed
to) gain such a strong grip on UNIP organisation on Malota,
only why they might wish to. Nor does it explain why the
Ngoni, who do not have such a tradition of centralised
political activity and are not so likely to have worked
on the Copperbelt, should hold one-third of UNIP posts on







Firstly, there is the economic superiority that
we have already noted. This provides resources that
might help an individual to achieve and maintain office.
Secondly, there is the historical factor. Eastern and
Northern Province migrants controlled political activity
right at the very beginning when the old 'Congress* first
became established in the town. Related to this is the
third factor; the element of competition that has always
existed between these two groups and the town*s most
Important tribe, the Lozi. This emerged at the very
beginning of political party activity and can only have
been exaggerated by the developing Bemba/Lozi conflict at
the national level. Linked up to all these three, and
perhaps the most important, is the fact that the Bemba
and Ngoni are essentially strangers, outsiders, within
the town. This is not to say that they are less able to
cope with urban life than the other migrants, indeed they
seem largely to have spent more time in urban areas than
other groups. But most of them were born at a great dis¬
tance from Livingstone, and have arrived at a later stage
in their migratory careers. Since the closure of the
Rhodesian border, very few of them are en route to any
other place; they have come to the town to find work and
to stay. Having found work in the town, though none of
them would ever regard it as *home*,their Job provides
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them with some form of commitment to remain. The rural
base from which these migrants originate is normally
sufficiently distant to make return visits severely
restricted because of time and money. Nor are kin and
friends from home as likely to visit them regularly.
This is quite unlike migrants from the Wiko, Lozi and
Tonga/lla groups of the surrounding provinces to whom
Livingstone is the nearest town to their homes and the
focus for family, kinsmen, and fellow-tribesmen. Such
men can both make and receive visits more easily. The
result is that Northern and Eastern men are much more
dependent upon the work situation and the residential
neighbourhood to provide them with a network of social
and political relationships. Thus when such men compete
for power and prestige, it is within these situations that
they will normally concentrate. As a result,there is a
tendency for them to seek the formal offices that are
available to them. Because of the pervasive nature of
UNIP sub-section organisation (all Zambian urban dwellers
are involved), such posts are the most easily available.
Added to this, the small and direct network of relation¬
ships involved in the selection process makes it easier
for an individual with limited support to be effective.
Ambitions can therefore be fulfilled at relatively low
cost and high reward. In simple terms then, their superior
1
McCulloch (1956:59) also noted this feature when
she observed that over 70% of Northern and Eastern men,
more than any other group, could be regarded as tempor¬
arily* or 'permanently* stabilised within Livingstone.
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resources make the Bemba and the Ngoni highly competitive;
their outsider status makes them more likely to seek
political office; and the one-party nature of the politi¬
cal structure within Livingstone at the time of this
study, made UNIP office the most rewarding, if not the
only, attractive alternative. It is the complex inter¬
twining of these factors that has brought about the
dominance of UNIP by these two groups on Malota,
UNIP is not, like some of the pre-independence
institutions, an urban phenomenon as such, though it is
highly centralised in the towns and cities, and particu¬
larly Lusaka, It is intended to be universal, and its
structure must allow for the organisation and partici¬
pation of all Zambian citizens. As a result, certain
general constraints determining party activity are imposed
from higher levels onto the participants at the grass¬
roots level. However, what I have tried to show in the
preceding sections is that the activities of individuals
at this lowest level is by no means solely determined by
these external constraints, and that there are a whole
series of factors relating to the urban situation (both
generally and specifically) that account for certain
aspects of UNIP activity.
Political activity can be seen as emergent from
the decisions of individuals working within certain
constraints in the same way that, in earlier chapters, we
saw the compound's social composition being a consequence
of such factors. As I stressed earlier, the Bemba and
Ngoni did not initially get together on Malota with the
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intention of taking over the leadership of UNIP. But their
origins, their previous migratory experiences, their
similar •outsider* status within Livingstone, end their
tendency to have superior skills and education, combined
to lead them to strive for similar goals within a frame¬
work of limited options. This did not mean that all Beraba
would achieve, or even seek, UFIP office, only that they
were more likely to because the combination of factors
that made TJNIP office a desirable and attainable goal,
occurred more frequently within the Bemba and Ngoni popu¬
lation. But this interpretation is too static. Once this
pattern of dominance emerges, it becomes in itself a
constraint on the future decisions of other individuals
who must, in turn, make their decisions and satisfy their
goals within this pattern of dominance.
Ethnic dominance of tJNIP on Mslota cannot there¬
fore be explained in terms of conflicts between ethnic
groups at the national level (though these are undoubt¬
edly a contributory factor). The explanation lies in
understanding the impact on UNIP activity of the ethnic
and socio-economic heterogeneity of urban life generally;
of the position of Livingstone - geographically, histori¬
cally, politically, and economically - within Zambia; and
of the unique role of Malota within the town,
10:5 Tribal Elders on Halota Compound
Many people, both on and off the compound,
remember the Tribal Elders that existed on Malota in the
years before independence. Many of them assume that they
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remain. The Municipal Authorities argue, logically, that
Elders cannot exist because there is no administrative
provision for them. The most likely explanation, on the
surface, for the continuing belief in their existence is
that people were attributing Elder status to men who are
important enough to have achieved such status if the
office still remained. It seemed important that, in
finding out the truth of the matter, a careful distinction
should be made between 'big men* and those who regarded
themselves, and were regarded by others, as Elders. This
was not as difficult as anticipated, for the latter turned
out to be a distinct cognitive category about which there
might be some dispute as to its political and administra¬
tive validity, but not of its existence. After extensive
questioning on Mslota there emerged $uat three men who
perceived themselves, and were perceived by a significant
number of others, to be Elders. These three weres
A - SAMACONGA
I was told by a group of Luvale men that the Luvale
Elder on Malota was Charles Samaconga, a businessman
living on C section. When interviewed, Samaconga was
adamant that he was only one of the few Elders that
remained on the compound. He claimed that they had
retained the authority to deal with personal matters
such as divorce, adultery and debt. A Chokwe infor¬
mant claimed that the *Chokwe man Samaconga* was the
only man with any real authority, for he could make
out notes to the court and impose fines and other
punishments. As we shall see later, this labelling
of the man as both Luvale and Chokwe is not necessar¬
ily contradictory. Later, I wss to meet Luchazi
informants who, although they spoke of a Luchazi elder
at * the other end of the compound *, regarded Samaconga
as their Elder. Thus Samaconga was associated with
the Luvale, Luchazi and Chokwe, three tribes from
that larger group that are known locally as 'Wiko* -
the 'people of the West*.
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Sasnaconga claimed to have succeeded the
previous Elder who had died in 1960, and who had been
the last official Elder under colonial rule. He had
been a close friend of this man for many years. They
had lived on adjacent plots and one of Samaconga's
younger sisters had married the second of the previous
elder's three sons. The man died when it was already
apparent that the role of Elder was virtually redun¬
dant. Ko decision had been made therefore, even at
the informal level, on the election of a successor.
But the Elder was not simply a channel of discontent
between the administration and the general population
for he performed, as we have seen, various welfare
functions. This was very important, particularly on
a compound such as Malota where wages and employment
were frequently irregular. As a result, though the
formal office might disappear, many people still felt
the same need at certain times for an Elder.1 It
could only be at the informal level that Samaconga
retained the role of Elder, for the arrival of inde¬
pendence meant that he could never be granted formal
expression of such status.
Samaconga was a trader and had always been so
during the 27 years that he had lived on Malota. A
good deal of his business had involved bi-lateral
trade with rural areas, taking cloth end household
foods to the larger villages of what was then Westernn w R rth-Western) Province, and returning with dried
fish, vegetables and, increasingly in recent years,
goods for the tourist market. During 1971 he
frequently claimed that he was ill and unable to
work, and it became increasingly evident that he was
effectively semi-retired. A great proportion of his
time was spent on a seat outside his plot where a
number of old men gathered during the day to talk and
drink. Together with the fact that his plot was
situated next to the only large open space on Malota -
a busy washing area - this gave the impression that
Sarcaconga was a major focus for social activity on
the compound.
B - LIORDO
A number of informants, including associates of
Samaconga made reference to the 'claims' by an Kbundan
man, Liondo, to be the elder for the Mbunda on Malota.
It was very clear that these claims were not taken very
seriously and that the man had 'no real power*.
Liondo was a self-employed blacksmith who had lived
•"J
Harries-Jones (1975:159) noted, for example,
that in Mikomfwa Tribal Elders retained most of their
functions as late as 1962.
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on Malota for only eight years. He was aged 'about
49', and used the plot of one of his uncles as a base
for his business. The buildings on the plot included
a covered work area with two hand-blown furnaces and
a number of small, mainly thatched-roof, pole and
dagga huts. The appearance of the plot, even by
Malotan standards, was distinctly rural. All nine
people living there were closely related to Liondo.1
He had arrived in Livingstone in the mid-1950s and
had first worked as a labourer for various construc¬
tion firms. Rather than pay the 'extortionate* rents
demanded in town, he and a few close friends built
their own houses outside the town boundary. Their
small compound began to grow rapidly and before long
the authorities stepped in and demolished it. Having
no job at the time, and therefore no chance of a
house on any of the other compounds, Liondo had been
forced to move onto his uncle *s plot on Malota which
then consisted of a single hut. Since then, he has
developed his business, built new huts on the plot,
and brought other members of his faaiily onto the com¬
pound. Though the plot was in his uncle's name, it
was assumed locally that Liondo was the 'landlord'.
In fact, not only did he pay rent to the Council, but
he was also responsible for the upkeep and welfare of
all the plot's occupants. Liondo worked very long
hours, with the assistance of his uncle, and rarely
left his plot. Many people came there either to bring,
or to enquire about, business. Most of the jobs were
small scale Involving the production or repair of
agricultural and domestic tools. The nature of his
work meant that virtually all his contacts, both
social and professional, were within Malota. This
was exaggerated by the fact that the majority of his
relatives living within the town were concentrated on
Malota.
C - LIMANDO
The final elder was a Luchazi man, Limando,
who was referred to earlier. Like Samaconga and
Liondo, he was a petty businessman and he had lived
on Malota for over 16 years. During the period of
this study, he returned to his home village in the
Western Province, supposedly to 'visit his people and
learn what was happening'. In fact, he had been
seriously ill and his relatives had demanded that he
return home to convalesce and recover. He seemed to
be highly regarded by members of all the 'Wlko' tribes,
but his absence meant that T have had to concentrate
on the activities of Samaconga and Liondo.
1
For further details of this plot see p.230
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1016 The 'Wiko«
Before going further, I wish to look briefly at
the Wiko group of tribes. The word 'Wiko* is derived
fro® the Lozi Mewiko, which refers to the large groups of
♦westerners' who moved into Barotseland from what is now
Angola and the North-Western Province of Zambia.1 It is
generally regarded as including the Luvale, Luchazi,
Chokwe and sometimes the Mbunda. Though they are dis¬
tinctive groups, they retain close links with each other.
Thus Brelsford comments that the Luvale and Chokwe "have
2
remained close". Samaconga himself would sometimes
refer to *the close links that have always existed between
our people*, Besides their important connection with the
Chokwe, the Luvale also have historical links, through
their ancestral frameworks, with both the Luchazi and the
Mbunda. Though there are undoubtedly © large number of
differences of a linguistic, cultural and historical
nature, and despite certain divergent tendencies since
the 18th century, the four tribes are often thought of as
a homogeneous group wi en compared with surrounding tribes.
This homegeneity is unquestionably exaggerated in the
urban situation. The names of the different tribes are
linked closely in people's minds and there is a certain
1 The history of the migration of the tribes of
this area, and the relationships that have developed
between them, is very complex. Fortunately, it has been
very well researched and details can be obtained from a
number of sources, particularly Gluckman (19^1), White





degree of flexibility, even interchangeability, in their
usage. Mubitana, in his study of Mukanda circumcision
ceremonies, found that it was a common thing for members
of this group to call themselves 'Luvale', irrespective
•i
of their actual origins. It was his central theme that
the stress laid on the homogeneity of these four tribes
by the re-emergence of Kukanda, in which they all took
part, was essentially derived from the opposition of this
group to the dominant, better educated, more influential
2
Lozi tribe. Though there was a tendency for a particular
tribe to dominate Hukanda in any one year, to outsiders it
was always something practiced by the 'Luvale* or the
'Wiko*. The Luvale group of tribes has always experienced
this domination by the Lozi and, in urban areas, other
groups from the North and East. The extent of this
domination in urban areas was dramatically reflected in
the occupational and educational structure of Livingstone
at the time of HcCulloch's study (See Table 9.1). As a
group, in relation to other groups, it is apparent that
the Western group of tribes had a significantly restricted
access to available resources. It was Mubitana's argument
that this lack of economic and occupational status amongst
1
Hubltana: Personal Communication
2 Gluckirsn (19^1) also noted this. McCulloch
(1956:35) comments that the "Lozi tend to look down on
the Luvele-Luchazi tribes, end the latter react with some
hostility." But it is not only the lozi who look oown on
the Luvale. Epstein (1969:102) points out that on the
Copperbelt all Luvale are called Nyamazai ('scavengers')
because they are the only group willing to undertake
night-soil removal.
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the *Wiko* led to a need for some sort of unified front
reflected in a re-assertion of common cultural values
that would overwhelm existing divisions. Initially, such
an argument seemed to be a plausible explanation for the
fact that it was only amongst the *Wiko# that the insti¬
tution of Elders appeared to have remained on Malota.
10:7 The ♦Legal* Role of Tribal Elders on Malota
As the institution of Elder no longer formally
exists, the meaning of the term, and what exactly it
involves, must necessarily be defined by those who claim
to be Elders and by those with whom they associate. In
this respect, both Samaconga and Liondo had a similar
conception of what constituted their role. In particular,
both claimed that they had a right to Judge and sentence
people for misdemeanours of a minor nature. The descrip¬
tions that they gave of the nature of the 1 court cases*
in which they were supposedly involved contained suggest¬
ions of a high degree of formality and implications that
their authority was substantial. They put forward an
impression of a scaled-down version of the Urban Courts
of the pre-independence era in which:
The law administered ... is wholly unwritten. Claims
are brought before the courts and are argued by the
litigants themselves in terms of the customary law of
the tribes. The cases are heard and settled within a
framework of procedure that constituted a fundamental
ingredient of tribal legal systems.1




for my benefit, but this in itself constituted an
interesting phenomenon for it was highly unlikely that
the maintenance of Elders and tlrtan Court-type hearings
would be regarded as either prestigious or desirable by
outsiders. Indeed, the acknowledgement of such activity
to myself, or my assistant (a Lozi), was potentially
hazardous if the information should reach the ears of
the authorities or UNIP officials. Initially, then, it
seemed very unlikely that these 'cases' existed at all
but both men were highly insistent and were supported by
their associates. Eventually, over a period of months,
it became apparent that a number of situations did arise
which were given the status of 'cases'• Below I have
recorded four incidents which were relatively typical of
those I personally observed and in which the two men
claimed to have been called in as elders to make judge¬
ment. As will be seen, they show how wide was the
discrepancy between the theory and the practice of their
•legal* role.
Case I
Two men, both middle-aged and dressed very shabbily,
arrived at Samaconga's plot one morning in a very
excited state. They were both Lozi and obviously
knew Samaconga well. They told him that they
urgently needed him to go to a plot on nearby D
section. Two Lozi women, relatives of one of the men,
were quarrelling and fighting and Saraaconga was
needed to help make some decision as to what should
be done. Samacongs, escorted by a group of friends,
went straight to the plot which was about two minutes
away. On arrival at the plot no one was to be found
apart from a young Lozi girl who told Sameconga that
•they have gone elsewhere'. Samaconga became very
angry and said that he refused to wait around, and he
said that the only solution was to recommend that the
'case* be taken to the local courts. He became
involved in an argument with the two men about the
wasting of his time, and then he walked away. Later
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in the day, Samaconga said that one of the men who
had approached him was the 'son of the Lozi elder',
and the other a mutual friend. When my Lozi assis¬
tant threw doubt on the likelihood of a Lozi elder,
Samaconga replied, irritably, that all tribes had
elders and it was their duty to assist each other
when needed. When this question was pursued further
he said that he would not give help to 'these Northern¬
ers or Nyanja-speakers'.1 He was, he stated, already
the elder of the Luvale and Chokwe and would help the
Luchazi when their elder was away in the village. At
this point he became insistent that he would not help,
nor would he be helped by, the Nbunda because 'they
are not a friendly people'• The Lozi elder that he
spoke of had been a neighbour and close friend of his
for many years and they had both come to Malota at
about the same time and from the same part of Western
(now North-v/estern) Province.
Case II
A woman aged about 35 came to Samaconga's yard and
spoke to the group of women who were making beer at
the back of the house. She seemed distraught and,
for about 15 minutes, there was much noisy conver¬
sation. Eventually, Samaconga's wife brought the
woman across to speak to her husband. The woman was
Luvale and the wife of a good friend of Samaconga's.
The,couple lived nearby on C section. Her complaint
was that her husband, a self-employed woodcarver, was
going out drinking three or four days of the week and
was therefore unable to provide money to buy food for
herself and their three children. She felt that if
Samaconga were to approach her husband, he would be
more likely to do something about it. Samaconga left
with the woman and returned thirty minutes later having
persuaded the man to give his wife four kwacha.
Samacongo commented that such cases were easy to solve
because the two men were 'drinking friends' and the
other man had often bought beer ffom Samaconga's wife.
A number of features stand out in these two incidents.
The most obvious, of course, is that they cannot, by any
stretch of the imagination, be described as 'cases' in the
A
legal sense. They both involved the request for advice
and assistance from a third party in the settlement of a
1
Nyanja is a primary language of the Eastern
region and increasingly seems to have been used as an
ethnic category particularly where national politics are
involved. See, for example, its frequent usage in
Tordoff (1974).
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dispute between two other parties. Thus, in neither cose,
did the people involved directly approach Samaconga.
Also, both esses involved the sort of Incident that is a
regular occurrence on Malota. Quarrelling and fighting,
for example, have a tendency to become public events
because the physical structure of the compound makes it
difficult for them to remain private, and such incidents
often attract small crowds. Onlookers are likely to Join
in, or attempt to mediate, and friends or kinsmen of the
participants may be called upon to act as intermediaries.
Both cases were centred around, and in this they were
typical, minor day-to-day problems of compound life.
Thirdly, all the participants were close friends, neigh¬
bours, or kinsmen of Samaconga. In basic behavioural
terms, then, both cases were informal situations in which
Samaconga was asked to mediate in a dispute between two
people. But we must also look at the approach and the
reactions of Samaconga to these two situations. Firstly,
his interpretation of his role as 'elder* in these 'cases*
was always retrospective and would emerge in the endless
conversations that took place between Samaconga and his
friends. It was then, rather than during the situation
itself, that his status was explicitly acknowledged, mainly
by people who were not involved in the case. In both
cases, however, Samaconga appeared to consciously pursue
the role of elder as far as the situation would allow.
In all these sorts of incidents he would adopt an air of
importance (some would argue self-importance) and as, for
example, in the first case where the disputants disap-
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peared, he would still insist on coming up with some sort
of 'recommendation' however apparently ineffective or
meaningless. Both in his approach to, and his conversa¬
tions about, the incidents in which he was involved he
-i
tried to impose the role of elder onto the situation.
The second feature to emerge was the view that Samaconga
had of the relationship between the various tribes
involved. The most noticeable feature of the first case,
of course, was that it involved Lozi who are supposed to
2
"despise the Lubale". Samaconga claimed that this
involved no contradiction as Elders helped each other out.
This was indeed the case in the pre-independence era, but
the existence of a Lozi elder was a figment of his imagi¬
nation presumably based on the fact that the 'elder' was
the brother of a man, now deceased, who had been the
3
elder.' The most important factor was undoubtedly the
very long relationship that existed between the two
families for over twenty years. It might also be relevant
that the Lozi involved were not from Barotseland itself
but from Norths-Western Province and that, by any standards,
they were highly unsuccessful. Samaconga also used the
It was probably the lengthy discussions of
•cases' that I did not observe that finally convinced me
that the claims of Samaconga and his associates about




My field notes show that when Samaconga first
spoke of the son of the Lozi elder , a dispute arose
between him and some of his friends. At the time, I took
the argument to be about the status of the son, but
retrospectively I feel almost certain that they were
questioning the existence of the Lozi elder.
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first situation to clearly define the relationship between
the various 'Wiko* tribes claiming that the Luvale and the
Chokwe (his own tribe) were essentially the same; that the
Luchazi were closely related; and that the Mbunda were
very much outsiders.
I will, at a later point, return to look more
closely at the significance of these factors, but first I
wish to look at two incidents involving Liondo. In his
case there was a good deal less of the day-to-day advice
and assistance that was such a feature of life on Sama-
conga's plot. The incidents below are the only two that
I recorded.
Case III
This incident involved accusations of adultery. The
husband and wife were both Mbunda, and the other
participant a Luvale man. The situation came to a
head on a Saturday night when the husband returned
from a local bar and found his wife and the other man
together. A fight started and a violent quarrel
ensued with a large crowd collecting and a number of
relations of the married couple becoming involved.
It was not long before Liondo heard of this and went,
with others of his family, to the plot because, as he
put it, 'these are my friends'.1 The quarrel contin¬
ued for a further half-hour, with Liondo attempting
to act as mediator. Eventually, he persuaded all
parties to return home and meet at his plot early the
following morning. About 8 a.m. the couple arrived
with the wife's mother and sister and the Luvale man
and his brother, Liondo, his maternal uncle and his
son were also present. The Luvale man had made no
denial of his part in the episode and, after the
initial fight, had taken only a small part in the
quarrel. The husband claimed to have 'dealt' with
the wife, and all that Liondo felt was required was
for the Luvale man to pay some sort of compensation to
the husband. The Luvale agreed, apparently willingly,
1
It was actually the parents of the couple
involved that were Liondo's close friends. It also seemed
that there was a marriage between the two families but I
was unable to find specific details.
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to pay a sum of K40 over a given period of time.
The group then broke up. Very little had been said
and the general opinion was that the quicker the
matter was disposed of the better.
Case TV
This case involved two young Lozi women, Angela and
Christine. Angela accused Christine, who was un¬
married, of having designs on her husband. Christine
was upset and indignant about the accusations which
she claimed were totally untrue. She was particu¬
larly upset because she felt that Angela was spread¬
ing the rumour all over Malota, Christine told
Angela that, if she did not stop talking, about these
things in public, she would be forced to take action.
The accusations continued and Christine, who was a
good friend of various members of Hondo's family
having attended the same church, one day complained
to Liondo. He suggested that Christine should bring
Angela along the following day, Angela agreed to the
meeting, but brought along three other women, two of
her sisters and a friend. When Liondo asked Angela
why she was causing so much trouble, the girl reiter¬
ated her accusations which were once again denied by
Christine. Liondo suggested that there was no real
proof of any relationship between Christine and the
husband and suggested that Angela apologise and make
a 'token' compensation of K2. Up to this point,
Angela did not seem to have questioned Liondo's role
in the matter but with this 'judgement' a heated
argument started and, after a short time, Liondo
said that, if they wouldn't accent his advice they
should go to the local courts and settle the dispute
there. Some weeks later Liondo mentioned that '
Christine was attempting to take the matter to Court.
As with Samaconga, it is quite apparent that both these
cases were situations in which Liondo acted Informally,
and not very effectively, as the mediator in disputes
between other people. In ore case he was not even
specifically called upon. The idea that he was an 'elder*
dealing with 'cases* came from the way in which he attemp¬
ted to structure the process of mediation - i.e. his
constant emphasis on 'judgement*, 'decision', 'solution',
and compensation - and the way in which he discussed (in
the adultery case, at very exceptional length) the cases
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with his family and friends. But it is apparent that the
*
high moral authority of the formal Elders was distinctly
restricted, and that if Liondo tried to move beyond simple
mediation to 'judgement* he was likely to find himself in
trouble. The major participants in Hondo's cases were,
similarly, people that were well known to hlsi, ©nd were
not restricted to the Mbunda, or even the Wiko.
Briefly summarising, these four cases have a
number of things in common. Firstly, they involve infor¬
mal mediation rather than formal judgement. Secondly, the
moral authority of the Elders is restricted. Thirdly,
their actions are not restricted to one tribe, or even to
the 'Wiko' group of tribes. Fourthly, they tend to arise
spontaneously with on-the-spot reactions to the sort of
domestic disputes that happen daily on Malota.
10:8 Samaconga and Liondo
To make the claim that he is an Elder, an indi¬
vidual must believe that he has a certain amount of pres¬
tige and status. To maintain his claim for any period of
time, he must actually have these. However minor the
incidents in the previous section might appear, they
provided a focus for both Samaconga and Liondo to assert
their claims. More Importantly, they provided a situation
in which these claims could be acknowledged (or rejected).
There were, of course, many other situations in which both




only situations I observed when actions were carried out
that even roughly approximated the behaviour of pre-
independence Elders, Without acceptance and support from
others, their claims would become so ridiculous that they
would have to be dropped, what then is the source of the
status of these two men, and who are the people who
support them and who are sufficiently aware of their status
that they do not dispute their claims?
The two men are very different in many respects,
but there are a number of similarities. They are both
self-employed, both older, both relatively poor in purely
financial terms, and both very much dependent upon Malota
for remaining in town. Without their own plots on the
compound, it is virtually certain that both would feel
that they had no other option then to return to their
rural homes. Other than this, they are different in many
respects and, in particular, the type of support they
receive for their claims to be elders.
In this respect, Samaconga is much more presti¬
gious. Given different circumstances, he could well have
been an Elder in the formal sense and was certainly the
most obvious candidate to succeed to the last Luvale
Elder. In that case he would have been a relatively
powerful and influential man on Malota. He is very aware
of this fact, and appears to feel slightly bitter about
it. He has been on Malota for 27 years and is well known,
not only on the compound, but throughout Maramba. He is
highly regarded, and receives support from members of the
Luvale, Chokwe and Luchazi. By these standards, Liondo
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is much less well known and respected, and his status
within the compound is significantly lower. His claims
to be Mbunda elder, though known, are disputed by many
other •Wiko*. He has only lived on the compound a
relatively short time (compared with Samaconga and his
associates), and the nature of his business and his
general life-style mean that his social contacts are very
much restricted within Malota (though, of course, his
business ensures that he knows, professionally at least,
a relatively large number of people). Of the two men,
his claims to be elder look much less convincing but the
fact remains that he is able to continue making these
claims.
What then is the nature of the support that the
two men receive? Samaconga has an extensive network of
contacts that he has built up over the many years he has
lived on Malota. Most of his closest associates are older,
long-term residents of Malota. They meet socially almost
every day and many of them no longer work full-time.
They largely represent what remains of the contacts that
he had developed when he was the natural heir to the post
of Elder. He frequently bemoaned the fact that many of
his friends had died or *gone back to their people*, His
immediate circle of associates must therefore have dimin¬
ished quit® considerably (and continues to do so), but it
remains sufficiently extensive to make him a man of some
importance, particularly within the Luvale on Malota. It
is from this network of friendship and neighbourhood links
that his support is essentially derived.
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Liondo, on the other hand, is not so old and
remains a working businessman with many commitments.
When he arrived on his uncle's plot originally, they were
the only two of his family living on Malota. In 1971,
over a six month period, I met a total of 21 relatives of
Liondo»s who, besides living on Malota, visited the plot
regularly. All told, there were five generations and
most of the people involved lived on three plots on B
section. This physical proximity resulted in a great
deal of day-to-day interaction, and casual visits from
relatives were a common feature of life on all the plots.
Most of these relatives are unskilled and unqualified and
depend to a great extent on petty trading for a living.
Most of the older men have been helped to find accommo¬
dation and occasional work by Liondo, mainly through his
business contacts. It is to Liondo that they invariably
turn in times of need. For instance, when his maternal
uncle required a loan of K12 in order to build an extra
hut on his plot, he went straight to Liondo. Many others
continually receive short term 'loans* of K1 or K2. Even
those younger men in the family who have Jobs, have
parents and children to support and need occasionally to
approach Liondo. Though many people in Livingstone, and
indeed on Malota, would have regarded Liondo as a poor man,
in relation to the rest of his family he is substantially
better off. In economic terms, he is undoubtedly the
leader of his family. However, in terms of seniority he
had a maternal and paternal uncle and a grandfather who
have superiority over him. It is within this context of
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a conflict between seniority and economic obligation that
Liondo's claims to be an elder must be understood.
Samaconga's claims to be an elder are more credible
than Liondo's, but even with him they are only accepted
amongst that group of people with whom he has direct and
continuing links over a period of time. Having acquired
a good deal of informal status on M&lots in the 1940s
and 1950s, he was prevented from formalising this status
by the movement towards independence. Eut in the post-
independence era he has managed to maintain that informal
status though amongst a diminishing group. He is now an
old man and there are many recent immigrants and younger
men who do not know him or do not accept his authority.
Most of his 'supporters* are long-term residents of
Kalota, and his claims to be elder are backed up by their
experiences before independence. As long as his claims
do not come into conflict with the formal framework, and
he only makes them within that group that accepts his
authority, his claim is unlikely to be denied. Nor is
the appearance of other elders, such as the Luchazi man,
contradictory as long as their immediate social networks
remain substantially discrete. Samaconga has therefore
attempted to manipulate a formally redundant political
category in order to institutionalise the informal
authority that he has in post-independence Zambia.
Liondo has attempted to do the same but for very
different reasons and in very different circumstances.
Liondo's authority is based on his ability to provide for
a relatively large group of kin who live in close proximity.
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His immediate social network and his day-to-day social
activity is heavily kin-oriented. His resources are
superior in terms of his family but limited outside of
that situation. Though most of hi® family are heavily
obligated to him (and particularly the older ones), he
does not have the seniority that makes him the natural
leader of the group.^ Those who are senior to him, though
very much in need of his economic support, are very reluc¬
tant to see him take on the role of family head. His
authority, even within his own family, is therefore highly
tenuous. His constant manipulation of the term 'elder*
can be understood as an attempt to institutionalise (and
therefore increase) the authority obtained from his
economic dominance of his kinship group. Because of the
very restricted basis for his authority, his claims are
rejected by most of those outside of his immediate network,
and only grudgingly accepted by those within it. Amongst
those who are indebted to him, he can continue to make his
claims without too much fear of direct contradiction. Such
a post, of limited attraction to others, is probably the
only one that he could maintain in an environment in which
there is great competition for political office. The long
tradition of elders on iialotaj the continuing belief that
Malota isaivyway conservative, rural and tribally bound;
and the existence of at least two other men claiming to
be (and to a certain extent being accepted as) elders,
1
Schildkrout (197^212) comments of the Mossi
that "First generation immigrants attempt to apply a
Kossi value, that is the association of generational
seniority with high status, in the urban context."
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prevents Liondo*s claims fro® being totally ludicrous.
The question that must now be asked concerns the
extent to which the activities of these two men in
institutionalising their status has a wider significance
and, in particular, how is it related to the phenomenon
of ethnicity. Why, for example, is it only ^iko* men
who choose to use this particular title? Is it simply
coincidence, or does it reflect the position of the Wiko
group within the wider urban political framework?
10:9 Ethnicity and Tribal Elders on Kalota•
Despite the wishes or intentions of the colonial
administration who were looking for a substitute for the
rural chief, the Tribal Elder or Representative was
always an urban institution. It was developed as a means
of controlling, and communicating with, the African urban
population, and was supposed to provide them with some
form of representation. It could only exist (and was
only needed) in situations where there was significant
ethnic heterogeneity. However, its basic purpose was not
to represent tribes as such, but to represent the urban
population as a whole. Hie use of tribal distinctions
was simply the most convenient and comprehensible method,
in terms of colonial goals, of breaking up the population
into manageable units. It was particularly attractive to
the administration because, though undoubtedly urban, it
stressed the rural origins of the migrants it represented.
In this sense its origins lay in distinctions between
black and white, and between urban and rural.
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The post-independence institution of Elder is also
a strictly urban phenomenon, but restricted (within
Livingstone at least) to a small group of people in a
particular residential area. Initially, its existence
is dependent upon the fact that it used to be an official
political post, and what little credibility it has is
based on its previous functions within urban areas. The
belief that the institution is retained on Halota is
still widely held both within, and outside of, the com¬
pound. It is believed that its existence is due to the
emergence of •tribalism*. Given the title of the office,
this is hardly surprising. But listening to the 'elders*
and their associates talking constantly of the various
tribal groups Involved in elder activity, of the
relationships between the various groups, and of the
*Luvale* as a category involving three tribes, it is
difficult not to conclude that these elders are a pheno¬
menon of ethnicity. As Sehildkrout comments? "Ethnicity
is relevant in a social situation even if only one actor
acknowledges its existence".1 But what type, what form,
or what level of ethnicity is represented by this parti¬
cular form of activity?
Recent literature would attempt to answer this
question by reference to various frameworks involving such
concepts as ethnic group, ethnic category, an ethnic
continuum, detribelisation/retribalisation, the politics




of concepts and terras reflects the highly variable and
complex nature of the phenomenon. The study of these
elders does not fit easily into any of these frameworks.
Their existence cannot be seen simply in terms of ethnic
categories, that is pragmatically defined, sets of people
that do not constitute corporate polieical groups , for
their existence is undoubtedly related to the existence
of what must be seen as, in the widest sense, political
groupings. Yet, equally, can these groupings really be
said to constitute ethnic ♦groups1 when they involve such
© highly restricted section of the population both of the
compound and of the *Wiko*, and where the boundaries of
the ethnic group (if that is what it is) are so poorly
defined?^ Nor can I see these groupings that gather under
the authority of the elders as being informal interest
group® pursuing a greater share of the resources within
the wider arena. Finally, I do not feel that it is
adequate, or even possible, to make some sort of quanti¬
tative evaluation; to decide at what point on an
heuristic continuum this particular form of ethnicity
lies.
We have seen that these elders are informal leaders
within small, highly integrated networks of face-to-face
relationships. The manipulation of the terra 'elder* takes
1
Grille (1974:160); Cohen (1969s4)
2 Grille(1974j160) says that the concept of
•boundary* refers generally to the extent to which rela¬
tions between those with different ethnic identities are
restricted and formalized, and interaction is confined
within the bounds of the ethnic group.''
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place as part of the competition for prestige end status
within these restricted networks. Indeed, in the case of
Liondo, the term is very definitely a resource in that
competition. As such, the existence of elders is
undoubtedly ♦political* in the sense that it involves
"processes involved in the distribution and exercise of,
and the struggle for, power within a social unit".1 But
to what extent is it the politics of ethnicity in the
sense of "strife between ... ethnic groups, in the course
2
of which people stress their identity and exclusiveness"?
It has to be remembered that the institution of
Elder Is not an aspect of »Wikot culture. It is a
specifically colonial, urban institution which, I argued
earlier, tended in some ways to reduce differences between
tribes rather than exaggerate them within the colonial
x
context. "Ethnic group boundaries consist of symbols",
but on Malota the existence of elders in 1971 was never
specifically associated with the Wiko even within the com¬
pound. It was essentially something that was done by
certain •Malotans*. As we have seen, Samaconga himself
constantly stressed the ethnic universality of elders on
Malota, So, whatever the intention, the effect of having
elders was not to provide a cultural symbol that excluded
non-¥iko. The 'cases1 presented showed that even the







as being basically responsible for the corporate feeling
amongst these tribes in the urban situation, could become
involved in the activities of the elders.
What then did the people in these groups have in
common? The most noticeable factors were that the
majority of the men involved were older, unskilled and
self-employed, uneducated, and relatively long-term
inhabitants of Malota who were unlikely to make any
further inter- or intra-urban moves. Very few of the®
could be said to be financially successful, though some
(Samaconga for instance) had obviously had periods in
their careers when they had done very well for themselves.
But this only served to exaggerate the fact that they were
mostly reaching the end of their urban careers and that,
economically, they were amongst the compound's less
privileged. We have already seen how at the time of
McCulloch's study (which, incidentally, took place seven
years after Samaconga arrived on Malota) the Western group
of tribes were substantially worse off than almost any
other group in the town.1 At the same time, they were by
far the largest group on Malota forming nearly one-third
of the population. Many of these people bought plots on
the compound and, because of their low economic security,
have remained on the compound. Despite the changes that
have gone on in the country because of independence, these
people have regained basically unchanged in socio-economic
1
In educational term®, for example, they were by
far the worst off with 62% having no education at all.
See McCulloeh (1956:46)
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terms. The new ^obs thst have been created have not been
for thea for they are too old to learn the skills. The
higher levels of education are beyond them because they
are too old (though their children and grand-children
may well have been able to take advantage of them), Their
present lives are dependent largely upon the pattern of
their urban careers in the pre-independence era,1
The older •Wiko* remain at the bottom of the
urban socio-economic hlerschy, their position probably
worse because they are older and find it harder to work,
and because the number of people on the compound who are
both educated and employed is much higher. Factors such
as seniority and self-employment, which were important on
pre-independence Malota, have become (as we saw in Chapter
6) less so in the last decade. No longer do age and
length of time on the compound automatically provide soroe
status in the competition for political office.
The choice of elders as the institutionalised
form of leadership within this section of the population
is a result of this increasingly low social and economic
status. They have chosen a political institution from a
previous era (one in which most of them were involved at
the peak of their careers) largely because it is redun¬
dant in terms of Zambia*s post-independence political
1
Though I do not have the actual statistics, it
seems likely that the socio-economic status of the
Western group of tribes has improved over the last two
decades and that the younger *Wiko* are much more able to
compete economically and politically with other groups.
Note for example the two young Wiko men who were UNIP
officials on Malota.
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structure. Because it is, the element of competition -
always very great since the beginning of the nationalist
movement - is nil, except within the networks involved.
The re-creation of the post of elder can therefore
be seen a® the result of the inability of certain indivi¬
duals and their associates, who could well have attained
political office in the pre-independence situation, to
cope with the changes that have taken place in the urban
political structure and the compound*s social composition.
If they wish to stay in town, and achieve the status they
feel they deserve, then they must develop their own
channels.
But this looks, on the surface at least, very ouch
a case of what Cohen has called *re-tribalisation*, that
is a situation in which an "underprivileged status ...
group will have to define its membership because it is
only by organising itself tightly that it can struggle
effectively with the other status groups". But it seems
to me that it is the status and not the ethnic element
that we oust retain as the significant factor. Undoubt¬
edly, there is a partial coincidence between the 'under¬
privileged status group* and the Wiko and throughout the
last two chapters we have constantly seen the close link
between socio-economic status and ethnic groups. But I
feel that to turn it into an ethnic phenomenon per se is
to confuse the issue. Tribal Eldership does not provide




nor, I believe, does it exclude non-Wiko of the same socio-
economic grouping. Indeed it is much more likely to
exclude the younger, better educated, employed sector of
the Wiko population. The partial coincidence of the
ethnic group and the status group is a consequence of the
historical factors leading to the inferior status of the
Western tribes, and the great numerical dominance of the
Wiko on Malota, But to turn it into a phenomenon of
ethnicity is to miss the essential point that, as Rotberg
points out at the national level, wlclass* is the more
determining variable in Zambian politics today, and that
the 'tribal* split in the governing party is symptomatic
rather than causal*,
10:10 Conclusion
In this chapter I have looked briefly at certain
aspects of two particular forms of political activity as
they existed on Malota in 1971. Two themes emerged which
relate to the central belief in the town that the compound
is subject to strong rural influences and is outside the
orthodox urban political arena. Of particular interest
was the role of ethnic or tribal groups and the general
idea that Malota's unusual social and physical structure
has had a ma^or impact on the nature of its political
institutions.
1
Samaconga, for example, obviously felt that
other people in his situation, but from other tribes,
could (and should) make similar claims to his,
2
Quoted in Bates (1970:556)
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It was seen that the dominance of political
institutions by specific ethnic groups was an urban rather
than a Malotan phenomenon. Malota tended to follow the
general pattern in that political activity was broken up
by divisions of a regional, rather than purely ethnic,
nature with certain institutions being dominated by
certain tribes or group of tribes. It would need the
detailed study of further •political• situations to make
this anything more than a very general conclusion, but
the data presented does appear to support Molteno * s
conclusion that during "the independence struggle the
African nationalist movement did not reflect significant
•tribal1 divisions, but conflict on sectional lines has
increased sharply in the years since 1964." However,
it has also been strongly argued that this •tribalism1
must be understood as the result, and not the cause, of
political conflict in Zambia.2
It is at the national level that these sectional
differences are, inevitably, most obvious for their effect
is concentrated and often traumatic. As we saw in the
previous chapter, conflict within the ruling party, UfflP,
has been centred in recent years on the Bemba and the
Lozi, whereas the ANC emerged (until it was banned) as
very much a party of the South. People in Zambia are only
too aware of these conflicts as could be seen in 1971 by





the formation of Simon Kapepwe's breakaway United
Progressive Party, Looking at the history of national
politics in Zambia, it is apparent that the divisions
are essentially regional and that they are subject to
changes as different groups alter their allegiances in
order to adapt to shifts in the balance of power, This
arises, according to Bates, because "In Zambia, as else¬
where in Africa, region of origin correlates highly with
1
tribal membership". He goes on to argue that the study
of urban areas has shown that region of origin has, in
fact, Supplanted* tribal membership as a criterion for
the formation of ethnic groups. This phenomenon appeared
in Livingstone in the tendency for all Northerners to be
called *Bemba*j for the Ngoni to be referred to (and to
sometimes refer to themselves) as the *Nyanja-speaking
peoples*j and for the terms *Luvale* and *¥iko* to be
used to designate a group of tribes from the West, As a
result, there can be little doubt that "political activity
and political leadership based predominantly on one
regional area, coinciding to a certain extent (but never
completely) with tribal units, are a fact in Zambia,"
But how does this affect,and how is it influenced
by, political activity in Zambia's urban centres? What
impact do these divisions at the national level have on
what I have previously termed the * local* factor? The





regional dominance and by studying them closely I have
tried to show what other factors are involved.
The first factor is historical. Colonial domin¬
ation of a country is usually uneven and this frequently
leads to the uneven development of facilities for the
indigenous population. As a result, often for no other
reason than historical accident, the population of
certain areas gain earlier and superior access to a
variety of resources such as employment and education.
This can bring about, as it has done in Zambia, a status
hierachy with a regional or tribal base. The formation of
this hierachy was, as we saw earlier, reflected in pre-
independence African politics in Livingstone when three
groups with high socio-economic status competed for the
available political power. The original distribution of
power was based on a second factor. This was the Out¬
sider' status of the Bemba and Ngoni in a town where the
p
Lozl "passed for the elite". This has undoubtedly
affected subsequent political development in the town
with the Lozl trying to regain the initial advantage that
they handed to the other two when they themselves continued
to concentrate on the Welfare Society during the early days
of 'Congress'.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Western
group of tribes were, in the pre-lndependence era, so
1
This 'historical accident* is, of course,
frequently related to the physical distribution of




under-privileged in terms of social and economic resources
that they were virtually excluded from competition in the
formal political arena. Because of this low socio¬
economic status, they made up a very large proportion of
the population of Malota and I have tried to show that
this is a primary factor in the retention of 'tribal
eiders* on the compound, even seven years after indepen¬
dence. Independence brings about many changes in the
distribution of power and resources, but there are
certain sectors of the population which do not gain
from these changes and who may, relative to the rest of
the population, become even snore disadvantaged. The
older, uneducated, self-employed population of Malota
ere ^ust such a group. If they had not lived (indeed,
acquired a plot) on Malota, many of them would have been
forced to return to their rural homes. As it is, the
change in the compound's social composition, with the
influx of younger, better educated, employed sub-tenants,
means that their socio-economic status Is even lower
than it was. Their retention of a redundant political
category is a reflection of their perceptions of, and
their experiences within, the formal political structure
and, in particular, their role within it. I have argued
that the existence of these elders should not be explained
in terms of ethnicity but in terms of socio-economic
2
status. This is not to deny the ethnic element, but to
This is not only in relative terms. Their age
and lack of skills means that, in absolute terms, they may
be poorer than they used to be.
This would, indeed, be tautologous as I have
already argued that one of these bases of socio-economic
differentiation is regTonality.
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insist that we do not lose the essential meaning of
these activities by labelling them with a term such as
'retribalisation* which immediately places the phenomenon
into a category which contains a wide range of disparate
activities that have little connection. The fact that
*Wlko* only are involved is due to the heavy numerical
preponderance of this group in this particular stratum.
This has come about as a result of action taken, and
policies laid out, before independence. As such, the
existence of elder3 does relate back to the pre-indepen-
dence era, but it should not be explained in terms of
♦conservatism*, •traditionalism* or 'tribalism*, but in
terms of those factors examined in the first half of this
thesis - availability of housing, stabilisation policies,
the employment/housing equation and so on. I cannot
therefore see the existence of these elders as being the
result of Malota's supposed marginality. It is, in a very
real sense, a hangover from the colonial urban past.
Nor, finally, can I see Bemba/Ngoni dominance of
UNIP as a peculiarity of Halota• Harries-Jones noted,
though could not explain, an overrepresentation of Northern
p
Province section officials.* The political structure of
Livingstone, it would seem to me, only serves to make such
1
I am aware that this argument is very close to
the basic framework that Cohen employe but it is interest¬
ing to note his comment that "sooner or later" we will have
to drop the term ethnicity because it is "principally
social and political, not sociological'. (Cohen 1974jxxi).





dominance more likely. The continuing minority, 'stranger*
status of the Bemba and Ngoni; the attachement of the Lozi
to UNIP and then ANC after their split with UNIP in the
late 1960s; and the persistent affiliation of the town's
other big tribal group, the Tonga, to the AKG serves to
concentrate the resources of outsider groups on UNIP, at
least until 1971. Though I have no statistical evidence
for other housing areas, I would suggest that the state
of UNIP on Malota was very much a reflection of the state




Kalota was considered by ir.ony people in Living¬
stone, including those who were responsible for its
future, to be a separate community, virtually a village
within the town. This idea is derived initially from the
physical aprearance and facilities of the compound which
are so poor as to have caused it to be declared a
"disaster area". In these terms Maiota is undoubtedly a
slum, and is very similar In certain respects to other
*shantytowns* that have grown up around Zambia's towns and
cities in recent years. The growth of squatter activity
2
has accelerated rapidly in the post-independence era, and
the squatter settlement has become a standard feature of
most towns* Indeed, it is argued by Van Velsen that; "It
is ,.* inevitable that ail towns should have unauthorized
■i
Appendix 1 contains the text of a draft memoran¬
dum from Livingstone*s Town Clerk to Simon Kspepwe (at the
time the Vice-President) or the subject of Kalota. Though
it was exaggerated for political, purposes, it shows many
of the stereotyped views that were hold in the town.
*
Seymour (1976:2) shows thnt in Lusaka the
squatter population grew from 18,000 in 19&3, when it
constituted 15# of the torsi population, to 166,000 in
1973 when it was ^5% of the total.
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settlements." This inevitability is primarily attributed
to the gap that exists between the rate of increase of the
urban population and the supply of authorised housing. In
addition, squatter settlements have certain economic
advantages, for example in terms of rent, over other
forms of low-cost housing. They offer opportunities for
self-employment which official housing areas do not, and
they permit a higher level of urban stabilisation. For
these reasons they have become, in situations of rapid
urban growth, a virtual necessity if the needs of the
urban poor are to be catered for.
However, if the term 'squatter' is taken to relate
primarily to the question of illegality of land tenure,
Livingstone does not (with one minor exception) have any
squatter settlements. Halota's status as a squatter
settlement must therefore be attributed to other charac¬
teristics normally associated with squatter populations.
Firstly, though the landlords have legal tenure, they often
break other regulations relating to building, planning, and
sanitation. Also sub-tenancy is unlawful and its existence
is dependent upon the local authorities turning a 'blind-
eye*. Finally, the businesses that are run from Malota's
plots are technically illegal. Thus, there are illegal
aspects to life on Malota which do not arise, and would
not be tolerated, on most municipal housing areas but which




Secondly, the stereotype of the Zambian squatter -
involving "parasitism ('scrounging'), crime, prostitution,
laziness and general unproductiveness; and, indeed, an
abuse of and threat to Zambia's newly won Independence,"
- is often applied to the population of Malota, Research
shows that this stereotype does not provide an accurate
reflection of reality, either for squatters or Malota,
Both are believed to be socially homogeneous residential
units, and their populations are regarded as outsiders to
the city. At an extreme, they are (like unauthorised
housing areas throughout the world) typified as "essentially
rural enclaves socially and economically peripheral to the
r>
city."" Their populations are frequently classified as
'misfits', 'loafers', or 'outcasts', all terms which
suggest that they are incapable of coping with urban life
and have been excluded from the normal process by which
individuals become urbanized. Once again, recent research,
particularly in Latin America, suggests that the opposite
is the case and that a squatter area "plays a functional
role in the processes of social and economic adaptation
•3
and mobility of migrants new to the city."-'
The conclusions of this study suggest that much the
sam® can be said of Kalota and that, rather than being a
hinderance to the town, it is essential to the continued







living on the compound. For, although the physical
facilities are obviously inadequate, the flexibility
inherent in the compound*s tenancy system provides options
that allow certain groups of people, including an increas¬
ing number of individuals already employed in the town, to
remain in Livingstone despite the inability of the local
authorities to provide sufficient housing. It is in this
sense that Malota is (and has been) different from, but
important to, the rest of Livingstone,
Urban areas arise to serve a variety of purposes.
They are complex units which must cater for a wide range
of needs and goals. Inevitably, their administration tends
to favour certain sectors of the population. Other sectors
will find themselves with restricted access to a variety
of resources such as employment opportunities, education
and housing. But despite this, the}' may be crucial to the
continuing functioning of certain aspects of urban life.
For example, various services are required by an urban
population which can best, or only, be provided by small-
scale, self-eraployed workers. Such Individuals, or groups
of individuals, must be catered for and this requires a
good deal of flexibility to be built into urban admini¬
stration, particularly in the provision of housing. This
is particularly so in situations of rapid change and
growth. The existence of squatter settlements shows how
the poorer sectors of the population can introduce this
flexibility through their own actions, when it has not
been provided by those who are in control. The development
of Malota shows dramatically how, not only can they cope
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with their inadequacies, but that they are capable of
adapting to changing circumstances more quickly than the
formal administration.
It was a stated assumption of this study that
Malota's distinctiveness, if it existed at all, had to be
demonstrated. It is a strong belief in the town that some
sort of strong 'community spirit* exists on the compound.
The 1971 Municipal Survey reported that many of the land¬
lords "have lived long enough in Malota, so much so that
a spirit of oneness has grown and now they feel they are
part of the big family in Malota% and that even the sub¬
tenants, though they would not be so affected by the com¬
pound's demolition, would still "to some extent feel the*
result of the breaking of the big family". These sort of
images make it easier for outsiders and observers to see
Malota as a separate community, and enhances the idea of
its marginality. I have concluded that Malota first came
to be seen as marginal because many of its population were
excluded from participation in what the colonial authori¬
ties regarded as the urban sector i.e. those people
involved in wage employment. Since municipal and employers*
housing was mostly tied directly to wage employment,
exclusion from the labour force meant virtual exclusion from
authorised rented housing. This arrangement "was incompat¬
ible with permanent urbanization? tied housing was there¬
fore less acceptable to the urbanized than to temporary
1
Municipal Council Survey (1971)
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•«!
migrants." This was the deliberate consequence of the
colonial administration's wish to restrict the potential
commitment of migrants to urban life. Faced with the
contradiction of needing a large labour force but not
wanting a large urbanized population, the administration
sought to control the process of urbanization by excluding
(or making it difficult for) certain categories such as
women, unemployed migrants, or self-employed or retired
workers. In tieing housing to employment they hoped to
make urban life sufficiently unstable that workers could
not regard a town as their base. By starting from the
assumption that there should be no urbanization, this
policy was, by definition, unable to cope with many of the
features associated with the urbanization process.
Those who were excluded by official policy sought
accommodation on Malota, as did wage employees whose
occupational instability made life in conventional rented
housing hazardous. It has to be remembered that Kalota
was still an official housing area , and the possibility
remains that the authorities used it in an indirect manner
to cope with some of the problems they faced as a result
of the inflexibility of their strict employment/housing
equation. If this was so, it was never admitted and the
effect was still that certain occupational categories,
excluded from better housing areas and rented accommodation,
came to be concentrated on Malote. The association of a




compound had a significantly different social composition
in terms of factors such as age, sex, and ethnic origins.
It was in these terms that there was a very distinct
division between Malota and the other authorised housing
in the town, and it was for this reason that the compound
had come to be regarded as marginal in the pre-independence
era. But I have argued that this distinctiveness was far
from being a reflection of the compound*s peripherality to
the city. Quite the opposite, it shows the attempts of
the population to avoid, or by-pass, those administration
policies that sought to prevent urbanization, Malota's
peculiar tenancy structure was manipulated by various
categories of individuals in order to allow them to cope
with the insecurities, both short-term and long-term, of
urban life. It was they, and not the residents of the
other authorised housing areas, who were better able to
marry, to cope with unemployment, to envisage a long-term
future (including possible retirement) in town. It was
they who were better integrated into urban life and who
would more easily remain in, and become committed to, town.
The decisions of certain individuals to live in a
particular town or residential area are based on a whole
series of factors. Such decisions are constrained by gov¬
ernment policy, financial considerations, housing availa¬
bility, familial obligations, and a variety of other
influences relating to the needs and expectations of the
individuals involved. Choice, and the actions based upon
it, are a consequence of the way in which individuals
perceive the available alternatives in terms of their own
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individual and social needs. The Individual must evaluate
the advantages and disadvantages of specific situations.
I have argued that colonial housing policy placed such
severe constraints on the alternatives available to indi¬
viduals that choice was, in fact, very limited. Thus the
individuals living on Malota before independence frequent¬
ly had no other options than a return to their rural homes
or a further urban shift. My discussion of pre-indepen-
dence Malota was therefore centred on a consideration of
the factors that made these latter options less attractive
than life on Malota, with all its disadvantages. My
primary concern was with the way in which the individual's
evaluation of the options was related to the point that he
had reached in his urban and occupational careers, and how
the compound*s social composition should be seen as
emergent from a set of individual choices and decisions
subject to a variety of constraints.
The needs of certain sectors of the urban popula¬
tion that were met by Malota existed in all urban areas.
They were, after all, part of the process of urbanization.
As a result, despite the official strictness of government
policy, a number of residential areas sprang up to cope
with these needs. Broken Hill had a system of *plots*,
and most towns had unauthorised housing areas. These
1
These unauthorised areas often involved people
settling on private land but with the owner's consent. As
such they did not technically fit into the category of
squatters. What squatting there was seems to have centred
on these compounds ^Seymour (1976:2)]. The Eccles Report
of 19^4 - quoted in Van Velsen (1975:298) - shows that,
even as early as that, there was a good deal of confusion
over the exact meaning of * squatter'.
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were subject to a fairly strict policy of containment and
occasional demolition campaigns. Thus, even before inde¬
pendence, there was an accumulating demand for housing
outside of the conventional rented sector. Independence
removed a major series of constraints when a wide range
of regulations relating to rural-urban influx and housing
were withdrawn. On the other hand, a series of new con¬
straints were to appear which would have an equally
significant impact on choice and availability. The most
important were focused upon the increase in the town's
population as a result of changing expectations in the
country as a whole. Though the administration saw the need
to contain the upsurge in urban population, this came into
conflict with the ideas and aims of the politicians who
wanted to be eble to show that they were going to keep
their promises. As a result, squatting was positively
encouraged by nationalist politicians. People flocked into
the urban centres in order to be able to participate in the
new standard of living that independence was supposed to
bring about. Housing quickly became in short supply.
Despite Its obvious disadvantages, and age was rapidly
exaggerating them, Malota became attractive as an option
to certain individuals who would previously have had
automatic access to other alternatives in the town because
of the previous responsibility of employers for the housing
needs of their employees. Now that this was no longer the
case, those individuals employed by the larger firms, the
local authority, or the Government, who could not obtain
council housing had to move to Malota in order to retain
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the urban base on which their ^obs were dependent. Such
people could be absorbed by the development of sub-tenancy
with the result that there was an increasing heterogeneity
in terms of occupation and other related variables. The
advantages provided by the compound as a form of transi¬
tional or temporary accommodation were seen by many,
particularly single, men as easily outweighing the
physical disadvantages of living in a slum. Malota once
again is in the position of providing an outlet for those
who wish to remain in town but who, through no fault of
their own and because of inadequacies in the administration
of urban housing, are excluded from what is regarded by the
authorities as conventional and •normal* urban housing.
Malota is only ♦marginal* in terms of the definitions and
assumptions of outsiders and observers. To the people who
live on Malota, many of whom are now in the wage-earning
sector, it is essential to their attempts to remain in
Livingstone, to become integrated into the town, that
Malota (or some equivalent) exist. It is in this positive
sense that Malota is like many of Zambia*s squatter
settlements for it seems certain that, without it, a
squatter compound (in the illegal tenure sense of that
term) would have arisen in the town.
It cannot therefore be said that Malota has
remained unaffected by the many changes of the last two
decades. If it has become more overcrowded and more dirty,
it is because of the demands made upon it as a result of
the authorities being unable to respond quickly enough to
these changes. In terms of its social composition, it has
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in certain respects been more radically affected than any
other housing area in the town. There is some continuity
between the pre- and post-independence situations in the
fact that, in both cases, the population of Malota was
heavily dominated by individuals excluded from the main
housing sector. However, the criterion used to exclude
has altered substantially. Before, it was based on
occupational factors; after, it was based on the availi-
bility of housing. The first is essentially ego-centred
with the emphasis on the acquisition of education, skills,
and employment by the individual. The second is primarily
external to the individual. Consequently, Malota has
increasingly become a bridgehead or temporary stop-gap for
those individuals, frequently occupationally mobile, who
wish (and intend) to stay in town, but who would prefer to
live elsewhere. Inevitably, the long-term commitment of
many of these people to Malota is low. They will remain
there only until alternatives present themselves, and for
this reason are likely to remain as sub-tenants. This is
in contrast to the pre-independence situation when, if the
authorities had provided extra housing, many of the inhabi<
tants of Malota would have remained, indeed had to remain,
on the compound.
In terms of its social composition, Malota - with
its increased heterogeneity and internal differentiation -
has become increasingly less distinct from the demographic
pattern of the town as a whole. On the other hand, it has
come to be regarded by people living in the town as more
distinctive than it used to be. This distinctiveness is
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frequently placed within a political framework.
Though, "sociologically, it is no longer very
striking to assert that slums or squatter communities are
not necessarily zones of social disorganization", there
are many people who continue to "believe otherwise. The
existence of the Jehovah's Witness church and tribal elders
on Malota, together with the belief that the banned ANC
had its headquarters there, was used as evidence to support
this idea. More generally, it was felt that the inhabi¬
tants of Malota were substantially more conservative and
traditional than elsewhere in the town. For these
reasons, it was said that the compound was the focus for
2
opposition to the government. This appears to be an
extension into the political arena of the belief that
slums end squatter settlements constitute a 'threat'.
It is based on a number of factors. Once again, physical




The strength, and inaccuracy, of this idea is
shown in the following example. I was told, by a number
of people of very different backgrounds, that the 'real'
political leader on Malota was a certain Mr. Chipango.
This man did not, in fact, live on Malota but was a noted
opponent of the government and his movements in 1971 were
highly restricted by the police. A one-time Mayor of
Livingstone, he was subsequently arrested in early 1973
as being an 'agent of the South* [Pettman (1974:242)3 .
He was later sentenced to death for high treason after
recruiting people for military training in Namibia prepara¬
tory to organising a coup (Africa Diary; xvi,32; August
5-11, 1976). His political connections with Malota were
virtually nil but his local notoriety as the symbol of
opposition meant that it was often thought that his
activities were centred on Malota.
3 Van Velsen (1975:306)
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looks like a village, it becomes very easy for outsiders to
assume that the population behave like * villagers*. The
assumption of many urban-dwellers, once again inaccurate,
is that this involves the retention of the traditional
rural values that prevent the speedy emergence of a
modern Zambia. The historical fact, well known throughout
Livingstone, that Malota was always the centre for the
town's Tribal Elders (even after they had been officially
discontinued) has led people to think that 'tribal'
values have had an unacceptably important impact on the
compound*s political activity. The study of two particular
politics! institutions on Malota - 'tribal elders' and
UNIP section leadership - has shown that ethnic divisions
are indeed apparent. But I have attempted to show that
these divisions cannot be attributed to 'conservatism* or
'tribalism* as such. Instead they should be seen as the
consequence of a series of factors relating to the distrib¬
ution of resources in the urban sector.
The emergence of African political institutions
in the pre-independence era was closely related to govern¬
ment policy on urbanization. The official policy demanded
that the commitment of migrants to urban life was to be
avoided. Initially, therefore, it was hoped that political
institutions cculd be developed that would stress the
rural nature of the urban migrant's background. But, as
with housing needs, the colonial administration was trying
to ignore, or at least delay, the inevitable. As towns
grew, demands by the African population for effective
representation were bound to emerge. Urban life gave rise
to new problems that could not be solved through rural-
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based institutions. In particular, the tribal elder was
designed to represent the African vis-a-vis other Africans
and could be of no use in counteracting the racial inequal¬
ities which were such a dominant feature of the urban
market place, particularly in relation to labour. For
this purpose, many Africans felt that they should have
appropriate institutions through which their protests
could be channelled. Their demands were intensified by
the development of an urban elite based on industrial
skills and education which believed that there should be
specifically urban institutions that would provide some
sort of political equality with whites. The urban situ¬
ation concentrated and intensified the political needs and
demands of Africans. However, the concessions that were
allowed by the colonial administration did not take account
of (or maybe Just refused to acknowledge) the nature of
these needs. As in other matters, the desire of the
administration to prevent any urbanization of a permanent
nature meant that it did not realise what was actually
happening in Northern Rhodesia's towns.
The political institutions (particularly the welfare
societies, political parties and Trade Unions) that did
eventually emerge soon began to reflect the urban context
within which they developed. Though it is generally
argued that internal conflict between Africans was muted
in the pre-independence era, it is apparent that the lead¬
ership of the various institutions was unequally distri¬
buted in terms of various factors, particularly ethnic
origin and economic status. The ability of individuals to
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take office was increasingly "derived from their education
and conscious approximation to European standards." These
criteria were essentially urban and were in stark contrast
to the factors that had been used to elect tribal elders
(particularly seniority and knowledge of rural values).
The development of urban areas brought about a new frame¬
work by which people's status could be assessed, and poli¬
tical participation came to be closely related to this
hierachy. Skills, education, wage employment, and Western
attitudes became resources in the competition for leader¬
ship in the new institutions. Those people without these
resources were, on the whole, excluded from office. As a
result, many continued to support the elders, whose status
was based on resources which they did have access to. We
have seen how, for a number of reasons, such people were
concentrated on Malota, and it is for this reason that
elders continued to be centred on the compound. The cause
of this was not, therefore, an innate conservatism or
tendency to tribalism, but the fact that the compound had
a particular social composition. fiutj as we have already seen, this social
/
#•
ition paralleled other urban demographic patterns in the country more closely than any
area in the town . Those categories which did not have the
resources for political office (other than elder) were
approximately the same categories which were excluded from
conventional municipal housing. But they were still an




their peripheral!ty, or from the fact that they were of no
use in the urban situation. It was a result of the fact
Vo rv
that they did not have these resources which, as the level
had continued to gorw and develop, had become increasingly significant.
We have seen how in Livingstone different insti¬
tutions initially came to be domineted by particular
ethnic groups, and how this has provided a basic framework
around which subsequent developments in political activity
have taken place. Simultaneously, socio-economic differ¬
entiations that had arisen within the urban situation were
seen to have had a significant impact on the way in which
political office was distributed. As a result, research¬
ers such as Mitchell and Epstein were able to conclude
that, with the continuing growth and development of towns,
tribalism was no longer the only category of interaction
and noted "the increasing significance of prestige or
♦class* as a further category of social interaction in
•i
African urban life." Such an approach tends to dichoto¬
mise 'class* and ethnicity, viewing them in an 'either/or*
type of relationship, and assuming that they are basically
contradictory. It fails to shed light on the complex
interrelationship that exists between the two factors.
1
Epstein (1958:240). As Little points out, (1974:
47) this view of 'class* did not involve the existence of
"corporately acting groups".
c
However, the very last sentence of Epstein's
book does note that the interplay between the two factors
poses "important problems for further research in the
field of African urbanism".
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It is too simple to argue that 'class' outweighs tribe tn
the political arena; or to argue that ethnicity is only a
consequence of socio-economic differentiation. In the
former we still have to explain why, statistically
speaking, certain ethnic groups become dominant. In the
latter we must take into account the effect that a wide¬
spread belief in the overwhelming influence of ethnicity
has on political activity, for it may provide very strong
Ideological support for the persistence of the socio¬
economic differentiations on which it is based. For
example, Bemba dominance may emerge as a result of socio¬
economic factors, but, once it has done so, its existence
becomes a further resource in the competition for power.
Thus it seems more appropriate to see socio-economic
status as an intervening variable between tribe and poli-
tical participation. In this way the relationship between
political leadership and ethnic origin becomes an indirect
one, for both are directly related to the same factor -
socio-economic status.
The issue was complicated with the arrival of
independence. Though towns and cities grew rapidly, and
the process of urbanization appeared to accelerate with
the removal of colonial restrictions, the existence of
ethnic cleavages appeared to be even more obvious. The
process by which ethnic relations in the urban situation
were supposed to become increasingly less important




the stated goals of this new independent Zambia, the
exaggerated emergence of ' tribalism* was assumed to be
associated with the conservatism and traditionalism of
certain sectors of the population. Yet the data presented
in this study strongly suggests that the divisions are,
once again, related to socio-economic distinctions that
have arisen in the urban situation, Deaographically, this
ethnic dominance undoubtedly appears but the relationship
is an indirect one which must be seen in terms of an
intervening variable. As s result, it is apparent that
"tribe, in itself, does not make a significant difference.
Rather it is tribal membership, in conjunction with other
variables, which is important,"
Why then has so much emphasis been placed on
♦tribalism* since Zambia's independence? It is difficult
to say, but the most likely factor appears to he that,
ethnic divisions are easily (and universally) observable.
Categories such as 'worker* which can be used to express
socio-economic divisions ai-e hard to apply in the African
situation which is, comparatively speaking, only semi-
industrialised, and where the wage-employment sector is
only one part of the urban economy. Ethnic origin, on the
other hand, is virtually a universal attribute. Socio¬
economic status in the urban situation is not clearly
defined and the "structure of *the stratification system is
2
extremely amorphous*", ' The divisions are often expressed
1
Bates (1970:549)
Schwab quoted in Little (1974:47)
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In terms of highly complex combinations of social and
economic factors. Political expression, on the other
hand, normally needs to be built upon simple categories
and, given the lack of alternatives (particularly now that
racial distinctions have almost been eliminated) and the
approximate coincidence between tribal membership and
socio-economic status, the use of ethnic terminology to
express the divisions within the political structure is
not particularly surprising. The fact that the coincidence
is only approximate is probably responsible for these
ethnic divisions being increasingly framed in terms of
regional categories, or 'alliances of region'.
As Zamblan towns have emerged from nothing, they
have become ethnically heterogeneous to an extent that
never occurred in the pre-urban, pre-colonial era. At
the same time the capitalist system within which these
towns have developed has led to a series of differenti¬
ations based on various social and economic factors.
These two sets of factors by which the urban population
can be differentiated are, and have been, intricately
related. In the competition for the resources available
in the urban situation, which is reflected in the variety
of political institutions that have emerged over the years,
it is inevitable that these two factors should be crucial.
The tentative conclusion here is that despite the apparent
changes in the impact of tribalism, socio-economic status
continues to be the determining variable.
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We have seen that many of the ideas that people
have about Malota cannot be substantiated. It is not a
squatter compound; its population is not primarily
composed of misfits and outcasts; it is not unchanging
or politically conservative. In most cases the reverse
is true. Though we should avoid making the conclusion
that Malota is a desirable place to live, it is apparent
that over the years it has played a crucial role in the
development of Livingstone and has been a very important
factor in the lives of many thousands of migrants. As
the town has grown, the compound has provided that flexi¬
bility which has been needed to cope with many of the
problems associated with rapid urbanization. Not only
has Malota been able to cater for needs not dealt with
elsewhere in the town, but it has allowed quick adapta¬
tions to changes that have occurred at the national level,
which the administration has been unable, or unwilling, to
cope with. The rise of squatter compounds represents the
informal reaction of the populace to changes which the
authorities cannot (or choose not to) deal with. Malota
is, in effect, an official alternative to squatting. In
order for it to exist many rules must be broken and the
administration must constantly turn a blind-eye to certain
activities. But the tenure is legal, a certain element of
official control remains, and the council continues to
collect rents. Meanwhile, the compound provides a legal
(and relatively secure) means by which the migrants who
have flooded into the town can cope with the problems they
encounter in Livingstone. A reflection of just how
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important the compound is can be found in the fact that it
was estimated in 1971 that it would cost K4 million to
resettle the population in new housing. The enormous
cost, together with the technical problems involved,
eventually caused the administration to decide in 1973 to
retain the compound as it was, with an upgrading of the
available facilities. Once again, as has happened so
often over the years, Malota has avoided demolition.
Needless to say, the compound will continue to be
surrounded with a variety of myths about its population
because the fact that it is so crucial only serves to
highlight, in a most dramatic manner, the inability of
the administration at the local and national levels to
cope with rapid urban change.
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APPENDIX 1
Livingstone Town Clerk's Office: Draft Memorandum 10/5/1970*
To; His Honour, The Vice-President of Zambia.
The Council has been concerned for some time at the
growth of Malota compound, which is an area very close to
the centre of Livingstone. Due to the size of the problem
which has to be solved a great deal of time has been
wasted, for, on the one hand, the Council has wanted to
act, and on the other has lacked the resources. But Malota
continues to grow and the Council have now realised that
even though this problem Is too big to tackle now, and
has been too big for some time now, it is going to be
an even bigger problem If weeks, months, and years continue
to slip by.
Therefore at their specially convened meeting on
9/5/1970, attended also by the Minister for Rural Develop¬
ment, Minister of State, Cabinet Minister for Southern
Province, District Governor, Council Education Officer and
Provincial Medical Officer the following resolution was
passed:
"That a petition be presented to His Honour the Vice-
President of the Republic of Zambia, S. Kapepwe,
Minister of Provincial and Local Government, request¬
ing, in the most urgent possible terms that in order
to deal effectively and quickly into the Malota
Compound,(sic) in which area thousands of persons are
living in terrible heart breaking conditions, the area
be declared a * disaster area' and that as a consequence
the Government make available all resources, financial
or otherwise, to deal with the area in the manner in
which disaster areas are usually dealt with, in view
of the inadequate resources the Livingstone Council
have to tackle this problem, and further that his
Worship the Mayor, the Minister of Rural Development
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and the Town Clerk be authorised to present the
Council's case for this request to his Honour the
Vice-President.M
Your Honour, it has already been mentioned that
the problem of Malota has occupied the Council's mind
for some considerable time. At almost every meeting of
the Project Management Team, which meets regularly at the
District Governor's office, ways and means of dealing with
Malota have been discussed. No really practical and yet
quick solutions have been found. The short term solutions
are impractical e.g. lack of resources. The practical
solutions are too slow e.g. gradual demolition.
Your Honour visited Malota on his tour of Living¬
stone in early March this year, we feel confident that in
view of what you saw you would never suggest a long term
solution to this problem. The heart breaking sight of
houses crowded so close together, of lack of privacy, of
lack of the basic facilities which enable a person to
live with some human dignity, the sight of these things
demands urgent, immediate action. It needs no psychiatrist
to tell us the effect living in these conditions will
produce on the residents, in the child who is set on the
road to crime and delinquency through poverty and sub¬
standard living? the adolescent who turns to crime and
prostitution as a means of obtaining a pleasant living to
escape these conditions! the adult who looses faith in
himself and his country through his degradation, the old
person who almost awaits death as a friend, as a release
from this pitiable existence. Each and everyone of these
residents suffers each and every day, every minute of every
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hour, the misery of his environment, which he cannot help,
or from which there appears to be no escape. We say "each
and every one" but how many are there? The dreadful
situation is that one knows not how many. Figures
ranging from 6,000-10,000 have been mentioned and a
figure of 4,000 children. Every unit in these figures
represents a person in despair. Every unit represents
a person depending upon the Council or the Government to
take some action to release their misery. It is so easy
to mention 6,000, 7,000, 8,000, 9,000. It is so simple
to see figures and numbers as figures and numbers instead
of seeing the individual people they represent. Imagine
Your Honour Just the 4,000 children we have mentioned,
4,000 young lives being stunted and destroyed before
their characters, abilities and talents have had a chance
to bloom. A * crop* of the most valuable of Zambia*s
assets - its young people - destroyed Just as certainly
as the crops in the field are destroyed by the locusts.
Your Honour the conditions In Malota are indes¬
cribable. Non-existent roads; open sewers, and refuse
and garbage everywhere; plots designed for one house
having seven or eight on them; flies and dirt all around.
In short a scene repugnant to everyone who respects the
rights of every person to a decent standard of living,
and the right of every man to live in some semblance of
dignity. But Your Honour we have not stressed the
physical situation, appalling as it is. We have rather,
as humanists should do, tried to draw a picture briefly,
yet accurately, factually but not emotionally, though
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emotions are roused, of the conditions in Kalota and we
hope that you will be able to see your way to giving to
those people the solution, urgently needed and which can
only be provided by declaring this area a disaster area*.
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